Datto Outage History

**Summary:** Between 2026-04-20 14:15 UTC and 2026-04-20 14:39 UTC, some US and UK customers could not access their BMS portals due to a timeout error. **Root Cause:** An unexpected infrastructure event caused a subset of backend systems supporting the BMS portal to become temporarily unavailable. This resulted in timeout errors for some users in the US and UK while accessing the service. **Incident Timeline:** * Identified: 2026-04-20 14:20 UTC * Resolved: 2026-04-20 14:39 UTC * Backfill post to the Status Page: 2026-04-20 15:14 UTC **Preventative Measures:** To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future, we are taking the following steps: **Strengthened Change Management:** * Additional validation steps will be required to confirm maintenance timing and scope before any changes that could affect production systems. **Improved Monitoring and Alerting:** * Expanded monitoring to more quickly detect unexpected system restarts or availability issues. * Enhanced alerts to ensure faster awareness and response when critical systems are impacted. **Operational Readiness Improvements:** * Updated internal procedures and runbooks to support faster recovery during infrastructure-related incidents. * Regular reviews of incident response practices to ensure teams are prepared to handle similar scenarios efficiently.

**Summary:** Between 2026-04-14 14:50 UTC and 2026-04-14 16:20 UTC, some customers experienced a “Server Error” while working with quotes. ‌ **Root Cause:** A recent configuration change led to unintended restrictions that interfered with normal request processing, resulting in intermittent errors for some customers. ‌ **Incident Timeline:** * Identified: 2026-04-14 14:55 UTC * Public Notification to the Status Page: 2026-04-14 15:27 UTC * Resolved: 2026-04-14 16:20 UTC ‌ **Preventative Measures:** To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future, we are taking the following steps: * Improving system monitoring and alerting to more quickly detect abnormal traffic patterns and service disruptions. * Refining our change management practices to further validate configuration updates before they are fully applied in production environments.

**Summary**: Between 2026-04-09T 22:15 UTC and 2026-04-10T 02:25 UTC, a small percentage of KQM customers experienced repeated gateway errors, slow loading across all pages, unexpected session expirations, and inability to save updates to quotes. **Root Cause**: This issue was caused by an unexpected spike in traffic into Kaseya Quote Manager **Incident Timeline**: * Impact start time: 2026-04-09T 22:15 UTC * Identified: 2026-04-10T 01:15 UTC * Public Notification to the Status Page: 2026-04-10T 02:12 UTC * Resolved: 2026-04-10T 02:25 UTC **What we’re doing about it**: * Faster detection: Enhancements to monitoring and alerting so issues like this are caught sooner. * Infrastructure resilience: Platform-level changes to ensure future unexpected traffic spikes do not impact the broader platform.

**DBMA/EBDR - Device failing to register – 2026-04-09** **Summary:** Between 2026-04-09 11:00 AM UTC and 2026-04-10 12:30 PM UTC, Some partners experienced an issue where a subset of Datto Backup for Microsoft Azure and Datto Endpoint Backup with DR devices experienced registration failures. ‌ **Root Cause:** The issue was caused by a release configuration error in which a required system image was not properly marked for production use. As a result, the platform was unable to successfully create operating system disks when provisioning new virtual machines. ‌ **Incident Timeline:** * Identified: 2026-04-09 11:00 AM UTC * Public Notification: 2026-04-09 06:00 PM UTC * Resolved: 2026-04-10 12:30 PM UTC ‌ **Preventative Measures:** To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future, we are taking the following steps: * To strengthen reliability going forward, we are introducing additional pre‑release validation steps * Enhancing real‑time monitoring and alerting around provisioning success * Conducting targeted training to improve rapid diagnosis and resolution of similar issues.

**BCDR - RLY Connections slow or failing - 2026-04-07** **Summary:** Between 2026-04-07 04:37 PM UTC and 2026-04-09 07:48 PM UTC, Some customers experienced intermittent performance degradation when accessing a device’s remote web interface. **Root Cause:** The incident was caused by a backend database table growing without limits alongside an inefficient background query that scanned the entire dataset. Over time, this placed a sustained load on the database. When a brief infrastructure disruption reduced capacity, the system could not recover quickly enough, leading to cascading database failures.` ` ‌ **Incident Timeline:** Add any major milestones we should disclose publicly * Identified: 2026-04-07 04:37 PM UTC * Public Notification to the Status Page: 2026-04-08 06:16 PM UTC * Resolved: 2026-04-09 07:48 PM UTC **Preventative Measures:** ` ` To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future, we are taking the following steps: * To prevent a recurrence, we removed outdated and unnecessary historical records from the affected database, significantly reducing its size. * Implemented automatic data expiration for new records, ensuring the table remains within healthy bounds and does not grow unchecked in the future.