Vetta Online Outage History

Started Oct 12, 2026, 10:06 PM UTC· resolved Oct 13, 2026, 12:53 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 10:06 PM UTC

   Some customers may be experiencing issues sending emails via our cp1 mail server. Engineers are investigating.

2. identified Oct 12, 2026, 10:46 PM UTC

   Issue has been identified as the recent ICANN KSK rollover, affecting DNSSEC validation being used as part of internal DNS recursion, which has not automatically moved to the new KSK keys. Remediation works are in progress and we expect functionality to be restored shortly. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

3. monitoring Oct 12, 2026, 11:02 PM UTC

   Remediation works have been completed and outbound mail is now flowing, with queued emails clearing. Incident moving to Monitoring state to ensure service restoration.

4. resolved Oct 13, 2026, 12:53 AM UTC

   Resolved

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Started Oct 06, 2026, 10:00 AM UTC· resolved Oct 06, 2026, 04:00 PM UTC

1. completed Oct 06, 2026, 04:00 PM UTC

   In order to resolve a sporadic route performance issue impacting some connections served from our Wellington PoPs to some destinations, our team will be performing route table updates to Wellington routing engines overnight tonight between 11pm-5am. While no impact is expected, there may be some latency irregularities to destinations while routes re-propagate.

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Started Oct 01, 2026, 04:30 PM UTC· resolved Oct 01, 2026, 05:30 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 04:30 PM UTC

   During the period of ~05:30~06:30 this morning, a DDoS attack took place to our network, targeted at a downstream customer. Our networks team was mobilised and have since mitigated against this attack which may have caused high latency, jitter, and/or loss. Normal service has been restored. We apologies for the interruption and inconvenience caused during this period.

2. resolved Oct 01, 2026, 05:30 PM UTC

   Resolved

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Started Sep 16, 2026, 02:00 PM UTC· resolved Sep 16, 2026, 08:35 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 16, 2026, 02:00 PM UTC

   During the period of ~2:00am ~ 8:35am this morning (17/09), some cloud compute customers with servers in Auckland and public IPv4 addressing contained within 103.85.28.0/24 subnet may have experienced degraded, or no IPv4 connectivity to these IP addresses. This was caused by this specific route not being distributed within our IGP following planned network maintenance overnight. Root cause investigation is underway, as well as increased monitoring of this IP subnet to proactively alert us to this issue in future. We apologise for any inconvenience caused. This issue was opened retrospectively.

2. resolved Sep 16, 2026, 08:35 PM UTC

   Resolved

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Started Aug 20, 2026, 09:03 AM UTC· resolved Aug 20, 2026, 09:45 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 09:03 AM UTC

   Some customers may be experiencing reduced connectivity, or higher latency to some destinations as a result of an incident with a core network element and subsequent routing path changes. Engineering teams are involved and investigating. Updates to follow.

2. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 09:10 AM UTC

   Current investigations are showing the loss of two core network paths out of one of our core Auckland network PoPs. Normal traffic levels have moved to alternate and less-preferable traffic paths. Investigations are continuing.

3. monitoring Aug 20, 2026, 09:16 AM UTC

   Disrupted paths have been restored by the fibre vendor, and traffic has reconverged back to normal network paths. Our team is continuing to monitor the situation closely.

4. resolved Aug 20, 2026, 09:45 AM UTC

   Primary paths have remained stable with normal traffic flow and this incident is now resolved. Our infrastructure team will continue communication with appropriate teams of the fibre vendors involved to identify root cause. We apologise for any inconvenience caused while traffic moved to alternate paths during this incident.

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Started Aug 13, 2026, 12:10 AM UTC· resolved Aug 13, 2026, 02:15 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 13, 2026, 12:10 AM UTC

   A connectivity disruption is currently being experienced to some hosted customer cloud servers, and our team is investigating.

2. monitoring Aug 13, 2026, 12:11 AM UTC

   Connectivity has been restored and the team are monitoring.

3. resolved Aug 13, 2026, 02:15 AM UTC

   Incident has been resolved and further preventative measures have been taken. Maintenance will be announced soon to complete changes in response to this incident and its subsequent root cause investigation. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

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Started Aug 12, 2026, 02:01 AM UTC· resolved Aug 12, 2026, 02:33 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 12, 2026, 02:01 AM UTC

   We are aware of impact to backend services supporting authentication of connections, which may impact new connections or DHCP renewals, impacting connectivity. Our team are investigating as a top priority. Updates to follow.

2. monitoring Aug 12, 2026, 02:20 AM UTC

   Backend systems are now recovering, and systems are under monitoring.

3. resolved Aug 12, 2026, 02:33 AM UTC

   This incident is now resolved. Root cause investigation is underway. We apologise for any invonvenience caused.

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Started Aug 12, 2026, 01:50 AM UTC· resolved Aug 12, 2026, 02:20 AM UTC

1. identified Aug 12, 2026, 01:50 AM UTC

   From approx 1:50pm~2:20pm, Auckland cloud server customers may have experienced an impact to reachability of servers due to a systems issue. This is now resolved, and we apologise for any inconvenience caused. Root cause investigation is underway. This issue was opened retrospectively.

2. resolved Aug 12, 2026, 02:20 AM UTC

   Resolved

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Started Aug 02, 2026, 09:04 PM UTC· resolved Aug 02, 2026, 09:54 PM UTC

1. identified Aug 02, 2026, 09:04 PM UTC

   There is currently a network outage being experienced to our Waitohi high-site, serving wireless (WISP) customers in the Waitohi/Pleasant Point/Levels areas. Engineers are investigating.

2. identified Aug 02, 2026, 09:18 PM UTC

   Engineer has been dispatched to site with spares. Next update on status change.

3. resolved Aug 02, 2026, 09:54 PM UTC

   Engineer has performed remediation works and services have been restored.

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Started Jun 30, 2026, 04:19 AM UTC· resolved Jun 30, 2026, 04:39 AM UTC

1. investigating Jun 30, 2026, 04:19 AM UTC

   Some customers may be experiencing an interruption or degradation of connectivity. Our team are investigating.

2. monitoring Jun 30, 2026, 04:23 AM UTC

   Affected connectivity has been restored, or is restoring. The team are continuing their investigations.

3. resolved Jun 30, 2026, 04:39 AM UTC

   Engineers have identified the cause of this disruption to a firmware bug. Maintenance is being planned to complete updates on two network elements and will be posted on our status page once confirmed. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

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Started Jun 25, 2026, 03:24 AM UTC· resolved Jun 25, 2026, 03:41 AM UTC

1. identified Jun 25, 2026, 03:24 AM UTC

   We have been alerted to a process lockup on network element pe2-akl1, causing potential interruption to service or suboptimal routing for customers connected via this device. Engineers have concluded a restart of the device is necessary, which may cause a brief interruption to directly connected and singlehomed equipment for approximately 5-10 minutes. We apologise for the inconvenience, and will post updates once completed and restored to normal operation.

2. monitoring Jun 25, 2026, 03:33 AM UTC

   Device restart has been completed and engineers are monitoring to ensure service restoration.

3. resolved Jun 25, 2026, 03:41 AM UTC

   Network element and associated services have remained stable since manual intervention. If you are experiencing issues with your service, please reach out to our team for further assistance.

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Started May 27, 2026, 02:24 PM UTC· resolved May 27, 2026, 03:05 PM UTC

1. investigating May 27, 2026, 02:24 PM UTC

   Some customers may be experiencing degraded international connectivity. Our team are investigating and updates to follow.

2. monitoring May 27, 2026, 02:48 PM UTC

   Issue has been isolated to an upstream transit path, which has now been temporarily removed from our network. Affected destinations, seemingly Europe-specific are now functioning.

3. resolved May 27, 2026, 03:05 PM UTC

   Issue has been confirmed as major congestion within a single transit providers network. This provider has been temporarily removed from our network and traffic re-routed, which has resolved affected traffic destinations. We apologise for any inconvenience.

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Started May 13, 2026, 01:36 AM UTC· resolved May 13, 2026, 02:05 AM UTC

1. identified May 13, 2026, 01:36 AM UTC

   We are experiencing an issue impacting some customers with Chorus connections authenticating onto the Vetta network. The team are investigating and resolving as quickly as possible.

2. monitoring May 13, 2026, 01:38 AM UTC

   Rollback has been performed from a change and impacted connections are recovering. The team are monitoring to ensure resolution.

3. resolved May 13, 2026, 02:05 AM UTC

   Incident has been resolved. If you are without connectivity, please reach out to our team. This incident was caused by an erroneous setting pushed into our authentication backend, which resulted in some service disruption for some customers, which will be investigated to analyse the root cause. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

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Started May 10, 2026, 02:49 AM UTC· resolved May 11, 2026, 10:55 PM UTC

1. investigating May 10, 2026, 02:49 AM UTC

   The team are currently investigating instability/degradation on the network. Investigations are underway and updates to follow.

2. investigating May 10, 2026, 03:13 AM UTC

   The team are continuing to investigate. Investigations thus far are indicating this could be a large attack against our network. Updates to follow.

3. investigating May 10, 2026, 03:37 AM UTC

   The team are continuing to work through this incident as quickly as possible. We apologise for the inconvenience caused, and will provide updates as they become available.

4. identified May 10, 2026, 04:08 AM UTC

   This incident has been confirmed as a very large distributed attack against our network. We have limited international connectivity of our network as an immediate response, which has improved domestic connectivity, while we work with upstream partners on further mitigation steps. Updates to follow.

5. identified May 10, 2026, 04:38 AM UTC

   Restoration of internal network elements and domestic connectivity is continuing successfully. International connectivity remains limited. Updates to follow. Thank you for your patience while our team deal with this large-scale attack.

6. identified May 10, 2026, 05:15 AM UTC

   Domestic, trans-tasman and internal network connectivity remains normal. The team are working through interrupted internal systems for impacted compute workloads. Network attack is still continuing, and international connectivity remains limited while further mitigations are implemented or levels subside. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

7. identified May 10, 2026, 05:50 AM UTC

   Domestic, trans-tasman and internal network connectivity remains operational. IPv6 traffic may subject to increased impact as opposed to IPv4. Impacted internal compute workloads have been restored. Network attack is still continuing, and international connectivity remains limited while further mitigations are implemented or levels subside. We apologise for the inconvenience caused.

8. identified May 10, 2026, 07:02 AM UTC

   Further works have been conducted in joint efforts with our upstream international transit providers to further mitigate against attacks, and international connectivity is no longer as heavily disrupted as earlier. Domestic, trans-tasman and internal network connectivity remains operational. IPv6 traffic may subject to increased impact as opposed to IPv4. International connectivity remains limitedc while further analysis continues. We apologise for the inconvenience caused.

9. monitoring May 10, 2026, 08:41 AM UTC

   Further defences have been implemented in joint efforts with our upstream international transit providers to further mitigate against attacks, and international connectivity is at near-normal performance levels. Domestic, trans-tasman and internal network connectivity remains operational. International connectivity remains limited, however is now at near-normal performance levels. Incident is now moving to a monitoring state with our response team. We apologise for the inconvenience caused while we worked through this immediate incident response of this large-scale distributed attack today.

10. monitoring May 10, 2026, 08:01 PM UTC

    The team have continued to mitigate this attack through the night, with customer services remaining stable and functional. Following on from our last update yesterday evening, there should be no significant impact to connectivity or services in this current state. Our team continue to monitor and adjust defences while this attack still continues.

11. monitoring May 11, 2026, 05:02 AM UTC

    Incident remains under monitoring. Attacks have continued and defence mitigations have been functioning as expected, resulting in no significant customer impact. Our team continue to monitor and adjust defences while this attack still continues. Next update tomorrow morning unless there is a change to network status.

12. monitoring May 11, 2026, 08:13 PM UTC

    Attacks appear to have subsided. Our team is monitoring closely. Next update on status change or to move through to resolution.

13. resolved May 11, 2026, 10:55 PM UTC

    This incident has been resolved. The large-scale distributed attack against our network has subsided, and all services are operating normally. We thank you for your patience throughout this incident, and apologise for any inconvenience caused.

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Started May 03, 2026, 10:24 AM UTC· resolved May 03, 2026, 10:46 AM UTC

1. investigating May 03, 2026, 10:24 AM UTC

   Our team are currently investigating a disruption to some international traffic paths, which appears to be an issue with an upstream transit provider. Updates to follow.

2. monitoring May 03, 2026, 10:38 AM UTC

   Affected traffic has been moved to alternate paths and service has been restored. Initial analysis was correct in that a transit provider was distributing routes, but traffic was unable to pass. Team is monitoring for any additional impacts before resolution.

3. resolved May 03, 2026, 10:46 AM UTC

   No further impacts have been identified since traffic paths have been moved. An incident has been raised with the affected transit provider for them to advise once their network is restored to normal function. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

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Started Apr 09, 2026, 08:08 AM UTC· resolved Apr 09, 2026, 09:30 AM UTC

1. identified Apr 09, 2026, 08:08 AM UTC

   Due to an ongoing upstream vendor issue, there is currently increased latency to/from traffic destined to or through our Sydney network PoP. Our NOC is monitoring this closely, and have also engaged the impacted vendor’s NOC for further information/investigation, which will be used in conjunction with our own monitoring for any further actions which our team may take as part of this incident response. Next update as new information becomes available or on status change.

2. identified Apr 09, 2026, 08:14 AM UTC

   Vendor NOC has confirmed issue has been identified within their network and is under action.

3. monitoring Apr 09, 2026, 09:06 AM UTC

   We are observing latency starting to restore to normal levels following NOC intervention. We are continuing to monitor to ensure resolution. Next update on status change or resolution confirmation.

4. resolved Apr 09, 2026, 09:30 AM UTC

   Latency and backhaul pathing for traffic transiting our Sydney network PoP has been restored to normal levels, and this incident is now resolved. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

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Started Mar 31, 2026, 07:35 PM UTC· resolved Mar 31, 2026, 08:20 PM UTC

1. identified Mar 31, 2026, 07:35 PM UTC

   We are aware of an issue being experienced with our credit card payment gateway provider, resulting in some customers being unable to make credit card payments through the portal, or are receiving credit card payment failure emails for automated payments. Our gateway provider has been notified and we are awaiting their resolution. Next update on status change.

2. identified Mar 31, 2026, 07:50 PM UTC

   Our gateway vendor has identified the issue and is working to resolve now. ETR 20~30 minutes.

3. resolved Mar 31, 2026, 08:20 PM UTC

   Issue has been resolved, and credit card processing is now completing as normal. Failed automated recurring charges are in the process of being retried. We apologise for any inconvenience or confusion caused.

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Started Feb 22, 2026, 06:54 PM UTC· resolved Feb 22, 2026, 07:41 PM UTC

1. investigating Feb 22, 2026, 06:54 PM UTC

   Our team are currently investigating a connectivity issue at one of our datacentre sites, which may be impacting services based at this location. We’re continuing to investigate and will update as we continue investigations and isolate the problem. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

2. monitoring Feb 22, 2026, 07:14 PM UTC

   Services are now appearing stable and are under monitoring observation. At this stage, it appears as though only our internal monitoring observability was impacted, and not customer services. Our team are continuing to look through logs.

3. resolved Feb 22, 2026, 07:41 PM UTC

   No further occurrences or irregular observations have been detected. Impacted device was within our management network, and we do not believe customer services were impacted by this incident.

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Started Feb 12, 2026, 09:16 AM UTC· resolved Feb 12, 2026, 10:03 AM UTC

No vendor updates were posted for this incident.

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Started Feb 10, 2026, 02:05 AM UTC· resolved Feb 10, 2026, 05:07 AM UTC

No vendor updates were posted for this incident.

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Started Jan 25, 2026, 07:19 PM UTC· resolved Jan 25, 2026, 07:59 PM UTC

No vendor updates were posted for this incident.

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Started Dec 09, 2025, 11:43 PM UTC· resolved Dec 10, 2025, 01:39 AM UTC

No vendor updates were posted for this incident.

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Started Dec 09, 2025, 08:17 PM UTC· resolved Dec 10, 2025, 01:37 AM UTC

No vendor updates were posted for this incident.

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Started Dec 01, 2025, 05:00 PM UTC· resolved Dec 11, 2025, 09:00 PM UTC

No vendor updates were posted for this incident.

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Started Nov 26, 2025, 11:00 AM UTC· resolved Nov 26, 2025, 01:30 PM UTC

No vendor updates were posted for this incident.

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