DNS Outage
Timeline · 1 update
- resolved Jun 25, 2026, 06:39 PM UTC
A DNS outage occurred that blocked all services from being accessible. The issue was detected internally and resolved. All services are accessible.
k-ID had 13 outages in the last 2 years totaling 101h 40m of downtime, averaging 0.5 incidents per month.
There were 13 k-ID outages since January 27, 2025 totaling 101h 40m of downtime. Each is summarised below. Incident details, duration, and resolution information.
A DNS outage occurred that blocked all services from being accessible. The issue was detected internally and resolved. All services are accessible.
The Family Connect site and age verifications are down for some customers. We are investigating the issue.
We have identified and cordoned the website traffic that was causing issues. Most customers should be healthy.
This incident has been resolved.
The Family Connect site and age verifications are current unavailable. We are investigating the issue.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
Family Connect and Verifications continue to appear healthy. We continue to monitor the system.
This incident has been resolved.
The external service we use for logging into Compliance Studio is experiencing an incident. This is affecting the ability to login to compliance studio. If already logged in, everything is working normally.
The issue is from the service we use for managing sessions in Compliance Studio. They've shipped some fixes, so login is working better. Although they're not seeing full recovery yet. We're continuing to monitor.
The upstream service has resolved the issue on their end. We're monitoring to make sure they stay stable.
This incident has been resolved.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
Our email provider is having issues across all their customers. We are monitoring.
We are seeing emails via our provider to Microsoft domains are being delivered. We will continue to monitor.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating the issue. We are aware this affects verification requests.
Mitigating the issue for the majority of customers.
We are continuing to investigate this issue and identifying long term fix.
Long term fix identified and a fix is being implemented. Mitigations are working and system has been stable for all customers.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
The incident was resolved at Tuesday Dec 9, 9:30 UTC. We also successfully deployed the long term fix, and the monitoring shows that it is working as expected. Total impact duration was 4.5 hours.
We are currently investigating this issue.
We are continuing to investigate this issue.
Our vendor has resolved a licensing issue and all systems are operational again.
We are currently investigating this issue.
We are continuing to investigate this issue.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating the issue.
We are continuing to investigate this issue.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
A 3rd-party vendor deployed a change to their staging environment for testing, which unexpectedly also affected their production environment and caused errors. * This resulted in users not being able to complete face scan verification during the incident. * Once identified, the change was reverted, resolving the issue.
We are currently investigating this issue.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
Some age verification methods (document scan and personal details) are not working due to an ongoing Cloudflare incident (https://www.cloudflarestatus.com/)
Cloudflare has identified the issue and is working on a recovery.
We are continuing to wait for services to recover.
We are seeing a recovery in the verification methods and will continue to monitor the status.
This incident has been resolved.
The ID Scan verification method is producing errors. End-users will need to select an alternative verification method.
We have an identified an issue with our ID Scan verification method, which began erroring at 15:14 UTC. Other jurisdiction appropriate verification methods are still operational. We are working with a vendor to resolve the issue.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results. ID verification method is working.
This incident has been resolved.
## Summary Two age verification methods \(ID scan and personal details\) were causing errors for a period of time, and for this time users were required to choose an alternate verification method. The root cause was a misconfiguration within one of our vendors. | **Impact** | **High** | | --- | --- | | Impact duration | 5h 43m | | Time to detect | 3h 46m | | Time to resolve | 1h 57 m | ## Remediations * The vendor has implemented improved blackbox monitoring in order to detect these outages faster. * k-ID has worked with the vendor to establish improved communication during incidents. * k-ID has implemented a mechanism for disabling verification methods that are known to be experiencing issues. * k-ID will implement monitoring and alerting on verification errors in order to improve our own time to detection.
The API is degraded due to an expired certificate. Team is replacing the certificate.
The expired certificate has been replaced and is being deployed. We expect resolution within the next ten minutes. Also, we identified that the same certificate issue impacts Family Portal and Publisher Portal; the severity of impact has been updated to reflect this.
Certificate deployment has completed for all components.
Traffic flow has returned to normal levels following the replacement of the certificate.
Production SSL certificate expired due to an IAM permissions misconfiguration that prevented cert-manager from creating DNS records to verify our domain ownership. * Root cause was a syntax error in the IAM policy that was previously unknown to our product teams. The rule was updated manually with the correct syntax during the incident and has since been rectified in our infrastructure configuration. * We have added an alert for certificates two weeks prior to expiration. This will allow engineers to verify that automated certificate rotations are successful and intervene manually if required before the certificate expires. | **Impact** | **High** | | --- | --- | | Impact duration | 27m | | Time to detect | 2m | | Time to resolve | 25m |