Datto Outage History

Started Sep 16, 2026, 09:06 AM UTC· resolved Sep 16, 2026, 03:20 PM UTC

1. identified Sep 16, 2026, 09:06 AM UTC

   We are currently experiencing a partial service disruption affecting some KaseyaOne and Kaseya Store functionality. Customers may experience issues when viewing or managing Subscriptions and when accessing the Professional Services page. This disruption is related to an ongoing global Salesforce service disruption. Our Engineering team is actively monitoring the situation and its impact on KaseyaOne and Kaseya Store services. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available. Thank you for your patience and understanding.

2. identified Sep 16, 2026, 10:31 AM UTC

   We continue to monitor the status of the Salesforce service disruption and its effects on our services. The Kaseya Store appears to have recovered, however, some KaseyaOne functionalities are still impacted by the issue.

3. monitoring Sep 16, 2026, 01:02 PM UTC

   The Engineering team confirmed that we no longer see issues related to either KaseyaOne or Kaseya Store functionality; both services are healthy now. We continue to monitor the situation to ensure we promptly detect and advise of any regressions, should they occur, while the Salesforce Service Status is not marked as fully resolved.

4. resolved Sep 16, 2026, 03:20 PM UTC

   After continued monitoring, KaseyaOne and Kaseya Store services have remained healthy. This issue is resolved.

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Started Sep 15, 2026, 01:02 PM UTC· resolved Sep 15, 2026, 03:38 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 01:02 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where Datto BCDR users paired to Server3188 in the Canada region are experiencing degraded offsite capabilities. The Kaseya Engineering Team is currently investigating the issue and working towards a resolution. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. resolved Sep 15, 2026, 03:38 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 14, 2026, 04:53 PM UTC· resolved Sep 14, 2026, 07:58 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 14, 2026, 04:53 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where Spanning customers hosted in the CA and AP regions are currently unable to login to their accounts. The Kaseya Engineering Team is currently investigating this issue. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. monitoring Sep 14, 2026, 06:34 PM UTC

   Following the identification of issues affecting customer account access in the Canada and Asia-Pacific regions, further investigation determined that customers in the US region were also impacted. A fix has been deployed, and full access to Spanning accounts has been restored across all affected regions. Our R&D team is monitoring for any other issues.

3. resolved Sep 14, 2026, 07:58 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 14, 2026, 03:05 PM UTC· resolved Sep 14, 2026, 06:47 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 14, 2026, 03:05 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where US-based users are currently unable to authenticate to US-hosted cells. The Kaseya R&D Team is currently investigating the issue and working towards a resolution. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. monitoring Sep 14, 2026, 03:20 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. resolved Sep 14, 2026, 06:47 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 14, 2026, 12:56 PM UTC· resolved Sep 14, 2026, 02:03 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 14, 2026, 12:56 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where Datto Networking users are currently unable to create Fabric Tunnels through Network Manager. The Kaseya Engineering Team is currently investigating the issue. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. resolved Sep 14, 2026, 02:03 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 14, 2026, 12:46 PM UTC· resolved Sep 14, 2026, 05:53 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 14, 2026, 12:46 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where Datto SaaS Protection Partners are unable to access their customer accounts due to the SaaS Protection Status Page within the Datto Partner Portal not loading customer details. The Kaseya Engineering Team is actively investigating this issue. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. investigating Sep 14, 2026, 02:30 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. monitoring Sep 14, 2026, 02:51 PM UTC

   Our R&D team has identified the issue and have deployed configuration changes to allow the SaaS Protection Status Page within the Datto Partner Portal to load customer details again as well as restore customer account access for all affected partners. The team is closely monitoring the results of the changes made.

4. monitoring Sep 14, 2026, 04:40 PM UTC

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

5. resolved Sep 14, 2026, 05:53 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 14, 2026, 09:21 AM UTC· resolved Sep 14, 2026, 11:57 AM UTC

1. identified Sep 14, 2026, 09:21 AM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where the inbound email parser is not creating items in the target Autotask PSA database on the DE1 and EU1 zones. The Kaseya Engineering Team is working on resolving the issue. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. monitoring Sep 14, 2026, 10:40 AM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. monitoring Sep 14, 2026, 11:23 AM UTC

   The system is currently working through items that queued up during this issue, therefore incoming email processing may still be delayed.

4. resolved Sep 14, 2026, 11:57 AM UTC

   The system finished processing the remaining items in the queue, and the Incoming Email Processing is currently creating designated items in real time. This incident is resolved.

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Started Sep 10, 2026, 09:38 AM UTC· resolved Sep 23, 2026, 03:08 PM UTC

1. monitoring Sep 10, 2026, 09:38 AM UTC

   The Kaseya R&D Team responded to alerts related to the eu.rocketcyber.com site. The incident lasted for about 30 minutes during which Rocketcyber customers hosted in the EU region were not able to access the product. The issue is now resolved, and we are currently monitoring the health of the service.

2. resolved Sep 23, 2026, 03:08 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

3. postmortem Sep 23, 2026, 03:19 PM UTC

   ` `**Public RCA: RocketCyber EU Production Service Interruption** **Incident Summary** On September 10, 2026, RocketCyber customers hosted in the EU region experienced service disruptions that prevented access to the RocketCyber console and caused intermittent failures in related platform services. The incident resulted in users receiving error messages when attempting to access the platform. Service was fully restored shortly after the event. We recognize the impact this disruption had on our partners and customers and apologize for the inconvenience. **Impact** **Affected Service:** RocketCyber EU Production Environment` ` **Impact Type:** Service Interruption` ` **Affected Users:** Customers utilizing the EU-hosted RocketCyber platform` ` **Duration:** Approximately 33 minutes for the primary console service disruption, with some dependent services recovering shortly thereafter. During the incident: * Users were unable to reliably access the RocketCyber console. * Some backend services experienced failures when processing requests. * Customers encountered server error messages while attempting to use the platform. **Timeline \(UTC\)** Timeline derived from the incident review. **Root Cause** The incident was caused by abnormal growth of certain database logging tables. Over time, these tables expanded significantly and exceeded operational thresholds. As the database attempted to protect itself and maintain data integrity, write operations became restricted and intensive maintenance processes consumed available database resources. This resource contention affected several dependent services, resulting in widespread application errors. As those services became unavailable, request traffic shifted to other platform components, creating additional load that ultimately impacted console availability. No customer data was lost or compromised during this event. The issue was related to system capacity and database maintenance processes rather than a security incident. **Resolution** The platform recovered as database maintenance activities completed and resource utilization returned to normal operating levels. Following service restoration, engineering teams continued monitoring platform health and performed additional analysis to validate system stability. **Preventive Actions** To reduce the likelihood of similar incidents, RocketCyber has implemented and is pursuing the following improvements: 1. Reduced unnecessary logging activity that contributed to excessive database table growth. 1. Reviewing and enhancing database growth monitoring and alerting to provide earlier visibility into capacity-related risks. 1. Evaluating additional traffic management and rate-limiting mechanisms to help prevent cascading impacts during service degradation events. 1. Developing operational guidance and runbooks to improve response efficiency for similar database-related incidents. **Current Status** All RocketCyber services are operating normally. Engineering teams have implemented immediate corrective measures and continue to strengthen monitoring and resilience controls to prevent recurrence. We appreciate your patience and understanding while this issue was being addressed.

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Started Sep 09, 2026, 12:51 PM UTC· resolved Sep 29, 2026, 07:45 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 09, 2026, 12:51 PM UTC

   We are experiencing service disruption on PHILKAS01 Server, which may impact administrators ability to manage endpoints. We are aware of the issue, and our team is actively working to resolve the same. We apologize for any inconvenience. - Kaseya Cloud Operations Team

2. monitoring Sep 09, 2026, 04:06 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. identified Sep 09, 2026, 05:04 PM UTC

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

4. monitoring Sep 09, 2026, 08:17 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

5. monitoring Sep 09, 2026, 11:23 PM UTC

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

6. monitoring Sep 14, 2026, 01:47 PM UTC

   We are experiencing service disruption on PHILKAS01 Server, which may impact administrators ability to manage endpoints. We are aware of the issue, and our team is actively working to resolve the same. We apologize for any inconvenience. - Kaseya Cloud Operations Team

7. resolved Sep 29, 2026, 07:45 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 08, 2026, 07:43 PM UTC· resolved Sep 09, 2026, 12:54 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 08, 2026, 07:43 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where Datto BCDR users paired to Server5465 can experience degraded offsite performance. The Kaseya Engineering Team is investigating the issue and working towards a resolution. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. monitoring Sep 08, 2026, 08:11 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. resolved Sep 09, 2026, 12:54 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 08, 2026, 07:10 PM UTC· resolved Sep 17, 2026, 02:30 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 08, 2026, 07:10 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where Datto BCDR users paired to Server2214 can experienced degraded offsite performance. The Kaseya Engineering Team is investigating the issue and working towards a resolution. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. identified Sep 09, 2026, 12:54 PM UTC

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. resolved Sep 17, 2026, 02:30 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 04, 2026, 12:43 PM UTC· resolved Sep 04, 2026, 07:40 PM UTC

1. identified Sep 04, 2026, 12:43 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where users on UK01 and UK02 who use Outlook as their email service are not having their Emails be sent and received. The Kaseya Engineering Team have identified the issue and are working with Microsoft to resolve it. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. resolved Sep 04, 2026, 07:40 PM UTC

   Microsoft has fixed the issue with receiving email from external domains. We have verified that emails are now getting processed without issue. This incident is resolved.

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Started Sep 03, 2026, 07:20 PM UTC· resolved Sep 04, 2026, 02:06 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 07:20 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where Datto Endpoint Backup for PC users hosted on Cloud Siris 299242 may experience degraded backup and recovery performance.. The Kaseya Engineering Team is investigating the issue and working towards a resolution. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. monitoring Sep 04, 2026, 12:11 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. resolved Sep 04, 2026, 02:06 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 02, 2026, 09:11 PM UTC· resolved Sep 02, 2026, 11:17 PM UTC

1. identified Sep 02, 2026, 09:11 PM UTC

   We're aware of an issue preventing Secure Edge administrators from viewing recent usage information within Datto Network Manager. We've identified the root cause of the issue. Queued data has resumed processing and we're expecting metrics to become available again within a few hours. We will update this post as we continue to monitor and work through the issue. Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. resolved Sep 02, 2026, 11:17 PM UTC

   The issue preventing Secure Edge administrators from viewing recent usage information within Datto Network Manager has been resolved. Queued data has finished processing, and usage metrics are now available as expected. We appreciate your patience while we worked through this issue. Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up to date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

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Started Sep 02, 2026, 08:33 PM UTC· resolved Sep 11, 2026, 03:06 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 02, 2026, 08:33 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where some customers hosted on pod 'aue1-saas-p0' are currently experiencing degraded backup performance for Exchange services. The Kaseya Engineering Team is actively investigating. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. identified Sep 02, 2026, 08:56 PM UTC

   Our R&D team has identified the issue and have started deploying changes to mitigate the Exchange backup performance issues for customers hosted on pod 'aue1-saas-p0'

3. identified Sep 03, 2026, 01:40 PM UTC

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

4. identified Sep 03, 2026, 07:31 PM UTC

   Following the recent changes deployed by our R&D team, we are seeing improvements in Exchange backup success rates for customers hosted on pod 'aue1-saas-p0'. Our team remains actively engaged and continues to work on further improvements while closely monitoring the environment.

5. monitoring Sep 04, 2026, 04:47 PM UTC

   Following additional changes deployed by our R&D team, we are seeing continued improvement in Exchange backup success rates for customers hosted on pod 'aue1-saas-p0'. Our team is closely monitoring the environment as backup processing and success rates continue to recover.

6. resolved Sep 11, 2026, 03:06 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 02, 2026, 10:10 AM UTC· resolved Sep 08, 2026, 04:26 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 02, 2026, 10:10 AM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where Cloud Virtualizations are hindered for some of our partners due to not being able to change power states on virtual machines in Datto BCDR. The Kaseya Engineering Team is investigating the issue. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. investigating Sep 02, 2026, 11:27 AM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. investigating Sep 02, 2026, 12:32 PM UTC

   The Kaseya Systems Engineering Team is continuing to investigate the issue.

4. identified Sep 02, 2026, 01:10 PM UTC

   The Kaseya Systems Engineering Team identified the issue and they are working on resolving the problem.

5. identified Sep 03, 2026, 02:42 PM UTC

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

6. identified Sep 03, 2026, 02:51 PM UTC

   The remediation has been identified and is currently being deployed to the affected nodes in a phased rollout to ensure a controlled and efficient resolution.

7. identified Sep 04, 2026, 02:19 PM UTC

   The majority of BCDR servers have been successfully restored and are operating normally. A limited number of servers remain under remediation, and Engineering teams are actively working to complete recovery efforts and return all impacted systems to full operational status.

8. monitoring Sep 04, 2026, 06:44 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

9. resolved Sep 08, 2026, 04:26 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 02, 2026, 06:00 AM UTC· resolved Sep 02, 2026, 10:11 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 02, 2026, 06:00 AM UTC

   We are aware of an issue where customers are encountering 500 errors while accessing Backup & RMM products within the Datto Partner Portal (DPP). The Kaseya R&D Team is investigating the issue. Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. monitoring Sep 02, 2026, 07:30 AM UTC

   We are pleased to inform you that the recent service incident experienced by our BCDR AND DRMM partners where users experienced difficulties logging into the Datto Partner Portal has now been successfully resolved. We understand the impact that such problems can have on your business operations, and we sincerely apologize for any inconvenience caused during this time. Our team has been diligently working to identify the root cause of the problem. Our goal is to not only address the immediate concern but also to minimize the risk of similar incidents in the future. By analyzing the underlying factors, we aim to enhance our systems and processes, ensuring a more robust and reliable experience for all our partners. Thank you for your patience and understanding. We remain committed to delivering exceptional service and continuous improvement.

3. monitoring Sep 02, 2026, 08:40 AM UTC

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

4. resolved Sep 02, 2026, 10:11 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

5. postmortem Sep 24, 2026, 01:06 PM UTC

   **Datto Partner Portal - Login Errors Affecting Partner Portal Users – 2026-09-02** **Summary:** Between **2026-09-02 06:30 AM UTC** and **2026-09-02 07:54 AM UTC**, **Datto Partner Portal** customers received HTTP 500 errors during authentication when logging into the Datto Partner Portal. **Root Cause:** A subset of users experienced login-related service disruptions resulting from storage capacity constraints within the production environment. As available storage resources became exhausted, authentication services were unable to process requests reliably, leading to an increase in login failures and degraded access to the platform. The issue was isolated to the affected production infrastructure, and remediation efforts were initiated to restore service stability and prevent recurrence. **Incident Timeline:** * Identified: **2026-09-02 06:30 AM UTC** * Public Notification: **2026-09-02 07:00 AM UTC** * Resolved: **2026-09-02 07:54 AM UTC** **Preventative Measures:** To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future, we are taking the following steps. * Modernize production storage capacity to align with current operational demands. Increase available storage resources and implement dedicated allocation for log retention to prevent routine growth from impacting service availability and overall system stability. * Strengthen operational monitoring through proactive capacity and service performance alerting.

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Started Sep 01, 2026, 09:49 PM UTC· resolved Sep 02, 2026, 04:51 PM UTC

1. monitoring Sep 01, 2026, 09:49 PM UTC

   A recent degradation with Intuit's QuickBooks Online has been reported by Intuit. This is currently affecting API calls which may result in sync failures causing delays in data syncing to and from QBO and ConnectBooster. Our team is currently monitoring the status of this from Intuit's Status Page which can be found here: https://status.developer.intuit.com/ At this time, a valid workaround is not available, and we recommend that you subscribe to Intuit's Status Page for immediate updates. Our team will continue to provide status updates as they are received to the status page. Thank you,

2. monitoring Sep 02, 2026, 03:00 AM UTC

   Intuit has updated their status page stating that this is a Major Outage within the Intuit system. They are still investigating the issue. This is currently affecting API calls resulting in sync failures causing delays in data syncing to and from QBO and ConnectBooster. Our team is continuing to monitor the status of this from Intuit's Status Page which can be found here: https://status.developer.intuit.com/ At this time, a valid workaround is not available, and we recommend that you subscribe to Intuit's Status Page for immediate updates. Our team will continue to provide status updates as they are received to the status page

3. monitoring Sep 02, 2026, 12:52 PM UTC

   Intuit has reported that API functionality has returned, and calls should be completing as expected. Our internal teams have confirmed that syncs are running now running as expected. We advise Partners to compare data between ConnectBooster, and QuickBooks Online to ensure the data is up to date, and if not, to set their sync date back to 9/1/2026 - 1pm which was prior to the outage being reported by Intuit and allow for an accounting package sync to take place. Thank you,

4. resolved Sep 02, 2026, 04:51 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 01, 2026, 12:13 PM UTC· resolved Sep 01, 2026, 01:27 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 12:13 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where the Datto SaaS Protection Status Page is not loading details for some of our users. The Kaseya Engineering Team is currently investigating the issue. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. monitoring Sep 01, 2026, 12:52 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 01:27 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 01, 2026, 11:37 AM UTC· resolved Sep 01, 2026, 03:56 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 11:37 AM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where users are unable to access the Vidal platform The Kaseya Engineering Team is actively investigating and we will provide updates as more information becomes available. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. monitoring Sep 01, 2026, 12:35 PM UTC

   The Kaseya Engineering Team has issued a fix. Service has been restored, and we are monitoring the environment to ensure continued stability.

3. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 03:56 PM UTC

   The issue affecting access to the Datto RMM Vidal platform has been resolved.

4. postmortem Oct 20, 2026, 01:41 PM UTC

   **Root Cause Analysis: Vidal Platform Access Issues from East US Locations** **Summary** On September 1, 2026, between 10:00 UTC and 12:35 UTC, some customers accessing the Vidal platform from East US locations were unable to access the service. The issue was detected at 10:00 UTC following customer reports and internal observations. Service accessibility was restored after the affected cached content was invalidated. **Root Cause** The issue occurred during a platform deployment when requests were temporarily distributed between the previous and newly deployed application versions. Under certain conditions, the application attempted to retrieve a web asset that was not available in the version handling the request. The resulting response was then stored in cache, preventing affected users from successfully loading the Vidal platform. **Incident Timeline** * **Identified:** September 1, 2026, at 10:00 UTC * **Public notification:** September 1, 2026, at 11:37 UTC * **Resolved:** September 1, 2026, at 12:35 UTC **Preventative Measures** To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future, we are taking the following steps: * **Enhancements to Application Response Handling:** We have updated the application to return an appropriate response when a requested web asset is unavailable, preventing an incorrect response from being cached. This corrective change has been completed. * **Enhancements to Cache Management:** We have refined our current process on how unavailable application assets are handled so that missing content is not stored in the cache and subsequently returned to users. * **Enhancements to Post-Deployment Validation:** Further strengthen our current post-deployment validation to verify platform accessibility from multiple network paths and locations immediately following a deployment. * **Enhancements to Monitoring and Alerting:** Expand the existing monitoring to identify platform accessibility issues quicker. * **Enhancements to Incident Response:** Enhance current documentation to include additional relevant post-deployment symptoms, potential causes, and validated remediation steps to support faster diagnosis and recovery if similar behavior is observed.

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Started Aug 31, 2026, 04:01 PM UTC· resolved Aug 31, 2026, 05:34 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 31, 2026, 04:01 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where Datto Workplace users in the U.S. region hosted on Cells 1, 6, and 15 may experience intermittent service connectivity disruptions, resulting in degraded access to Workplace services. The Kaseya Engineering Team is investigating this issue and working towards a resolution. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. monitoring Aug 31, 2026, 04:12 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. resolved Aug 31, 2026, 05:34 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 28, 2026, 05:13 PM UTC· resolved Aug 28, 2026, 06:23 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 28, 2026, 05:13 PM UTC

   We are experiencing service disruption on EU - VSA114 Server, which may impact administrators ability to manage endpoints. We are aware of the issue, and our team is actively working to resolve the same. We apologize for any inconvenience. - Kaseya Cloud Operations Team

2. investigating Aug 28, 2026, 05:16 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. resolved Aug 28, 2026, 06:23 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 28, 2026, 10:30 AM UTC· resolved Aug 31, 2026, 01:40 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 28, 2026, 10:30 AM UTC

   We are investigating an issue affecting status reporting between Datto RMM, Datto EDR, and Datto AV. Some devices may generate alerts in Datto RMM reporting that Datto EDR or Datto AV is not detected. Datto EDR and Datto AV remain installed and are operating normally on affected endpoints. This issue is limited to how their status is communicated to and displayed within Datto RMM and does not indicate a loss of endpoint protection. Our Engineering teams are investigating this issue with high priority. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. identified Aug 28, 2026, 12:59 PM UTC

   We have identified an issue affecting status reporting between Datto EDR, Datto AV, and Datto RMM. As a result, some devices may incorrectly generate alerts in Datto RMM indicating that Datto EDR requires attention or that Datto AV is not installed. Our investigation has confirmed that Datto EDR and Datto AV remain installed and functioning properly on affected endpoints. Endpoint protection services continue to operate as expected. The issue is limited to the status information being reported and displayed within Datto RMM and does not indicate a loss of protection or a failure of the Datto EDR or Datto AV products. Engineering teams have identified the underlying cause and are actively working on a resolution. We will continue to provide updates as additional information becomes available. If you have questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

3. monitoring Aug 28, 2026, 08:33 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. resolved Aug 31, 2026, 01:40 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 27, 2026, 02:52 PM UTC· resolved Aug 31, 2026, 08:11 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 02:52 PM UTC

   We are aware of a problem where some customers hosted on pod 'use1-saas-p7' are currently experiencing degraded backup performance for Exchange services. The Kaseya Engineering Team is actively investigating. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 05:38 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. identified Aug 28, 2026, 12:40 PM UTC

   Our R&D team has identified an issue causing the degraded backup performance for Exchange services on pod 'use1-saas-p7'. Configuration changes have been implemented to help mitigate the issue and additional changes are being prepared for deployment to further address Exchange backup performance.

4. identified Aug 28, 2026, 01:49 PM UTC

   Our R&D team has deployed additional changes to further address the issue and Exchange backup performance on pod 'use1-saas-p7' is improving.

5. monitoring Aug 28, 2026, 05:18 PM UTC

   Backup success rates for Exchange services on pod 'use1-saas-p7' continue to improve. Additional changes have been applied to further address the Exchange backup performance issue and our R&D team is closely monitoring the results.

6. monitoring Aug 28, 2026, 08:30 PM UTC

   Backup success rates for Exchange services on pod 'use1-saas-p7' continue to improve following the changes that have been implemented. Our R&D team continues to closely monitor system performance and backup outcomes to ensure the positive trend is maintained.

7. monitoring Aug 31, 2026, 01:27 PM UTC

   Backup success rate metrics for Exchange services on pod 'use1-saas-p7' have returned to normal levels and remain stable. Our R&D team is continuing to monitor for any other issues.

8. resolved Aug 31, 2026, 08:11 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 27, 2026, 12:39 PM UTC· resolved Sep 03, 2026, 03:28 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 12:39 PM UTC

   We're seeing a spike in alerts for this rule caused by a recent change in Microsoft's default behavior. This is not indicative of active threats. A rule update is expected today. In the meantime, you can temporarily disable the rule under Policies → Detections → "Possible Shim Database Persistence via sdbinst.exe" to reduce noise until the fix is deployed. Should you need any additional questions or require assistance, please contact our support team at https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb#/contact Subscribe to the Kaseya Status Page for up-to-date information at https://status.kaseya.com/

2. monitoring Aug 27, 2026, 01:31 PM UTC

   Microsoft's Program Compatibility Assistant (PCA) uses sdbinst.exe to manage application compatibility databases as part of routine Windows maintenance. The August Windows update introduced known gaming compatibility issues, and Microsoft's remediation of those issues triggered sdbinst.exe activity across affected endpoints simultaneously — matching the spike pattern we observed. The affected rule has been updated as of 9:15 AM EST and pushed to all tenants. Alert volumes should return to expected levels. If you disabled the rule as a temporary measure, it is safe to re-enable it under Policies → Detections → "Possible Shim Database Persistence via sdbinst.exe".

3. resolved Sep 03, 2026, 03:28 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

4. postmortem Sep 08, 2026, 09:21 PM UTC

   **Datto EDR - Mass Detection on Windows Behavior – 2026-08-27** **Summary** Between **2026-08-27 08:00 UTC** and **2026-08-27 16:00 UTC**, Datto EDR customers experienced an elevated volume of detections generated by the **Possible Shim Database Persistence via sdbinst.exe** detection rule. The increase in alerts created additional operational overhead for customers and analysts reviewing alerts. No service outage occurred, and endpoint protection functionality remained operational throughout the event. The issue was resolved after the detection rule was updated to account for a newly observed legitimate Windows operating system behavior. **Root Cause** A legitimate Microsoft Windows behavior involving **sdbinst.exe** and the file path **C:\\Windows\\appcompat\\cloudsdb\\apppatch.sdb** was not covered by the existing exclusions within a Datto EDR detection rule. A change in Microsoft's behavior matched the criteria of the rule **Possible Shim Database Persistence via sdbinst.exe**, resulting in a higher-than-expected volume of detections. The rule logic was updated to properly account for the newly observed behavior and eliminate the unintended detections. **Incident Timeline** * **Identified:** 2026-08-27 08:00 UTC \(customer reports and alert volume increase identified\) * **Public Notification:** 2026-08-27 11:00 UTC \(incident escalated to Product and Detection Engineering teams and communications initiated\) * **Resolved:** 2026-08-27 16:00 UTC \(updated rule deployed and alert volume returned to expected levels\) **Preventative Measures** To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future, we are implementing the following improvements: **Enhancements to Monitoring and Alerting** * Implement monitoring and baselining for individual detection rules to identify abnormal spikes in alert volume more rapidly. * Develop internal metrics that provide visibility into detection trends and anomalous rule behavior before large-scale customer impact occurs. **Enhancements to Incident Management and Response** * Improve escalation workflows for significant detection-volume increases to ensure appropriate engineering resources are engaged as quickly as possible. * Continue refining response procedures for detection-rule tuning and validation when unexpected platform or operating system behavior changes are observed. **Detection Content Improvements** * Enhance detection engineering review processes to account for evolving operating system behaviors and newly introduced legitimate execution patterns. * Expand validation and exclusion testing for detection rules where operating system updates may introduce behavior changes that resemble suspicious activity. **Customer Impact** * Product Affected: **Datto EDR** * Impact Type: **Increased detection volume / mass alerts** * Service Availability: **No outage** * Security Protection Status: **Protection remained active and operational** * Customer Impact: Customers experienced increased alert volume requiring additional review and operational effort. This incident has been fully resolved, and Datto EDR continues to operate normally.

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