Okta Outage History

Started Oct 21, 2026, 06:49 PM UTC· resolved Oct 21, 2026, 09:32 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 06:49 PM UTC

   On October 21, 2026, at 11:49 AM PT, the Engineering Team became aware of an issue with Group Push affecting our customers in US Cell 3. Impacted customers may experience delays with group push imports. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta.com:3

2. identified Oct 21, 2026, 07:48 PM UTC

   A subset of our customers are currently experiencing failures or severe delays in Group Push imports. Background jobs are either stuck in the "pushing" state or taking longer than usual to complete. Existing user access and active sessions remain unaffected. To mitigate the impact, we are continuing to scale up processing capacity. Next update in 30 minutes.

3. monitoring Oct 21, 2026, 07:59 PM UTC

   We are seeing recovery across the impacted Group Push imports. Mitigation efforts have significantly reduced the processing backlog. We are actively monitoring system stability and performance metrics. Next update in 30 minutes.

4. resolved Oct 21, 2026, 09:32 PM UTC

   The issue causing Group Push failures has been resolved. Additional root cause information will be available within five business days.

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Started Oct 21, 2026, 06:00 PM UTC· resolved Oct 21, 2026, 11:28 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 06:00 PM UTC

   On October 21, 2026, at 11:00 AM PT, Engineering became aware of an issue with our cloud vendor affecting reporting services on EMEA Cell 9. During this time, reporting will not be available. Our team is actively working with our cloud vendor to mitigate the issue. We will provide another update within the next 1 hour, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta.com:9

2. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 08:55 PM UTC

   Our cloud vendor has made a configuration change as part of mitigation efforts and is monitoring for signs of recovery. Reporting services on EMEA Cell 9 may continue to be impacted. Our team is continues to monitor and work with our cloud vendor to fully mitigate the issue. We will provide another update within the next 1 hour, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. monitoring Oct 21, 2026, 09:52 PM UTC

   Monitoring is showing recovery of reporting services on EMEA Cell 9. We will continue to monitor with our cloud vendor until we can confirm full recovery. We will provide another update within the next 1 hour, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

4. resolved Oct 21, 2026, 11:27 PM UTC

   The issue affecting reporting services on EMEA Cell 9 has been addressed. The third-party provider has deployed a fix, and all system metrics have stabilized. Additional root cause information will be available within 5 business days.

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Started Oct 13, 2026, 07:25 AM UTC· resolved Oct 13, 2026, 09:08 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 13, 2026, 07:25 AM UTC

   At 13/10/2026 00:50 PT, the team became aware of an issue with to our Core Platform service affecting customers in EMEA Cell 1. During this time, users may be experiencing intermittent issues within our system. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta-emea.com:1

2. monitoring Oct 13, 2026, 08:40 AM UTC

   We have implemented a fix for the issue and are now seeing Okta Services restored. We will continue to monitor and provide an update in the next 30 mins.

3. resolved Oct 13, 2026, 09:08 AM UTC

   The incident has been resolved. The services were in read only mode and actions were taken to restore service and return to normal operations. An RCA will be available within 5 business days.

4. resolved Oct 20, 2026, 07:19 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On October 10th at 12:50 AM PT, Okta’s monitoring systems alerted on-call teams to a database server issue on EMEA Cell EU1. During this time, administrators and end users may have encountered Read Only Mode (See KB: https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/What-is-Oktas-Readonly-Mode ) during this period, as well as errors related to write operations and certain authentication flows. Root Cause Summary: The root cause of the disruption was an unexpected crash of the primary data store supporting the impacted cell, which automatically resulted in Okta application servers transitioning to Read Only mode to ensure data integrity. Remediation Steps: Immediately upon receiving alerts, incident response processes were activated. On-call incident responders analyzed the database service failure and took actions to failover to a healthy primary and restore service functionality. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent and mitigate similar incidents in the future, Okta has currently implemented the following: - Improved alerting for faster impact analysis - Conducted a full scan of all database error log files to ensure this issue had not happened previously - Fixed a bug related to authentication failures during Read Only Mode related to Device Assurance checks Additionally, Okta is reviewing operating procedures to recover the service faster and is currently working with external infrastructure vendors to investigate the underlying cause of the database crash. Duration (# of minutes): 35

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Started Oct 13, 2026, 04:00 AM UTC· resolved Oct 13, 2026, 03:56 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 13, 2026, 04:00 AM UTC

   At 10/13/2026 6:00 AM PT, the Okta team became aware of an issue with Group Push affecting customer operations in EMEA Cell 1. Our team is actively investigating this issue and to mitigate the issue. We will provide another update within the next 1 hour, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta-emea.com:1

2. investigating Oct 13, 2026, 01:53 PM UTC

   The Okta Engineering team has identified the root cause affecting Group Push for select applications. New Group Push operations initiated outside the affected window are processing successfully. We are actively mitigating and working to resolve the impacted jobs. We will provide further updates as the situation progresses.

3. identified Oct 13, 2026, 02:35 PM UTC

   Following the implementation of a mitigation action, job processing has resumed, and the backlog of pending operations is steadily declining. Our engineering team continues to work to clear the remaining queue and restore full functionality for all affected customers. Our next update will be in 30 minutes or sooner if additional information becomes available.

4. monitoring Oct 13, 2026, 03:25 PM UTC

   Job processing has resumed for the majority of impacted customers, and we're continuing to monitor residual impact across the remaining subset. Customer Support will continue to reach out directly to customers still experiencing the residual impact to provide a status update and next steps. Engineering remains engaged to fully resolve outstanding cases. Our next update will be in 15 minutes or sooner if there's a change in status.

5. resolved Oct 13, 2026, 03:56 PM UTC

   The issue causing Group Push failures has been resolved. Our Support teams remain in direct contact with affected customers to address any lingering impact. Additional root cause information will be available within five business days.

6. resolved Oct 20, 2026, 11:44 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On October 13th, 2026, at 5:57 AM PT, Okta customer reports alerted our engineering team of group push membership processing delays for EMEA Cell EU1. During this time, customers may have experienced delays in Group Push operations. Administrators discovered the issue only when downstream applications failed to reflect changes or when "Last Push" timestamps were updated without completing, ultimately delaying access to new membership changes in provisioned downstream applications. Root Cause Summary: The root cause was a previously deployed configuration change intended to reduce impact on datastore CPU. However, this change had the unintended side effect of ultimately delaying the update of group membership in downstream provisioned applications. Remediation Steps: At 6:57 AM PT, Engineering identified the root cause of the delay and promptly reverted the configuration change. To accelerate recovery and clear the resulting backlog, engineering temporarily increased processing capacity, allowing the backlog of group membership processing to return to nominal processing rates. These actions successfully addressed the issue, and normal operations were restored by 9:07 AM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta has implemented the following: Updated alerts for identification and faster notification of these scenarios Additionally, Okta is reviewing testing scenarios and monitoring these processes. Duration (# of minutes): 567

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Started Oct 05, 2026, 01:23 AM UTC· resolved Oct 05, 2026, 01:31 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 01:23 AM UTC

   This is just a test please ignore Affected cells: OK2

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Started Oct 05, 2026, 12:53 AM UTC· resolved Oct 05, 2026, 01:07 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 12:53 AM UTC

   This is just a quarterly test. Not a real incident Affected cells: OK20

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Started Oct 01, 2026, 01:17 PM UTC· resolved Oct 01, 2026, 11:59 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 01:17 PM UTC

   On October 01, 2026, at 6:17 AM PT, we're investigating an issue with Okta Workflows where some automated event hook triggers aren't executing as expected. Our engineering team is actively analyzing system logs and working on root-cause remediation. We will provide an update within 30 minutes or as soon as additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta.com:1, okta.com:2, okta.com:3, okta.com:4, okta.com:6, okta.com:7, okta.com:11

2. identified Oct 01, 2026, 03:17 PM UTC

   Mitigation steps have been implemented to address delivery and execution delays affecting automated event hook triggers in Okta Workflows. System telemetry indicates that event delivery is recovering and that backlogged automated workflows are beginning to process. We are actively monitoring performance to ensure full stability. A follow-up update will be provided within 15 minutes.

3. monitoring Oct 01, 2026, 03:50 PM UTC

   System metrics continue to demonstrate sustained recovery following the applied mitigation. New events are being processed successfully, and backlogged events continue to be processed with no recurring errors, consistent with initial customer feedback. We are maintaining active monitoring to ensure ongoing stability. We will provide a final update in 30 minutes or upon formal resolution.

4. monitoring Oct 01, 2026, 04:20 PM UTC

   Okta Workflows performance remains stable, and remaining backlogged events continue to be processed. To ensure sustained system health across all tenants, engineering will maintain active observation. We will share the next update in 60 minutes or as soon as service stabilization is fully confirmed.

5. monitoring Oct 01, 2026, 05:45 PM UTC

   We have confirmed recovery across several Okta cells, where event hook processing has normalized, and queue backlogs have cleared. Engineering is continuing to track processing metrics across all remaining cells as backlogs normalize. We remain in an extended monitoring phase to ensure sustained system stability across all cells before declaring full resolution. Our next update will be provided in 60 minutes or upon formal closure of the incident.

6. monitoring Oct 01, 2026, 07:38 PM UTC

   We have remediated the root cause affecting automated event hook delivery in Okta Workflows, and the majority of cells have fully recovered. A subset of cells continues to process a backlog of queued events; based on current processing rates, this may take up to 12 hours to complete. We remain in an extended monitoring phase while this backlog clears, and we will provide a further update as the situation progresses.

7. resolved Oct 01, 2026, 11:59 PM UTC

   Following a period of active monitoring, we can confirm that this incident has been fully resolved. Automated event hook execution and queue delivery are operating normally. Additional root cause details will be provided in a formal report within five business days.

8. resolved Oct 09, 2026, 03:44 AM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On October 1st, 2026, at 6:55 AM PDT, Okta customer reports alerted our team of workflow lag issues for US Cells OK6, OK7, OK8, OK9, and OK11, as well as Okta Preview Cell OP1. During this incident, customers using Okta event hooks experienced delays receiving subscribed events. Workflows triggered by Okta webhooks would have also executed with delays or become non-responsive. In US East Okta Cell 11, a subset of events was dropped entirely, and the webhook delivery failure logs do not appear in the system logs. Root Cause Summary: During our transition to a new internal event delivery system, Okta experienced an issue where retried, consistently failing event hooks deliveries blocked the processing of the queue. Once the primary queue reached max retry events, the system was unable to process additional messages from the queue, causing widespread delivery delays. Additionally, because the queue did not throw error alerts when it became saturated, our standard monitoring did not immediately flag the issue, allowing the backlog to persist until customers noticed gaps in their expected data. A small number of customers were affected by a migration misconfiguration stemming from an unrelated prior incident. This configuration error caused the new delivery system to skip processing a small portion of events entirely. Remediation Steps: Once the source of the issue was identified, Okta's engineering team immediately began rolling back to the original event delivery service at approximately 7:30 AM PT. The rollbacks were completed at approximately 1:21 PM PT. Any events triggered after 1:21 PM encountered no lag. The remaining events in the new system queue were organically processed by 4:45 PM PT. These actions successfully addressed the issue, and normal operations were restored by 4:45 PM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta has currently implemented the following: Added and improved alerting related to Okta webhook delivery Additionally, we are reviewing and enhancing additional internal alerting processes and procedures to prevent this issue from recurring in the future. To further enhance reliability, we are implementing stronger validation and assurance practices for new system component change controls.

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Started Sep 15, 2026, 03:15 PM UTC· resolved Sep 26, 2026, 12:22 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 03:15 PM UTC

   At 9/15/2026 8:15 AM PT, Okta Engineering has identified an issue causing intermittent access failures when users launch Microsoft Office 365 applications, specifically Outlook, Calendar, and People, directly from their Okta Dashboard chiclets. When clicking these application chiclets, the user will receive an HTTP 401 Unauthorized error due to configured redirects. We are actively investigating the root cause. Further updates will be provided as soon as more information becomes available. Affected cells: okta-emea.com:1, okta.com:1, okta.com:2, okta.com:3, okta.com:4, okta.com:6, okta.com:7, okta.com:8, okta.com:9, okta.com:11, okta.com:12, okta.com:14, okta.com:16, okta.com:17, okta.com:18, okta.com:19, okta.com:20, okta.com:22

2. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 04:22 PM UTC

   Okta Engineering teams are actively working on a solution and coordinating with the service vendor to restore direct tile functionality. We'll provide an update in 30 minutes, or sooner, as additional information becomes available.

3. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 04:54 PM UTC

   We are continuing to work directly with our third-party service provider to troubleshoot and resolve the intermittent HTTP 401 redirect errors affecting Office 365 applications. We will provide another update as soon as new details are available.

4. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 06:30 PM UTC

   Active troubleshooting with our vendor remains a high-priority escalation across both engineering teams. While root cause determination is still underway, we understand the operational impact and are fully focused on driving this to resolution. Our next update will be posted as soon as new details are available.

5. identified Sep 15, 2026, 11:02 PM UTC

   Our third-party vendor has identified the root cause that is intermittently impacting Microsoft 365 services and is currently deploying a fix. The deployment is underway as of September 15, 2026, though complete propagation across all user accounts is expected to take approximately 48 hours to fully resolve the issue. We are actively monitoring the rollout progress and will provide further updates as new details become available. Additional root cause information will be available once the vendor has fully completed the rollout of the fix and validated full resolution.

6. identified Sep 17, 2026, 10:28 PM UTC

   We continue to track the issue intermittently affecting Microsoft 365 applications. Our third-party vendor has completed the fix and is actively rolling out. We anticipate an additional 24 hours to complete remediation and verify service stability. We will provide our next update by September 18, 2026, 4 PM PDT, or sooner if new details become available. Thank you for your continued patience as we work with the vendor to resolve this issue.

7. monitoring Sep 18, 2026, 03:28 PM UTC

   Okta teams are observing steady recovery across all environments following the deployment of a fix by our third-party vendor. As our Engineering teams continue post-remediation monitoring to ensure lasting platform stability, users who previously experienced redirection failures are now encouraged to re-test application access via their standard dashboard chiclets. Additional updates will be shared as recovery fully stabilizes across all tenant environments.

8. resolved Sep 18, 2026, 11:00 PM UTC

   The intermittent issue affecting Microsoft 365 applications has been addressed. Our monitoring shows a return to normal conditions. Our team is collaborating with our third-party vendor to identify the underlying root cause, and a Root Cause Analysis will be forthcoming.

9. resolved Sep 26, 2026, 12:22 AM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: On September 15, 2026, at 06:33 UTC, Okta customers utilizing identity provider-initiated sign-on flows for Office 365 Outlook, Calendar, and People applications began encountering intermittent HTTP 401 Unauthorized errors upon redirection. End users successfully completed authentication through Okta, but were unable to reach the target applications when selecting application tiles. Root Cause Summary: An architectural update to Microsoft’s infrastructure inadvertently affected incoming requests via legacy application redirection paths, resulting in HTTP 401 Unauthorized errors. While Okta completed session authentications and policy evaluations as expected, session handoffs failed at Microsoft’s endpoints due to changes in legacy assembly handling. Okta services remained fully operational throughout the event. Remediation Steps: Okta Engineering worked directly with Microsoft to identify and escalate the issue for resolution. Okta then monitored service telemetry until Microsoft completed the deployment of a software fix across its production environments, confirming full mitigation on September 18, 2026, at 17:30 UTC. Preventive Actions: Okta is implementing dynamic runtime URL configuration capabilities to allow application tile target URLs to be updated without requiring standard release cycles. Timing: Incident start: September 15, 2026, at 06:33 UTC Incident resolved: September 18, 2026, at 17:30 UTC Duration (# of minutes): 3 days, 10 hours, and 57 minutes.

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Started Sep 11, 2026, 12:10 PM UTC· resolved Sep 18, 2026, 09:37 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 11, 2026, 12:10 PM UTC

   At 11/09/2026 05:10 PT, Issues with Custom Domains in Cell OK9 - Customers with custom domains are currently experiencing issues in OK9. Engineering are currently investigating intermittent connectivity errors. Affected cells: okta.com:9

2. monitoring Sep 11, 2026, 12:50 PM UTC

   Engineering has identified the issue and taken remediation steps to mitigate the issue. Connectivity to Custom Domains has been restored and the service has returned to normal. Okta will continue to monitor.

3. resolved Sep 11, 2026, 01:10 PM UTC

   Okta has remediated the OK9 connectivity issues. Connectivity errors persisted from 5:00 AM PDT to 5:36 AM PDT. We will continue to monitor and produce an RCA in 5 business days.

4. resolved Sep 18, 2026, 09:37 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact On September 11, 2026, at 5:09 AM PDT, Okta’s internal monitoring detected access issues for custom domains on Cell OK9. During this period, customers on OK9 using custom domains may have experienced intermittent connection timeouts, connection resets, and TLS handshake failures when attempting to access Okta. Standard Okta domains were not impacted. Root Cause Summary An automated, scheduled infrastructure update left the service running with reduced capacity, rendering it incapable of sustaining incoming connection volume. Because connection-based autoscaling was non-functional at the time, traffic surges could not trigger an automatic scale-out. As a result, the service reached its connection limit and could not establish new connections. Okta Engineering resolved the issue by manually expanding router capacity to process the traffic and fully restore operations. Remediation Steps Okta Engineering incident response teams identified the connection limit as the cause and scaled out router capacity to handle the additional load, restoring service at 5:36 AM PDT. Preventative Actions To mitigate future occurrences, Okta is actively implementing key preventive measures: updating and improving connection-based autoscaling, enhancing alerting to accelerate detection of connection bottlenecks. Trust Category: Service Degradation Total Duration: 36 minutes

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Started Sep 03, 2026, 09:30 AM UTC· resolved Sep 11, 2026, 05:26 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 09:30 AM UTC

   At 9/3/2026 2:35 AM PT, the Engineering team became aware of an issue affecting customers in US Preview 1. During this time, users may be experiencing intermittent issues within our system. Our team is actively investigating this issue and to mitigate the issue. We will provide another update within the next hour, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: oktapreview.com:1

2. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 10:42 AM UTC

   The Engineering team continues to investigate the error 500 issue in OP1. During this time, users may be experiencing intermittent issues within our system. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 11:02 AM UTC

   The Engineering team continues to investigate the error 500 issue in OP1. During this time, users may be experiencing intermittent issues within our system. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

4. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 11:34 AM UTC

   The Engineering team continues to investigate the error 500 issue in OP1. During this time, users may be experiencing intermittent issues within our system. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

5. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 12:00 PM UTC

   The Engineering team continues to investigate the error 500 issue in OP1. During this time, users may be experiencing intermittent issues within our system. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

6. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 12:30 PM UTC

   The Engineering team continues to investigate the error 500 issue in OP1. During this time, users may be experiencing intermittent issues within our system. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

7. monitoring Sep 03, 2026, 01:03 PM UTC

   Okta Engineering was able to take the necessary actions to mitigate the issue and is currently monitoring for stability. The cause of the issue and specifics on actions taken will be posted on the Trust page.

8. resolved Sep 03, 2026, 02:09 PM UTC

   After monitoring for an extended period, we confirmed that the issue has not reoccurred. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days. We sincerely apologize for the impact this had on you and your users.

9. resolved Sep 11, 2026, 05:26 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On September 2nd, 2026 at 11:43 PM PDT, Okta internal monitoring and customer reports alerted our team of issues for users accessing Okta Preview Cell OP1 in North America. During this period, some customers on OP1 may have experienced HTTP 500 Internal Server Error or 503 Service Unavailable response codes for various endpoints, including those related to authentication and SSO. Root Cause Summary: A release introduced a temporary cache data structure mismatch between software versions. This cache data is used as a part of request evaluation and expected to be forward and backward compatible. As a result, these failed cache object evaluations resulted in errors across core authentication and API endpoints. Remediation Steps: Okta Engineering incident response teams took a number of corrective actions, including rolling back service changes and isolating and clearing incompatible data values from the cache store. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta has currently implemented the following: Resolved data structure to an upgrade safe implementation Implemented drift detection data consistency enforcement rules and added additional automated tests related to enforcing compatibility between service deployments Additionally, we are reviewing and enhancing our internal testing processes and procedures to prevent this issue from recurring in the future.

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Started Aug 14, 2026, 12:00 PM UTC· resolved Aug 21, 2026, 04:05 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 14, 2026, 12:00 PM UTC

   At 8/14/2026 7:35 AM PT, the Core Identity team became aware of an issue with email deliverability affecting customers in commercial cells. During this time, users may be experiencing intermittent issues receiving email from Okta. Our team is actively investigating this issue and is working to mitigate it.

2. investigating Aug 14, 2026, 03:23 PM UTC

   Okta Engineering is investigating and has determined that the incident is currently impacting email delivery to a subset of customers. During this time, customers may experience email delivery deferrals. We’ll provide an update in 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. monitoring Aug 14, 2026, 03:39 PM UTC

   Okta Engineering has determined that certain third-party providers were failing to receive emails from Okta. Our monitoring shows delivery rates are recovering to normal conditions and will continue to monitor until full resolution. Our next update will be in 30 minutes or sooner if additional information becomes available.

4. resolved Aug 14, 2026, 04:50 PM UTC

   Our monitoring indicates that email deferrals to the impacted third-party email service have returned to the expected baseline. Additional information will be available within 5 Business days.

5. resolved Aug 21, 2026, 04:04 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Okta detected an increase in customer support tickets regarding email delivery issues. Customers using custom email domains routed through Proofpoint experienced email delivery deferrals. During this period, affected end users were unable to receive system-generated emails, including One-Time Passwords (OTPs), account activation emails, password reset emails, factor enrollment emails, and other automated notifications. Root Cause Summary: Third-party provider Proofpoint experienced a service disruption, causing issues with email deliverability. When Okta services attempted to send emails to recipient domains whose MX records pointed to Proofpoint’s infrastructure, the delivery attempts failed due to connection errors, resulting in deferred delivery. Okta’s email sending infrastructure operated normally throughout the event. Remediation Steps: Okta Engineering monitored service telemetry and confirmed that email delivery returned to normal pre-incident baselines once Proofpoint restored stability to its infrastructure. Preventive Actions: Okta is defining automated alerting thresholds for email-bound and deferral rates to decrease detection time and updating runbooks to allow faster diagnosis of downstream provider disruptions. Timing: Incident start: August 14, 2026, at 5:00 AM PDT Incident resolved: August 14, 2026, at 10:04 AM PDT. Duration (# of minutes): 304 minutes Based on details provided by https://www.proofpoint.com/us/support-services

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Started Jul 24, 2026, 10:55 AM UTC· resolved Aug 28, 2026, 05:34 PM UTC

1. monitoring Jul 24, 2026, 07:30 AM UTC

   At 3:55 AM PT on July 24th, 2026, the Okta Engineering team became aware of a a third-party incident occurred and affecting customers on OK7/OK14/OK12/OP3 cells of the environment. During this time customers on the impacted cell may experience timeout and not able to login. The issue was resolved at 4:25 AM PT and Okta continues to monitor as our monitoring shows a recovery to normal conditions. Affected cells: okta.com:7, okta.com:12, oktapreview.com:3, okta.com:14

2. monitoring Jul 24, 2026, 01:55 PM UTC

   After a period of stability and monitoring, we can now confirm that the service issue has been fully resolved. Additional root cause information will be available within five business days.

3. resolved Aug 01, 2026, 03:28 AM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to our services to prevent future occurrences. Detection and Impact On July 24, 2026, at approximately 3:55 AM PDT, Okta observed service disruption for US-5 and US-Gov-1 and service degradation for US-7, US-12, US-14, and Preview-3. The incident specifically impacted customers utilizing AD/LDAP delegated authentication and OAuth token-endpoint clients situated within the AWS us-west-2 region. Throughout the event, users encountered errors accessing resources, authentication failures, agent connection timeouts, latency, and OAuth token requests. Root Cause Summary The root cause originated from errors within a cloud service provider for the affected region. Remediation Steps The cloud service provider recovered connectivity, and Okta service stabilized by approximately 4:10 AM PDT, and our teams confirmed a complete return to baseline operations at 4:19 AM PDT. Preventative Actions Okta is actively reviewing and executing several initiatives to prevent future occurrences. These measures include: auditing and improving our incident response processes in the case of extended issues within a region, and refining our monitoring and alerting based on this incident. Total Duration Total Duration (Minutes): 15 minutes Start Time: 3:55 AM PDT End Time: 4:10 AM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 15

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Started Jul 22, 2026, 12:15 PM UTC· resolved Jul 29, 2026, 11:34 PM UTC

1. monitoring Jul 22, 2026, 03:14 PM UTC

   Please be advised that our scheduled maintenance is currently still ongoing, and the Okta Engineering teams are actively engaged. During this extended window, customers may experience errors when logging in to Okta Workflows. We appreciate your patience as our teams work to complete this operation as quickly and safely as possible. To understand how this might impact your organization and to view recommended workarounds, please review our detailed support article: https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/okta-workflows-cell-migration-expected-behaviors-and-workarounds?language=en_US . We will provide further updates in 30 minutes, or sooner, as more information becomes available.

2. monitoring Jul 22, 2026, 03:49 PM UTC

   Maintenance activity is still ongoing as we ensure the migration is completed safely and successfully. We will continue to share updates in 30 minutes or sooner, as they become available. In the meantime, please refer to the support article below for the latest guidance on workarounds and expected behaviors: https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/okta-workflows-cell-migration-expected-behaviors-and-workarounds?language=en_US

3. monitoring Jul 22, 2026, 04:19 PM UTC

   We are now observing stable system performance following the migration activities. Our engineering teams remain actively engaged in monitoring all services. Core workflows are recovering, and customers should see continued improvements. We will provide our next update in 30 minutes, or sooner if new information becomes available.

4. resolved Jul 22, 2026, 04:59 PM UTC

   After a period of stability and monitoring, we can now confirm that the service issue has been fully resolved. Additional root cause information will be available within five business days.

5. identified Jul 23, 2026, 02:15 AM UTC

   The Workflows migration has extended beyond our anticipated completion and will now be completed at 4:00 PM UTC. We apologize for any inconvenience and will provide further updates as more information becomes available. Affected cells: okta.com:1, okta.com:2, okta.com:3, okta.com:4, okta.com:6, okta.com:7, okta.com:11

6. resolved Jul 29, 2026, 11:34 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to our services to prevent future occurrences. We recognize that this maintenance ran beyond its originally communicated window and that our status updates during that extension did not keep customers informed in a timely way. We apologize for this; improving it is part of our preventative actions below. Detection and Impact On July 22, 2026, at 5:15 AM PDT, Okta Workflows in our North America region (FL1 cell) began experiencing issues that affected Workflows users across US Cells 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 11. During this time, some workflow executions failed or ended prematurely, and users encountered errors loading the Workflows Console. Additionally, some app connections stopped working, requiring users to manually reauthenticate to restore functionality. Root Cause Summary The issue occurred during a planned system upgrade. A defect in a third-party vendor's software caused the upgrade to run significantly longer than expected. While migrating to a new datastore system, a communication failure between system components prevented the service from returning to its normal state within the expected window. During this period, the Workflows Console did not degrade gracefully when the underlying data store was unavailable; instead, it surfaced errors directly to users. In addition, app connections whose credentials could not be refreshed during the disruption were left in a failed state and were not automatically refreshed, which is why some errors continued after the upgrade completed, until the affected connection was reauthorized. Remediation Steps The third-party vendor confirmed the cluster stabilized at 8:34 AM PDT. Following stabilization, Okta Engineering recovered affected services to clear stale configuration caches. Any customers who experienced OAuth token refresh errors during this period were required to manually reauthorize any app connections. Full functionality was restored by 9:33 AM PDT. If you’re still affected: manually reauthorize the affected connection credentials in the Workflows Console (see KB: Okta Workflows: Cell Migration Expected Behaviors and Workarounds). Workflow executions that failed during the window can be re-run using your normal process; contact Okta Support if you’d like help identifying affected executions. Preventative Actions To prevent similar incidents from occurring, Okta has taken the following steps. We have enforced a fleet-wide hold on all further datastore engine migrations until our third-party vendor deploys a fix for the confirmed defect and confirms it is safe to proceed. We are also updating the Workflows Console to fail fast and recover automatically when infrastructure is temporarily unavailable, ensuring users see a reconnecting state rather than raw system errors. In parallel, we are adding direct automated monitoring and alerting for cluster-convergence failures to ensure faster detection during maintenance windows. Finally, we are improving how we communicate during maintenance that runs long, including a more timely status page and progress/completion updates. For questions about Workflows reliability or roadmap, your Okta account team can help. Total Duration Total Duration (Minutes): 258 minutes (4 hours and 18 minutes) Start Time: 5:15 AM PDT End Time: 9:33 AM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 258 minutes

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Started Jul 14, 2026, 01:32 AM UTC· resolved Jul 14, 2026, 01:52 AM UTC

1. investigating Jul 14, 2026, 01:32 AM UTC

   This is just a test performed quarterly to ensure the tooling works. Affected cells: OK1

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Started Jul 13, 2026, 08:01 PM UTC· resolved Jul 21, 2026, 01:57 AM UTC

1. investigating Jul 13, 2026, 08:15 PM UTC

   On July 13, 2026, at 1:15 PM PT, we detected a service interruption that impacted all users in cell OP2. Users may have encountered connection errors or 5xx error messages. Our team is actively investigating this issue and is working to mitigate it. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: oktapreview.com:2

2. identified Jul 13, 2026, 09:23 PM UTC

   Our engineering team has applied a potential fix to the impacted preview environment and is actively monitoring the system for recovery. We will provide another update within 30 minutes, or sooner if new information becomes available. We sincerely apologize for any inconvenience.

3. monitoring Jul 13, 2026, 09:39 PM UTC

   Our Engineering team has applied a fix, and we are observing service restoration to our OP2 preview environment. We are closely monitoring the system and will provide another update within 30 minutes.

4. resolved Jul 13, 2026, 09:53 PM UTC

   We have confirmed that the OP2 preview environment has fully stabilized, and the earlier issue is completely resolved. Additional root cause information will be available within five business days.

5. resolved Jul 21, 2026, 01:57 AM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On July 13, 2026 at 1:01 PM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to elevated errors in the EMEA Preview Cell environment. During this period, all customers in the EMEA Preview Cell environment were impacted, experiencing authentication failures and service slowness. Administrators and end users may have encountered "Internal Server Error" messages and other errors when attempting to sign in or access Okta services. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered during a scheduled service upgrade. A misconfiguration caused the EMEA Preview Cell cluster to inadvertently receive an incorrect version of a critical infrastructure routing component. This update broke internal networking routing, which prevented communication between otherwise healthy infrastructure components. Because requests could not reach the core application, it resulted in widespread service errors and authentication failures. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified the issue and immediately began deploying the previous, stable version of the routing configuration. Following the rollback, engineers systematically restarted the affected services (including gateways and proxies) to restore internal connectivity. These actions successfully addressed the issue, and customer impact was fully mitigated by 2:20 PM PT. Preventative Actions: We are refining our operational processes to enhance service stability. This includes ongoing work to improve auto detection and monitoring capabilities, helping us identify and address potential issues more effectively. Total Duration (Minutes): 79 minutes (1 hour 19 minutes) Start Time: 1:01 PM PT End Time: 2:20 PM PT

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Started Jul 07, 2026, 07:40 PM UTC· resolved Jul 27, 2026, 07:00 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 07, 2026, 08:15 PM UTC

   At 7/7/2026 12:40 PM PT, the Workflows Automation and Extensibility team became aware of an issue with to our service affecting customers in US Cell 14. During this time, users may be experiencing intermittent issues within our system. Our team is actively investigating this issue and to mitigate the issue. We will provide another update within the next , or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta.com:14

2. investigating Jul 07, 2026, 08:50 PM UTC

   Okta engineering has an identified an issue affecting Okta Workflows and are currently taking steps to remediate. Customers may see 500 errors or timeouts in the Okta Workflows console, API endpoints, and inbound webhooks. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. resolved Jul 07, 2026, 09:03 PM UTC

   The issue with Okta Workflows has been resolved. All Workflows are now processing normally. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

4. resolved Jul 15, 2026, 03:22 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident may have caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On July 7th, 2026, at 1:01 PM PDT, Okta internal monitoring and customer reports alerted our team to issues with users accessing Workflows on the Okta cell OK14 in North America. During this period, customers on FL14 may have experienced HTTP 500, 503, or 504 Gateway Timeout errors when navigating to Workflows from the admin portal or attempting to log in to the Workflows Console via SSO. Existing sessions may have errored out intermittently. Scheduled and on-demand workflows, inline hooks, and webhooks may have experienced errors and timeouts. Additionally, in-flight executions experienced timeouts. Root Cause Summary: This incident occurred during the planned deployment of release 2027.07.0 to the FL14 cell. In the course of the deployment process, a service pod responsible for executing schema updates was terminated prematurely. This early termination led to unexpected, long-lived database connections, which ultimately caused connection exhaustion on the cell's primary database. Remediation Steps: Upon receiving alerts and customer reports, the team began diagnostics at 12:44 PM PDT. By 1:30 PM PDT, they isolated and removed the service pod performing schema updates. This allowed the database connections to clear, restoring full service by 1:45 PM PDT. Preventative Actions: To prevent future occurrences, Okta is committed to strengthening our infrastructure stability and enhancing our monitoring capabilities. We are currently implementing strategic improvements to our deployment processes and alerting systems to ensure faster detection, response and greater resilience across our services. Total Duration: 67 minutes

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Started Jun 26, 2026, 02:00 PM UTC· resolved Jul 07, 2026, 12:53 PM UTC

1. identified Jun 26, 2026, 02:30 PM UTC

   The Okta Engineering team has identified the potential cause of the issue. Customers trying to connect to the custom domain would see the connectivity error. Our Core Identity team is working on implementing a fix. We will provide another update within the next 15 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta.com:11

2. monitoring Jun 26, 2026, 03:22 PM UTC

   Our Engineering team has identified the issue, and we will continue monitoring the issue. We will provide another update within the next 15 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. resolved Jun 29, 2026, 11:50 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 22nd, 2026, at 2:08 PM PDT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to errors in the EU environment. During this period, administrators and end users may have experienced intermittent 500 Internal Server Error and 429 Rate Limit responses when attempting to access Okta services. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by an unexpected scaling down of the application cluster during scheduled maintenance of the environment. This change accidentally overwrote the custom capacity settings for several of our applications. This caused the system to automatically revert to its lowest default capacity, drastically reducing the amount of user traffic it could handle simultaneously. As a result, the remaining servers were immediately overwhelmed by the normal volume of user requests, leading to system slowdowns, errors, and "too many requests" blockages for our customers in the impacted cell. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified the root cause issue at 2:44 PM PDT. The team mitigated the issue by scaling up resource capacity, completely stabilizing service health back to normal levels by 2:48 PM PDT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: - Strengthen guardrails by improving our validation tools and multi-environment review processes to automatically detect and flag unexpected server capacity changes before they’re applied. - Accelerate system monitoring by implementing enhanced monitoring thresholds to instantly detect and report infrastructure capacity drops before they can impact end users. - Optimize failover protocols by auditing critical alert paths for maximum reliability while establishing a clear, structured communication plan for when automated backup systems are triggered. These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again. Duration (# of minutes):40 minutes

4. resolved Jun 30, 2026, 03:01 PM UTC

   The Root Cause Analysis (RCA) details previously posted in this update were published in error and belonged to a separate incident that occurred on June 22nd (I-10858). We sincerely apologize for any confusion this may have caused. Our formal RCA process for this OK11 custom domains incident (I-10874) is still actively underway. We remain committed to transparency and will provide an accurate, dedicated RCA for this disruption within 5 business days (expected late July 6, 2026). Thank you for your patience.

5. resolved Jul 06, 2026, 10:01 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 26th at 7:43 AM (PT), Okta was alerted to customer reports of connection issues and authentication failures when accessing custom domains. The incident was isolated to OK11 and normal connectivity was restored at 7:53 AM (PT). Root Cause Summary: Okta Engineering identified that the root cause of the issue originated during a custom domain traffic migration in OK11 on June 26th at 10:47 AM (PT), the new routing infrastructure became resource-constrained under increased traffic volume the next day. This resulted in TCP connection resets and errors sent to clients attempting to access custom domains. Remediation Steps: Once the source of the issue was identified, Okta engineering immediately mitigated the issue by reverting custom domain traffic back to the previous infrastructure, restoring normal connectivity within minutes. Preventative Actions: To prevent future incidents, the routing infrastructure was scaled to prevent recurrence. Okta will work to implement enhanced monitoring and alerting, as well as updated auto-scaling policies to ensure routing infrastructure maintains adequate capacity during traffic fluctuations and future infrastructure improvements. Duration (# of minutes): Total Duration (Minutes): 53 minutes

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Started Jun 22, 2026, 09:22 PM UTC· resolved Jul 09, 2026, 02:41 PM UTC

1. investigating Jun 22, 2026, 09:22 PM UTC

   At 6/22/2026 2:22 PM PT, the team became aware of an issue with our Core Platform service affecting customers in EU Cell 1. During this time, users may experience intermittent failures and high latency when logging in or accessing the service. Our team is actively investigating this issue and is working to mitigate it. We will provide another update within the next 15 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta.com:1

2. monitoring Jun 22, 2026, 10:02 PM UTC

   The Okta Engineering team has observed that the errors have been reduced. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates as we move toward full mitigation.

3. resolved Jun 22, 2026, 10:33 PM UTC

   Internal monitoring confirmed that the EU1 environment has fully recovered and is operating normally. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

4. resolved Jun 30, 2026, 02:43 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 22nd, 2026, at 2:08 PM PDT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to errors in the EU environment. During this period, administrators and end users may have experienced intermittent 500 Internal Server Error and 429 Rate Limit responses when attempting to access Okta services. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by an unexpected scaling down of the application cluster during scheduled maintenance of the environment. This change accidentally overwrote the custom capacity settings for several of our applications. This caused the system to automatically revert to its lowest default capacity, drastically reducing the amount of user traffic it could handle simultaneously. As a result, the remaining servers were immediately overwhelmed by the normal volume of user requests, leading to system slowdowns, errors, and "too many requests" blockages for our customers in the impacted cell. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified the root cause issue at 2:44 PM PDT. The team mitigated the issue by scaling up resource capacity, completely stabilizing service health back to normal levels by 2:48 PM PDT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: - Strengthen guardrails by improving our validation tools and multi-environment review processes to automatically detect and flag unexpected server capacity changes before they’re applied. - Accelerate system monitoring by implementing enhanced monitoring thresholds to instantly detect and report infrastructure capacity drops before they can impact end users. - Optimize failover protocols by auditing critical alert paths for maximum reliability while establishing a clear, structured communication plan for when automated backup systems are triggered. These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again. Duration (# of minutes):40 minutes

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Started Jun 02, 2026, 09:45 AM UTC· resolved Jun 10, 2026, 02:19 AM UTC

1. investigating Jun 02, 2026, 12:45 AM UTC

   At 6/2/2026 2:45 AM PT, the Core Identity team became aware of an issue with authentication to our service affecting customers in EMEA Cell 9. During this time, users may be experiencing intermittent issues within our system, resulting in error 500. Our team is actively investigating this issue and rerouting the traffic to mitigate the issue. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta.com:9

2. investigating Jun 02, 2026, 11:21 AM UTC

   Engineering is still investigating the issue, recent actions that were taken show errors subsiding.

3. monitoring Jun 02, 2026, 11:40 AM UTC

   The Okta Engineering team has observed that the errors have been reduced. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates as we move toward full mitigation.

4. resolved Jun 02, 2026, 12:07 PM UTC

   Okta Engineering has confirmed that the issue has been resolved. An RCA will be provided in five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

5. resolved Jun 10, 2026, 02:19 AM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 2nd, 2026, at 2:36 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to elevated errors in the OK9 environment. During this period, administrators and end users may have experienced intermittent 500 Internal Server errors when trying to access Okta services. Additionally, Admins may have encountered error messages when fetching certain records. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by a misconfiguration introduced during a scheduled maintenance of the environment. This maintenance introduced an error that caused connectivity issues within specific infrastructure components. Only a small percentage of the infrastructure was affected during this period. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified and isolated impacted infrastructure at 4:01AM PT. These actions successfully addressed the issue, and normal operations were restored by 4:17 AM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: Incident response processes, procedures, and investigation tools to more rapidly diagnose similar issues in the future. Risk evaluation processes to include expanding error types and adding additional appropriate corresponding alerts and monitoring associated with vulnerability updates. These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again and, in cases like these, allow Okta to respond faster when possible. Duration (# of minutes): 100

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Started Apr 30, 2026, 08:07 PM UTC· resolved May 08, 2026, 02:51 AM UTC

1. identified Apr 30, 2026, 11:24 PM UTC

   On April 30, 2026, at 1:07 PM PT, we identified a service disruption when logging on to the OP1 Preview environment. Following the completion of our initial infrastructure rollback, we have confirmed that the underlying service instability persists, indicating a more complex root cause. While our primary focus has been on immediate technical mitigation to stabilize the environment, further analysis reveals that the issue extends beyond the initial proxy configuration. We have now escalated this to our core engineering teams for a comprehensive audit. Emergency routing measures are being evaluated to restore service for critical workflows while we work to isolate and resolve the impact. Affected cells: oktapreview.com:1

2. monitoring May 01, 2026, 12:28 AM UTC

   The Okta Engineering team has successfully resolved the service instability that was causing system timeouts. Okta engineering has confirmed that errors have subsided, and we have transitioned into a monitoring phase to ensure continued stability. We sincerely appreciate your patience while our team worked to identify and resolve the issue.

3. resolved May 01, 2026, 01:01 AM UTC

   Internal monitoring confirmed that the OP1 environment has fully recovered and is operating normally. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

4. resolved May 08, 2026, 02:51 AM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On April 30th, 2026, at 10:57 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team of login issues for users accessing Okta Preview Cell 1. During this period, customers may have received 500 errors for query timeouts and were unable to log in. Root Cause Summary: The incident stemmed from a database query change. The updated query intermittently exceeded its timeout limit across several login endpoints. Consequently, users experienced 500 errors and were unable to log in. Remediation Steps: Upon receiving the alerts, Okta Engineering immediately launched an investigation. By 1:02 PM PT, the team took initial mitigation steps to resolve the issue, however these steps did not resolve the issue. The incident response team continued to triage and diagnose the issue and identified the root cause related to the updated database query change at 4:50 PM PT. The team reverted the new query behavior at 5:00 PM PT in Preview Cell 1, and full service functionality was restored by 5:05 PM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: -Reviewing incident response processes and investigation tools to more rapidly diagnose similar issues in the future -Risk evaluation processes associated with query updates -Alerts and monitors associated with the database proxy These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again and, in cases like these, allow Okta to respond faster when possible. Duration (# of minutes): 375

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Started Apr 22, 2026, 04:08 PM UTC· resolved May 06, 2026, 07:14 AM UTC

1. resolved Apr 22, 2026, 04:08 PM UTC

   On April 22, 2026, at 9:08 AM PT, we confirmed a third-party incident occurred with the Device Trust SAML authentication flow resulting in some users being redirected to an incorrect service provider between approximately 8:24 and 8:30am PT. This behavior originated from Kolide, a third-party middleware integration used for device trust signals and was isolated to organizations that use that specific security layer. While this resulted in users receiving 400 errors and being unable to access their intended applications, our investigation confirms that users were unable to access unauthorized applications or environments. Mitigation was in place by 8:30 AM PT, restoring service. A full root cause analysis will be forthcoming.

2. resolved Apr 29, 2026, 10:42 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Customers using the third-party service Kolide began reporting that attempts to sign in to their orgs redirected to an unrelated tenant and received an HTTP 400 error with the message “Login Failed - 400: Bad Request Error Code: GENERAL_NONSUCCESS” Root Cause Summary: Kolide has confirmed for Okta that an incident occurred with their Device Trust SAML authentication system, resulting in some users being redirected to an incorrect service provider after completing authentication. This resulted in users receiving a 400 error. Kolide reported that users were unable to access their intended application, any unauthorized applications, or any unauthorized environments. Remediation Steps: Okta Support advised customers that they could temporarily disable their Kolide integrations to allow their users to successfully access their services. Timing: Kolide reports: Incident start: April 22, 2026, at 8:24 AM PDT Incident resolved: April 22, 2026, at 8:30 AM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 6 Minutes

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Started Apr 19, 2026, 08:52 PM UTC· resolved Apr 26, 2026, 02:14 AM UTC

No vendor updates were posted for this incident.

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Started Apr 13, 2026, 06:30 PM UTC· resolved Apr 21, 2026, 11:16 PM UTC

1. resolved Apr 13, 2026, 06:30 PM UTC

   At 4/13/2026 12:30 PM PT, Engineering became aware of an issue with job processing to our service affecting customers submitting Access Requests. Our team is actively investigating this issue and working on a fix to address the issues. We will provide another update within the next 30 min, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

2. resolved Apr 13, 2026, 08:33 PM UTC

   Okta has identified the issue impacting Access Request job processing and Engineering Teams are working to restore the service. We are rolling out the fix for this issue in 30 minutes and will provide another update once the fix is rolled out.

3. resolved Apr 13, 2026, 08:59 PM UTC

   Okta has identified the root cause of the issue affecting Access Request job processing as of 1:00 PM PT. A resolution was implemented at 1:45 PM PT, and the service is now fully operational for new submissions. The engineering team is currently working to restore and process any requests submitted during the disruption period. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

4. resolved Apr 13, 2026, 09:29 PM UTC

   While new Access Request job processing has been restored, Okta is also working to resolve the issue affecting in-flight Access Request job requests processed during the disruption period. The fix for this issue is expected to be implemented around 5:00pm PT. Okta will provide another update at 5:00pm PT or sooner if one becomes available.

5. resolved Apr 14, 2026, 12:25 AM UTC

   The issue with in-flight Access Request job requests processed during the disruption period has also been resolved. All Access Request jobs are now processing normally. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

6. resolved Apr 21, 2026, 11:16 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact: On April 13, 2026, at 11:51 AM PST, an incident was reported where Okta Identity Governance (OIG) access requests stalled in the "In Progress" state indefinitely across all environments. The system accepted initial submissions and first-level approvals, but failed to trigger subsequent automated tasks like assigning users to apps/groups or running delegated workflows. . Root Cause Summary: During a recent update deployment, new tasks inadvertently moved to a 'LOCKED' status without implementing the necessary logic to transition them back to 'OPEN.' This caused the tasks to become permanently hidden, preventing the automated execution of the action associated with them. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering teams promptly responded, initiating immediate detection and diagnosis. Corrective measures, including a code fix deployed to all cells, were implemented to prevent any new access requests from becoming stuck. A remediation migration successfully transitioned most affected requests to a fixed state. Normal functionality was fully restored by April 13, 2026, at 5:18 PM PST, following the completion of a final migration to unblock remaining requests.On April 14, 2026, Okta took further steps to resolve in-flight requests that were stuck, moving them to a final, terminal state. Preventative Actions: Okta is taking several steps to prevent this issue from recurring. These include enhanced testing, deployment of safeguards, and improvements to our monitoring and alerting systems. Duration (# of minutes): 434

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Started Mar 16, 2026, 08:42 AM UTC· resolved Apr 15, 2026, 11:37 PM UTC

1. resolved Mar 16, 2026, 08:42 AM UTC

   Okta Engineering team became aware of the third-party issue that impacted access to support.okta.com and status.okta.com, and confirmed that the third-party provider has resolved the issue and services are restored. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

2. resolved Mar 24, 2026, 11:32 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Okta internal monitoring alerted our engineering team to disruptions to the Okta status page and the commercial support portal. Okta Engineering identified a service disruption with our third-party provider and confirmed the impact. During the disruption, customer admins were unable to access the Okta Support Center (support.okta.com) to log support cases or view the primary status page (status.okta.com). Root Cause Summary: Okta’s third-party provider, responsible for hosting the Okta Support Center and status page, experienced a service disruption. The third-party provider identified a version mismatch between their application and database layers as the technical trigger. This mismatch resulted in internal server errors and login failures, rendering the Okta Support Center and status page inaccessible for a portion of their disruption. Remediation Steps: Okta teams posted an admin banner within the Okta Admin Console to provide visibility into the disruption and offer a phone number for customers who needed to log support cases manually while the Okta Support Center was unavailable. Services were fully restored after the third-party provider successfully deployed a fix-forward release to the impacted infrastructure, which restored login access. Preventive Actions: As part of Okta’s commitment to operational resilience, we have optimized our vendor engagement matrix to accelerate incident mitigation and downstream coordination. We are also conducting an expanded audit of external dependencies to formalize alternative response procedures within our disaster recovery plans. Simultaneously, Engineering has enhanced real-time monitoring and alerting for service endpoints, enabling faster detection and resolution. Timing: Incident start: March 16, 2026, at 08:58 PM PDT Incident resolved: March 16, 2026, at 11:34 PM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 156 minutes

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Started Mar 13, 2026, 06:40 PM UTC· resolved Apr 15, 2026, 11:36 PM UTC

1. resolved Mar 13, 2026, 06:40 PM UTC

   At 10:30 AM PT on 3/13/2026, the Okta Engineering team became aware of an impact to the Okta Admin Console. affecting customers on OK1 and EU1 cells. During this time, customers may not be able to view all the users. The Okta Engineering team is investigating and working to mitigate the issue as soon as possible. We’ll provide an update in 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

2. resolved Mar 13, 2026, 06:48 PM UTC

   At around 11:20AM PT, Okta Engineering has confirmed that the issue has been resolved in both cells, EU1 and OK1. An RCA will be provided in five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

3. resolved Mar 20, 2026, 08:35 PM UTC

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact On March 13, 2026, at 10:49 AM PT, Okta detected a service degradation that prevented some customers on the OK1 and EU1 cells from performing directory operations, viewing or searching for users, groups, and devices in the Okta Admin Console. Customers may have experienced "Invalid search query" messages or 5xx errors. This issue also affected several API endpoints related to users, groups, and devices, which may have impacted customer integrations relying on this functionality. End-user authentication was not impacted. Root Cause Summary The root cause of this incident was a planned configuration change that exposed a bug in the underlying service, resulting in system errors and disrupting both directory-based APIs. Remediation Steps Upon detection, Okta's engineering teams initiated incident response procedures. Once the problematic configuration change was identified as the source of the errors, it was immediately reverted. After the reversion was applied and verified, full functionality was restored to all impacted customers. Preventative Actions Okta is taking steps to prevent future occurrences of this kind, including enhancing our testing processes, hardening and improving our configuration rollout strategy, and upgrading our monitoring and alerting systems for enhanced detection. Start Time: 03/13/2026 10:17 AM PT End Time: 03/13/2026 11:21 AM PT Duration (# of minutes): 64

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