IONOS Cloud Outage History

Started Nov 07, 2026, 10:21 AM UTC· resolved Nov 09, 2026, 10:32 AM UTC

1. identified Nov 07, 2026, 10:21 AM UTC

   We are currently experiencing intermittent issues with our phone availability, which may prevent our agents from connecting to incoming calls. We are actively working to resolve this as soon as possible. If you are unable to reach the team by phone, please open a ticket via email or the DCD Support form.

2. resolved Nov 09, 2026, 10:32 AM UTC

   The technical issue has been resolved.

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Started Oct 30, 2026, 09:45 AM UTC· resolved Nov 02, 2026, 03:49 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 09:45 AM UTC

   We are currently experiencing DNS resolution issues affecting access to multiple Cloud services. Existing workloads and running virtual machines are not affected. We are working with the responsible team to resolve the issue as quickly as possible and will provide an update shortly.

2. monitoring Oct 30, 2026, 09:55 AM UTC

   The DNS resolution issue has been resolved. All Cloud services are recovering. We are monitoring to confirm full restoration across all affected components.

3. resolved Nov 02, 2026, 03:49 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Oct 27, 2026, 08:54 AM UTC· resolved Oct 27, 2026, 10:58 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 27, 2026, 08:54 AM UTC

   Currently, there is an increased processing time for provisioning orders that are initiated via Data Center Designer or API. Occasionally, connections may be lost in the direction of the Data Center Designer. Availability and accessibility of your virtual data center resources will remain unaffected. We will inform you as soon as the functionality has been restored.

2. resolved Oct 27, 2026, 10:58 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Oct 23, 2026, 10:44 AM UTC· resolved Oct 25, 2026, 06:45 PM UTC

1. identified Oct 23, 2026, 10:44 AM UTC

   We are rolling out a security update across our Compute infrastructure to address CVE-2026-99999. A runtime mitigation has already been applied to a large portion of our fleet, and we are now deploying the permanent kernel fix across all remaining hosts. The permanent fix is applied via live migration to avoid service disruption. In rare cases, virtual machines that cannot be live-migrated may experience a brief restart.

2. resolved Oct 25, 2026, 06:45 PM UTC

   The security update for CVE-2026-99999 has been applied across our Compute infrastructure. All hosts are now protected. We will continue to monitor for any issues. If you experience any problems, please contact our support team.

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Started Oct 22, 2026, 12:36 PM UTC· resolved Nov 03, 2026, 07:32 AM UTC

1. identified Oct 22, 2026, 12:36 PM UTC

   We are currently experiencing intermittent issues with our phone availability, which may prevent our agents from connecting to incoming calls. We are actively working to resolve this as soon as possible. If you are unable to reach the team by phone, please open a ticket via email or the DCD Support form.

2. identified Oct 30, 2026, 09:57 AM UTC

   We just want to remind our customers of the degraded Support availability via phone, the issue is still ongoing. Please reach out to our team via email. Thank you.

3. resolved Nov 03, 2026, 07:32 AM UTC

   For now, we restored Support phone availability.

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Started Oct 21, 2026, 12:57 PM UTC· resolved Oct 21, 2026, 04:59 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 12:57 PM UTC

   We are currently investigating an issue with our Nextcloud Workspace.

2. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 12:59 PM UTC

   Due to a critical, industry-wide PHP security vulnerability, IONOS has executed an emergency temporary shutdown of all Nextcloud-based services. Services were shut down immediately to protect customer data and infrastructure, and will be restarted as soon as the official PHP patch is available, tested, and fully implemented. We estimate that the service will be available again in the next 2-3 hours.

3. resolved Oct 21, 2026, 04:59 PM UTC

   Our Nextcloud-based services have been restored. As part of resolving the current PHP security vulnerability, we have preventively suspended all administrator accounts on your system that were changed and/or newly created within the last 24 hours. What does this mean for you? - Review required: Please check your system's user management for any unknown or suspicious accounts. - Reactivation: If you created a legitimate administrator account yourself in the last 24 hours that is now suspended, please briefly contact our support team so we can unlock it after verification.

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Started Oct 16, 2026, 01:46 AM UTC· resolved Oct 16, 2026, 08:08 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 16, 2026, 01:46 AM UTC

   We are currently investigating an issue potentially affecting kube-api availability as well as issues when trying to schedule stateful workflows. Customers may experience delays in NodePool scaling and maintenance operations. Our engineering team is actively working to resolve the issue as quickly as possible. We will provide regular updates as new information becomes available.

2. investigating Oct 16, 2026, 01:48 AM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. identified Oct 16, 2026, 02:05 AM UTC

   We have identified the source of the issue. Our Compute and MK8s Team have responded and are working on mitigation. We will keep this status page updated. We aim to publish the next update within 30 mins, or when we can share a significant update.

4. monitoring Oct 16, 2026, 02:22 AM UTC

   Mitigation rollout is completed and all systems are operational again. We are setting this Incident into monitoring state and continue to observe the situation.

5. resolved Oct 16, 2026, 08:08 AM UTC

   System are back running & stable now, this incident is resolved.

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Started Oct 14, 2026, 04:12 PM UTC· resolved Oct 15, 2026, 02:22 PM UTC

1. identified Oct 14, 2026, 04:12 PM UTC

   We are currently experiencing intermittent issues with our phone system, which may prevent our agents from connecting to incoming calls. We are actively working with our vendor to resolve this as quickly as possible. If you are unable to reach the team by phone, please open a ticket via email or the DCD Support form.

2. resolved Oct 15, 2026, 02:22 PM UTC

   The issue has been resolved and phone lines should operate normally again.

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Started Oct 14, 2026, 06:50 AM UTC· resolved Oct 14, 2026, 12:03 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 14, 2026, 06:50 AM UTC

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting persistent volume management (PVC) and node provisioning within Managed Kubernetes clusters. As a result, some workloads may experience prolonged timeouts during volume attachment (AttachVolume timeouts) or delays in NodePool scaling and maintenance operations. Our engineering team is actively working to resolve the issue as quickly as possible. We will provide regular updates as new information becomes available.

2. identified Oct 14, 2026, 07:50 AM UTC

   We have identified the source of the issue. Our Compute and MK8s Team have responded and are working on mitigation. We will keep this status page updated. We aim to publish the next update within 30 mins, or when we can share a significant update.

3. identified Oct 14, 2026, 08:17 AM UTC

   Mitigation is still progressing. We expect completion within next 30-45 minutes.

4. monitoring Oct 14, 2026, 08:48 AM UTC

   Mitigation rollout is almost completed on all hosts. We are setting this Incident into monitoring state and monitor the remaining rollout. Customer impact should be mitigated.

5. resolved Oct 14, 2026, 12:03 PM UTC

   We are marking this incident as resolved and will publish an RCA once it is compiled.

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Started Oct 07, 2026, 08:06 AM UTC· resolved Oct 08, 2026, 06:28 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 08:06 AM UTC

   We are writing to inform you that we have been experiencing sporadic connection issues and substantial delays on packet delivery. Network technicians have started working on the occurrence immediately after detection and will isolate the problem and solve the issue as quick as possible. However, it is possible that there will be a certain degradation in connection quality affecting individual virtual resources. We will inform you as soon as the functionality has been restored.

2. monitoring Oct 07, 2026, 09:21 AM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. resolved Oct 08, 2026, 06:28 AM UTC

   We are marking this incident as resolved, as no further disruptions or degradations were detected after the mitigation was deployed. Our Network Team is currently working on establishing the Root Cause. The result of this investigation will be published here.

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Started Oct 02, 2026, 08:16 PM UTC· resolved Oct 02, 2026, 09:28 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 02, 2026, 08:16 PM UTC

   The DCD is currently unavailable. We are currently investigating this issue and will keep you updated.

2. resolved Oct 02, 2026, 09:28 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Oct 02, 2026, 01:55 PM UTC· resolved Oct 07, 2026, 09:18 AM UTC

1. identified Oct 02, 2026, 01:55 PM UTC

   There may be periods of increased waiting times when calling IONOS Cloud Support by phone. We ask Customers and Partners to contact Cloud Support via the DCD Form or Email, instead. Thank you.

2. resolved Oct 07, 2026, 09:18 AM UTC

   We are marking this note as resolved.

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Started Sep 29, 2026, 09:58 AM UTC· resolved Sep 29, 2026, 02:08 PM UTC

1. identified Sep 29, 2026, 11:35 AM UTC

   The AI Model Hub API is currently unavailable. We are working on restoring the service.

2. resolved Sep 29, 2026, 02:08 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 29, 2026, 07:48 AM UTC· resolved Sep 29, 2026, 02:09 PM UTC

1. identified Sep 29, 2026, 07:48 AM UTC

   Customers may experience connection problems to the control plane and degraded functionality of kubernetes

2. identified Sep 29, 2026, 09:42 AM UTC

   Our engineering team has identified the root cause of the Kubernetes service degradation and is actively working to restore full functionality. Customer workloads in affected locations may be experiencing disruptions, including unavailability of running services. Cluster management operations -- deploying, scaling, and accessing the Kubernetes API -- are also impacted. We will provide another update within 60 minutes.

3. identified Sep 29, 2026, 09:47 AM UTC

   Our engineering team has identified the root cause of the Kubernetes service degradation and is actively working to restore full functionality. Customer workloads in affected locations may be experiencing disruptions, including unavailability of running services. Cluster management operations -- deploying, scaling, and accessing the Kubernetes API -- are also impacted. We will provide another update within 30 minutes.

4. monitoring Sep 29, 2026, 11:07 AM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

5. resolved Sep 29, 2026, 02:09 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 26, 2026, 12:25 AM UTC· resolved Sep 26, 2026, 11:11 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 26, 2026, 12:25 AM UTC

   The DCD is currently unavailable, displaying an endless "Loading DCD..." page. We are currently investigating this issue, and will keep you updated.

2. monitoring Sep 26, 2026, 02:57 AM UTC

   The DCD is now available again, and we are monitoring the situation.

3. monitoring Sep 26, 2026, 03:04 AM UTC

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

4. resolved Sep 26, 2026, 11:11 AM UTC

   After hours of monitoring incident the DCD is fully stable and operation

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Started Sep 24, 2026, 08:43 AM UTC· resolved Sep 24, 2026, 02:33 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 24, 2026, 08:43 AM UTC

   We are writing to inform you that we have been experiencing sporadic connection issues and substantial delays on packet delivery. Network technicians have started working on the occurrence immediately after detection and will isolate the problem and solve the issue as quick as possible. However, it is possible that there will be a certain degradation in connection quality affecting individual virtual resources. We will inform you as soon as the functionality has been restored.

2. investigating Sep 24, 2026, 08:58 AM UTC

   On top of the network issue in TXL, there may be delays in provisioning.

3. monitoring Sep 24, 2026, 11:57 AM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. resolved Sep 24, 2026, 02:33 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 23, 2026, 05:15 PM UTC· resolved Sep 24, 2026, 05:43 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 05:15 PM UTC

   We are currently experiencing control plane instability affecting our managed Kubernetes clusters. While existing application workloads continue to run normally, administrative and management capabilities are currently degraded. Our engineering team is actively working on a resolution, and we will provide updates as new information becomes available.

2. identified Sep 23, 2026, 06:32 PM UTC

   We have successfully identified and mitigated a high-latency condition in our core storage infrastructure that temporarily impacted the responsiveness of the Kubernetes control plane. Our engineering team is currently executing a phased reconciliation and rollout process to gracefully restart the management instances and restore full functionality. Existing application workloads continue to run normally and remain unaffected.

3. resolved Sep 24, 2026, 05:43 AM UTC

   The incident has been mitigated successfully at approx. 19:00 UTC, 23.09.2026. The teams involved are currently investigating the root cause and we will publish a report here once it is compiled.

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Started Sep 08, 2026, 11:43 PM UTC· resolved Sep 21, 2026, 07:24 AM UTC

1. monitoring Sep 08, 2026, 11:43 PM UTC

   We are currently investigating network connectivity alerts related to our TXL datacenter. While connectivity appears to be restored already, we are actively monitoring the situation to ensure stability. We will provide updates as new information becomes available.

2. identified Sep 08, 2026, 11:56 PM UTC

   We see indications of a recurrence of the issue and are setting the status page to active. Our Network Team is investigating and we will share updates here as they become available. The issue is currently negatively affecting Compute, Provisioning and Network Components.

3. identified Sep 08, 2026, 11:59 PM UTC

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

4. identified Sep 09, 2026, 12:20 AM UTC

   Our Network Team has identified an issue related to a recent router replacement and applied a mitigation. Compute and Storage systems are showing signs of recovery. We are actively monitoring the environment until all services are fully restored

5. identified Sep 09, 2026, 01:07 AM UTC

   We are currently investigating potential residual impact on DBaaS Services. Compute and Block Storage have reported full recovery.

6. monitoring Sep 09, 2026, 02:19 AM UTC

   DBaaS service has recovered, as well. We are setting the incident into Monitoring status, while the teams are ensuring that all affected services operate normally.

7. resolved Sep 21, 2026, 07:24 AM UTC

   We are marking this incident as resolved

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Started Sep 08, 2026, 02:15 PM UTC· resolved Sep 08, 2026, 09:57 PM UTC

1. identified Sep 08, 2026, 02:15 PM UTC

   While phone support will generally be available, our Support capacity is reduced due to multiple cases of sick leave. We want to inform you that our phone support will be limited during the following time slots, leading to increased response times on the phone channel. In these cases, please reach out per email. Thank you.

2. resolved Sep 08, 2026, 09:57 PM UTC

   We have people available now, Support is reachable as usual.

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Started Sep 04, 2026, 04:53 PM UTC· resolved Sep 08, 2026, 06:31 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 04, 2026, 04:53 PM UTC

   While phone support will generally be available, our capacity is reduced due to multiple cases of sick leave. We want to inform you that our phone support will be limited during the following time slots, leading to increased response times on the phone channel. In these cases, please reach out per email. Thank you.

2. identified Sep 07, 2026, 06:16 AM UTC

   We still run short on coverage of service, and we are currently doing changes on our ticketing system. So we kindly ask for your understanding if Support responses are not as timely as you are accustomed to. Thank you.

3. resolved Sep 08, 2026, 06:31 AM UTC

   We managed to fully re-establish our service, Support is back. thank you for your patience.

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Started Sep 01, 2026, 01:36 PM UTC· resolved Sep 01, 2026, 04:12 PM UTC

1. identified Sep 01, 2026, 01:36 PM UTC

   For our partners with subcontracts: We found that subcontracts cannot access the new Frankfurt location "de/fra/1". We are currently working on a fix to make this available, we will keep you informed when it's done.

2. monitoring Sep 01, 2026, 03:01 PM UTC

   Wir konnten das Problem beheben, sodass die neue Region nun für alle Verträge verfügbar ist. Wir monitoren, ob es dazu noch weitere Rückmeldungen gibt.

3. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 04:12 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 31, 2026, 03:35 PM UTC· resolved Aug 31, 2026, 05:03 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 31, 2026, 03:35 PM UTC

   The DCD is currently unavailable, displaying an endless "Loading DCD..." page. We are currently investigating this issue, and will keep you updated.

2. monitoring Aug 31, 2026, 03:52 PM UTC

   The DCD is now available again, and we are monitoring the situation.

3. resolved Aug 31, 2026, 05:03 PM UTC

   We are marking this incident as resolved. Our network team is investigating negative impact on the IAM Services caused by a change rollout. We will update the Status Page once the root cause has been established.

4. postmortem Sep 01, 2026, 03:32 PM UTC

   # **Preliminary Root Cause Analysis** This Root Cause Analysis is preliminary as research is still being conducted to determine the technical root cause of the incident. ## **What happened?** On August 31, 2026, between 15:00 UTC and 15:43 ITC, and again between 16:32 UTC and 16:35 UTC, customers were unable to reach IONOS Cloud's Identity and Access Management \(IAM\) service and the Data Center Designer \(DCD\), which is dependent on this service. The disruption affected direct logins, partner and reseller portal access, and associated management consoles. The total customer-facing impact lasted approximately 48 minutes across both intervals. Cloud APIs \([api.ionos.com](http://api.ionos.com)\) remained fully operational throughout the incident. The underlying application services were healthy at all times - the failure was confined to the network edge layer. ## **How was this possible? \(Root Cause\)** During a scheduled maintenance window on August 31, 2026, a network configuration update was applied to the edge network infrastructure with the intent of optimizing routing filters. The configuration was verified as correct prior to and during application. Following the rollout, a routing propagation anomaly emerged on one edge network switch, causing asymmetric routing behavior: incoming TCP connection requests from clients were silently dropped \(black-holed\) at the network edge before reaching the application cluster. Because the application services themselves remained up and healthy, this failure mode was not immediately visible through internal health checks - the services were isolated from receiving inbound public internet traffic rather than failing. The root cause of why this specific switch exhibited asymmetric routing behavior following an otherwise valid configuration change remains under active investigation. Whether this was triggered by a switch platform behavior or a software version-specific bug is being determined through staging environment reproduction. ## **What are we doing to prevent recurrence?** ### **Immediate Actions** * **Configuration Rollback:** Upon identifying the routing anomaly, a full rollback of the network configuration was executed across all affected edge switches. Routing announcements and TCP reachability of the public production IP addresses were verified following the rollback. All affected services - DCD, Partner Portal, Reseller Portal, and IAM - were confirmed fully operational by 16:35 UTC. \(DONE\) ### **Short-term** * **Staging Environment Replication:** Detailed test cases are being executed in the staging environment to reproduce the exact routing propagation behavior under the same switch configuration conditions. The goal is to determine whether the anomaly is attributable to a specific software version bug or a switch platform behavior, so that the precise failure condition can be isolated and addressed before any future rollout. ETA: Within two weeks ### **Mid-term** * **Revised Rollout Strategy:** Based on the findings from staging, a revised rollout approach will be designed to ensure that any future application of these routing filter optimizations can be performed with greater stability guarantees - including more granular validation checkpoints between switch-level changes. ETA: October 2026 ## **Closing remarks** We recognize that loss of access to IAM and DCD carries real operational impact. The fact that the underlying services were healthy throughout is not a mitigation of that impact. We are committed to ensuring that the root cause is fully understood before any re-attempt of the original change, and that the revised rollout strategy addresses the conditions that led to the asymmetric routing behavior. We thank you for your patience while we conclude the investigation.

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Started Aug 26, 2026, 09:53 AM UTC· resolved Sep 03, 2026, 01:39 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 09:53 AM UTC

   We are currently investigating increased latency affecting S3 Object Storage in the eu-central-1 region. Some customers may experience slow response times for read and write operations. Our engineering team is actively working on resolving the issue. We will provide updates as more information becomes available.

2. identified Aug 27, 2026, 12:00 PM UTC

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. identified Aug 31, 2026, 05:08 PM UTC

   We see recurring latency spikes affecting our S3 service in eu-central-1. The Object Storage and Network teams are jointly investigating. Although a technical root cause remains undetermined at this time, our highest priority is implementing measures to mitigate the frequency and amplitude of the spikes. We appreciate your patience and will keep you informed.

4. identified Sep 01, 2026, 03:18 PM UTC

   Our engineering teams have identified a path to remediation. Initial measures have been applied, improving the situation for some services. Customers using Object Storage in eu-central-1 may continue to experience elevated latency, which may vary in severity. Work continues on a comprehensive fix. We will provide further updates

5. monitoring Sep 03, 2026, 08:27 AM UTC

   Response times for Object Storage in eu-central-1 have improved significantly and continue to stabilize. We are closely monitoring system performance. We will provide further updates as remediation progresses.

6. resolved Sep 03, 2026, 01:39 PM UTC

   The increased latency affecting S3 Object Storage in eu-central-1 has been resolved. Response times have returned to normal levels. We will continue to monitor the service.

7. postmortem Sep 08, 2026, 12:25 PM UTC

   # Root Cause Analysis ## What happened? Starting approximately 19:00 UTC on 24 August 2026, customers accessing S3 Object Storage in the Frankfurt \(FRA4\) data center experienced elevated latency across all operations - uploads, downloads, metadata requests, and deletions. Intermittent HTTP 503 Service Unavailable and 404 Not Found errors were observed on object read requests. The impact was measurable for all customer which had buckets in the both affected datacenters of the region, with some customers experiencing severe degradation depending on their bucket configuration and access patterns. The incident remained in progress with high priority from 25 August through 3 September 2026. The latency issue was mitigated at approximately 13:40 UTC on 3 September 2026. ## How was this possible? \(Root Cause\) **Primary cause - Software bug in Quality of Service \(QoS\) subsystem** IONOS S3 Object Storage in the Frankfurt region is using a distributed object storage system. A QoS feature of this service - implemented via a redis-qos service - applies rate limiting to S3 requests at the cluster level. A bug in the S3 service leads to not well distributed queries to the Redis-QOS service \(which is served by multiple server for high availability\) this caused the Redis-QOS process to reach and sustain 100% CPU utilization, progressively slowing down all S3 request processing at the cluster level. This affected every request passing through the affected nodes, irrespective of the operation type or the specific bucket accessed. ‌This is an internal defect within the software used. The bug caused the S3 service to consume all available resources before load reached request levels that would normally trigger throttling, meaning the degradation occurred continuously rather than only under peak conditions. ‌In close cooperation with the software vendor, we disabled the QoS rate-limiting function on 3 September, which fully resolved the latency issue. S3 is currently operating without some QoS features while a permanent fix is prepared by the vendor. ## What are we doing to prevent recurrence? **Already completed:** * ‌QoS disabled in the S3 service - fully resolved the latency issue. \(DONE\) * Requesting permanent solution from the software vendor. \(INPROGRESS\) ‌**Short-term - ETA: within 2 weeks:** * Permanent fix for the Cloudian QoS bug: IONOS Cloud is in active coordination with the vendor to obtain and deploy a fix for the redis-qos defect. Once the fix is validated, lost QoS features will be re-enabled. * Database partition monitoring: We are implementing monitoring that alerts on partition size growth before any individual partition approaches a problematic threshold. This will allow our team to identify and address bucket layout issues proactively. **Mid-term - ETA: 1 to 3 months:** * QoS architecture review: Following the permanent QoS fix, we will review the architectural isolation of the QoS service together with the vendor to ensure that a future resource contention event in the rate-limiting layer cannot propagate to the request path at the same scale. * Monitoring and alerting improvements: We are extending cluster-level monitoring to surface redis-qos CPU saturation and database compaction backlog as first-class incident signals, with automated escalation before customer-visible latency develops. ## Closing remarks An incident of this duration in a core infrastructure service is not acceptable. The high-latency period persisted for nine days, during which customer workloads depending on S3 in the Frankfurt region were degraded. Multiple optimisations and mitigation strategies were implemented during the course of the incident, but could only improve the situation for individual buckets and only to a certain extent. Detecting the underlying QoS bug and developing a mitigation required coordination with the vendor’s engineering team. While the latency issue is mitigated, we remain in close contact with the vendor. The engineering work to deliver a permanent QoS fix, reduce database partition pressure, and prevent recurrence is in progress. We are also working closely with our technology partner to understand delays in the analysis of the root cause of this incident. We will conduct a joint post mortem to identify areas where collaboration during incidents can be improved. We recognise the impact this incident caused to your operations. We believe that the listed measures will help us prevent similar error patterns and speed up analysis and recovery for software related issues in the future. We thank you for your patience during the incident.

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Started Aug 23, 2026, 12:47 PM UTC· resolved Aug 23, 2026, 05:48 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 23, 2026, 12:47 PM UTC

   We are currently investigating an issue where Buckets and Object Storage Keys are not displayed in the Data Center Designer. It is currently not possible to access, alter, create and delete Buckets and Keys via the Data Center Designer.

2. resolved Aug 23, 2026, 05:48 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 21, 2026, 07:52 AM UTC· resolved Aug 23, 2026, 05:49 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 21, 2026, 07:52 AM UTC

   Currently it's not possible to reserve or handle IP blocks, neither in DCD, nor via API. Our teams are investigating the issue. We will keep you updated.

2. identified Aug 21, 2026, 08:18 AM UTC

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. resolved Aug 23, 2026, 05:49 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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