Cloud.gov experienced a notice incident on June 11, 2026, lasting 19h 33m. The incident has been resolved; the full update timeline is below.
Update timeline
- investigating Jun 11, 2026, 05:52 PM UTC
Service brokers that Cloud.gov customers use to manage AWS resources (e.g. RDS, S3, etc) are currently experiencing an outage. The Cloud.gov team is investigating and will provide further updates as we know more.
- identified Jun 11, 2026, 06:48 PM UTC
The Cloud.gov team has identified the cause of the outage as inadvertent access key rotation for Cloud.gov applications that manage AWS resources, such as service brokers for RDS databases. The AWS access keys themselves that customers use to access their resources (e.g. RDS databases, S3 buckets) **are unaffected and are still working**. The Cloud.gov team is actively working to restore functionality for services that manage AWS resources.
- monitoring Jun 11, 2026, 09:27 PM UTC
All services on Cloud.gov that manage AWS resources should now be operational. If you are still experiencing issues, please contact us at [email protected].
- resolved Jun 12, 2026, 01:25 PM UTC
Since we deployed our fixes at approximately 5:27 PM ET, the Cloud.gov team has observed no further indications of failures from the services that manage AWS resources. All customer-facing services and service brokers should be fully operational. If you are still experiencing issues, please contact us at [email protected]. As always, the Cloud.gov team will be conducting a post-mortem analysis of this incident in the coming days. We will share our findings and next steps once our analysis is complete.
- postmortem Jun 15, 2026, 06:07 PM UTC
**Summary** From approximately 12:22 PM to 7:19 PM ET on Thursday, June 11, 2026, [Cloud.gov](http://cloud.gov) service broker management actions were unavailable. During this window, customers could not create, update, or delete brokered services. Existing brokered services, including S3 buckets, RDS databases, and other already provisioned services, remained available. Customer applications continued to run, and we did not observe application downtime from this incident. **Impact** During the incident, customers were unable to: * Provision new brokered services * Update existing brokered services * Delete existing brokered services Existing service instances and customer applications were not interrupted. **Timeline** All times are Eastern Time. * 12:22 PM - An automated credential rotation process changed IAM credentials used by [Cloud.gov](http://cloud.gov) service brokers. * 12:57 PM - A [Cloud.gov](http://cloud.gov) engineer identified that some service broker IAM credentials were no longer working as expected. * 1:35 PM - The [Cloud.gov](http://cloud.gov) began coordinated incident response. * 2:34 PM - The [Cloud.gov](http://cloud.gov) began restoring IAM credentials and redeploying affected service brokers. * 7:19 PM - The final service broker was redeployed. All [Cloud.gov](http://cloud.gov) service brokers were confirmed operational. **Resolution** [Cloud.gov](http://cloud.gov) created replacement IAM credentials, redeployed the affected service brokers, and tested broker operations. After validation, the team confirmed that customers could again create, update, and delete brokered services. **Follow-up Actions** [Cloud.gov](http://cloud.gov) will take the following actions to reduce the change of a similar incident and improve recovery: * Add alerting to detect service broker IAM credential failures sooner. * Review IAM credential rotation procedures for service brokers. * Add stronger safeguards for automated credential rotation. * Improve automation for redeploying service brokers after credential changes. * Review incident response runbooks for service broker credential failures. Thank you for your patience while we resolved this issue. If you have any questions, please contact us at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]).