1Password Outage History

Started Jan 23, 2026, 08:04 PM UTC· resolved Jan 23, 2026, 08:04 PM UTC

1. resolved Jan 23, 2026, 08:04 PM UTC

   The 1Password browser extension, which works by injecting code into web pages, inadvertently included code from PrismJS, a third party dependency, breaking syntax highlighting on some websites that display code blocks.

2. postmortem Jan 23, 2026, 08:05 PM UTC

   # Incident Postmortem - 1Password Browser Extension Code Syntax Rendering Issue **Customer impact began \(stable rollout start\):** 2025-12-09 **Investigation Started:** 2025-12-17 **Incident Declared \(UTC\):** 2025-12-30 13:13 **Fixed Release First Available:** 2026-01-01 **Fixed Release Fully Available and Verified:** 2026-01-05 **Incident Marked Resolved \(UTC\):** 2026-01-05 02:15 **Service\(s\) Affected:** 1Password browser extension ## Summary The 1Password browser extension, which works by injecting code into web pages, inadvertently included code from PrismJS, a third party dependency, breaking syntax highlighting on some websites that display code blocks. The issue was reported in beta in early December, escalated after additional customer reports and a report from an external partner, and required releasing a stable update to remove the problematic dependency chain. This issue affected page rendering only and did not expose vault data or credentials. ## Impact on Customers Customers experienced broken code-block syntax highlighting on websites with `` HTML elements while using the 1Password browser extension version 8.11.22 across all major browsers. * **Code snippet rendering issue:** Syntax highlighting for code blocks was broken on sites that display code snippet; impacted sites included developer documentation pages, technical forums, and blogs with code snippets. * **Browser scope:** Reported in Chromium-based browsers initially, and confirmed to affect all major browsers. * **Customer reports:** Started in beta with a single report on December 3, 2025, with additional reports in stable December 15–16, 2025. From December 9, 2025 through January 3, 2026 we received 55 unique customer reports. The issue was later observed in stable and amplified via social media. ## What Happened? The injected content script in the 1Password browser extension was able to include UI-related dependencies from other parts of the 1Password codebase in a context where they should not exist. This happened due to a small change that accidentally pulled in additional libraries caused by insufficient restrictions/guardrails on what dependencies could be imported into injected scripts. * **Detection and Escalation:** On December 3, 2025, we received a beta report that syntax highlighting was broken when the 1Password extension was enabled. That report was incorrectly tagged and did not reach the owning team for timely triage, so we did not recognize it as a potential release blocker before version 8.11.22 rolled out to stable on December 9, 2025. On December 17, 2025, an external partner reported the issue affecting stable. That report was routed correctly, we connected it to the earlier beta issue, and we began investigation and remediation. * **Timeline of Events \(UTC\):** * 2025-12-03: Internal ticket created after beta report of broken syntax highlighting. * 2025-12-09: Bug released to stable version 8.11.22. * 2025-12-15 to 2025-12-16: Three additional customers reported the issue \(not yet routed to the owning team\). * 2025-12-17: An external partner reported the issue affecting stable via a shared Slack channel; the Filling & Saving team began investigation. * 2025-12-22: Fix merged \(script pruning applied broadly to remove PrismJS from injected scripts\). * 2025-12-30: Reports surfaced that social media users observed the issue; stable update coordination began. * 2025-12-31: Releases published across all browser platforms. * 2026-01-01: Release approved by web stores. * **Root Cause Analysis:** We did not have an enforced dependency boundary for injected content scripts, which allowed unexpected UI and runtime dependencies to be bundled into the page-injected context. * **Trigger:** A new import introduced an indirect dependency chain from an injected script to a UI module and ultimately to PrismJS. * **Contributing Factors \(if any\):** * Mis-triage of beta report * Missing side-effect regression tests ## How Was It Resolved? We removed PrismJS from the scripts the extension injects into web pages by eliminating the import chain that pulled it into the injected bundle. We then shipped an updated extension across all supported browsers. * **Mitigation Steps:** * Coordinated releasing a stable update once stable impact and broader visibility were confirmed. * **Resolution Steps:** * Fix merged on 2025-12-22. * Fix was applied to the previous stable release. * New beta/stable builds created and published across platforms. * Fix approved by web stores as of 2026-01-01. * Releases published across nightly, beta, and stable. * Because extension updates roll out via browser web stores and auto-update schedules, we consider the fix fully available once all stores had approved the release and we verified the issue could no longer be reproduced on known affected sites. * **Verification of Resolution:** * We tested the new builds on known affected websites, validating that code block formatting is working as expected. * We confirmed that the browser extension build no longer contained the PrismJS library. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * Added lint rules to block disallowed imports into injected scripts. * Added internal documentation describing how to avoid dangerous imports and the potential impacts. * Ensure new lint rules to prevent dangerous imports are blocking in CI pipelines. * Add an automated test to internal testing sites to ensure injected content scripts don’t introduce side effects. * Implement automated rules \+ a triage SLA so new beta issues are reviewed by the owning team before stable release decisions. * Ensure bundle size changes are blocking changes, enforced by our automated build systems as part of the code review process. ## Next Steps and Communication * Most browsers will auto-update extensions via their web stores. If the issue persists, customers should manually check for updates and verify they are on the fixed extension versions \(8.11.27 and newer\). Customers can verify their version in their browser’s extension/add-ons settings \(1Password extension version **8.11.27** or newer\). * We will continue monitoring for regressions and follow up on guardrails \(blocking lint rules, bundle-size checks, and automated website-side-effect tests\). We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

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Started Jan 12, 2026, 05:24 PM UTC· resolved Jan 12, 2026, 10:58 PM UTC

1. investigating Jan 12, 2026, 05:24 PM UTC

   We are currently experiencing intermittent issues with some forms on 1password.com and are investigating. Our team has identified an issue with one of our vendors and is working with them to restore service as quickly as possible. We’ll share updates here as we learn more.

2. monitoring Jan 12, 2026, 07:01 PM UTC

   The vendor-related form issues have been addressed with fixes in place and no issues are currently being reported. Our vendor continues to investigate root case and we are continuing to monitor closely until we are able to confirm a full resolution.

3. resolved Jan 12, 2026, 10:58 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Dec 17, 2025, 02:35 PM UTC· resolved Dec 17, 2025, 03:08 PM UTC

1. monitoring Dec 17, 2025, 02:35 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

2. resolved Dec 17, 2025, 03:08 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Nov 30, 2025, 08:35 PM UTC· resolved Nov 30, 2025, 09:52 PM UTC

1. identified Nov 30, 2025, 08:35 PM UTC

   We’re aware that 1Password.com isn't loading for some customers. Our team has identified an issue with one of our upstream vendors and is working with them to restore service as quickly as possible. We’ll share updates here as we learn more.

2. resolved Nov 30, 2025, 09:52 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Nov 18, 2025, 05:22 PM UTC· resolved Nov 18, 2025, 07:15 PM UTC

1. investigating Nov 18, 2025, 05:22 PM UTC

   We are actively investigating an issue causing significant service degradation across 1Password impacting sign in, SSO, MFA, and accessing items.

2. investigating Nov 18, 2025, 05:27 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. investigating Nov 18, 2025, 05:51 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

4. investigating Nov 18, 2025, 05:59 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

5. identified Nov 18, 2025, 06:04 PM UTC

   We identified the issue, the engineering team is working on a mitigation and we're starting to see recovery.

6. monitoring Nov 18, 2025, 06:22 PM UTC

   We implemented a mitigation and service is restored. We will continue to closely monitor performance to ensure the issue is fully resolved.

7. resolved Nov 18, 2025, 07:15 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

8. postmortem Nov 21, 2025, 07:05 PM UTC

   # Incident Postmortem - Cloud Services Degraded **Date of Incident:** 2025-11-18 **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 5:03pm UTC - 6:05pm UTC **Service\(s\) Affected:** SSO, sign in, sign up, CLI, web interface, access to vault content and other items, admin console, MFA **Impact Duration:** ~60 mins ## Summary On November 18, 2025, at 5:03 PM UTC, 1Password experienced degraded and temporarily unavailable cloud services for customers in the US region. The issue was caused by database resource exhaustion, causing operations to fail and connections to be rejected. This was not a security incident and no customer data was impacted. The issue was resolved by resizing the database to restore normal performance and ensure additional capacity for future growth. ## Impact on Customers * **Single Sign-on \(SSO\), Multi-factor Authentication \(MFA\):** Users with SSO or MFA enabled experienced delays, and in some cases failures to log in. * **Browser Extension:** Users who needed to authenticate via the web interface were unable to unlock their vaults. * **Web Interface, Administration**: Customers were unable to log in, sign-ups failed, syncing between devices was not functioning, access to vault and other items were unavailable and the admin console was not reachable. * **API Access:** CLI users and API requests received timeout errors and slow responses. * **Number of Affected Customers \(approximate\):** All customers utilizing cloud interfaces and APIs in the affected region for the duration of the incident. * **Geographic Regions Affected \(if applicable\):** US/Global. ## What Happened? * **Timeline of Events \(UTC\):** * 2025-11-18 4:59pm: Automated monitoring detects increased errors * 2025-11-18 5:03pm: Team began investigating * 2025-11-18 5:09pm: Servers restarted, service is still degraded * 2025-11-18 5:23pm: Public status page updated to Investigating and services Degraded * 2025-11-18 5:25pm: Servers scaled down to reduce database load * 2025-11-18 5:41pm: Database instance size upgrade started * 2025-11-18 5:44pm: Potentially problematic cron job disabled * 2025-11-18 5:56pm: Services slowly started to scale up * 2025-11-18 5:57pm: Services started to come back as the database instance resize completes * 2025-11-18 6:05pm: Incident marked as Identified * 2025-11-18 6:05pm: Team continues to monitor, performance has returned to normal levels * 2025-11-18 6:23pm: Incident marked as Monitoring and services Operational * 2025-11-18 7:16pm: Incident marked as resolved * **Root Cause Analysis:** The refactor of a feature increased the impact of a poorly performing query that had previously gone undetected. The result was the exponential increase in resource consumption for the main database. Once resources were fully exhausted, the service rejected connections and all requests failed. * **Contributing Factors \(if any\):** * Non-performant queries * Database under-provisioned ## How Was It Resolved? * **Mitigation Steps:** * Background services were halted to reduce load on the database. * Application servers were scaled down to further reduce load. * **Resolution Steps:** Increasing the database instance size resolved the issue. * **Verification of Resolution:** Monitoring metrics were closely observed to ensure error rates returned to normal and database performance had stabilized. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * **Improving monitoring:** We are updating our monitoring systems to better detect database issues like this before impacting customers. * **Improve database performance:** We are refactoring the responsible query to improve performance and reduce load, and tuning the background service to prevent resource contention. ## Next Steps and Communication No action is required from our customers at this time. We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

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Started Nov 18, 2025, 12:06 PM UTC· resolved Nov 18, 2025, 03:47 PM UTC

1. investigating Nov 18, 2025, 12:06 PM UTC

   We’re aware that 1password.com is currently not loading for some customers. Our team has identified an issue with one of our upstream vendors and is working with them to restore service as quickly as possible. We’ll share updates here as we learn more.

2. investigating Nov 18, 2025, 12:09 PM UTC

   We’re continuing to work with our vendor to resolve the issue affecting the 1password.com marketing site. The 1Password app and password manager remain fully operational.

3. monitoring Nov 18, 2025, 02:41 PM UTC

   Our upstream vendor has implemented a fix, and our teams are monitoring to ensure full recovery.

4. resolved Nov 18, 2025, 03:47 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Nov 13, 2025, 03:57 PM UTC· resolved Nov 18, 2025, 03:37 PM UTC

1. investigating Nov 13, 2025, 03:57 PM UTC

   Some users may notice that the Item Usage information shown in dashboards and reports isn’t updating right away. The data is still accurate, but may take longer than usual to refresh. Our team is working to restore real-time updates.

2. investigating Nov 13, 2025, 04:58 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. investigating Nov 13, 2025, 06:19 PM UTC

   Our teams continue to actively investigate this issue.

4. investigating Nov 13, 2025, 09:50 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue. We identified a potential root cause and work is in progress to confirm. We will share another update when that work is complete.

5. identified Nov 13, 2025, 11:55 PM UTC

   We've identified the issue and our team is taking steps towards mitigating.

6. identified Nov 14, 2025, 09:49 PM UTC

   We've observed signs of improvement from steps we've taken so far, and we are continuing work to mitigate the issue. We will share another update when that work is complete.

7. identified Nov 15, 2025, 01:15 AM UTC

   We've completed mitigation work and are monitoring results.

8. monitoring Nov 15, 2025, 01:16 AM UTC

   We've completed mitigation work and item usage metrics appear to be updating in real time. We will continue to closely monitor performance to ensure the issue is fully resolved.

9. resolved Nov 18, 2025, 03:37 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Nov 06, 2025, 08:16 PM UTC· resolved Nov 06, 2025, 10:04 PM UTC

1. investigating Nov 06, 2025, 08:16 PM UTC

   We are investigating an issue causing elevated errors and increased latency on some backend endpoints. As a result, some users may experience slow loading times or error messages when attempting to sign in or authenticate. Retrying may allow access in some cases.

2. monitoring Nov 06, 2025, 08:55 PM UTC

   We identified an issue and implemented mitigations. Latency and error rates have returned to normal levels. We will continue to closely monitor performance to ensure the issue is fully resolved.

3. monitoring Nov 06, 2025, 09:29 PM UTC

   We are continuing to closely monitor performance to ensure the issue is fully resolved.

4. resolved Nov 06, 2025, 10:04 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Oct 29, 2025, 06:20 PM UTC· resolved Oct 30, 2025, 02:11 PM UTC

1. identified Oct 29, 2025, 06:20 PM UTC

   Due to an issue with an upstream provider, some Trelica users are experiencing errors. Various pages will fail to load or load with errors. Files will not be able to be uploaded or downloaded, and images may not load. Some integrations may fail. Workflows will not run; admins will need to manually complete administrative tasks during the incident. Workflow runs will reprocess once the service is restored.

2. identified Oct 29, 2025, 06:40 PM UTC

   The upstream provider identified the issue and initiated the deployment to mitigate. We will provide more updates as they become available.

3. identified Oct 29, 2025, 07:11 PM UTC

   The upstream provider is deploying the mitigation. We will provide more updates as they become available.

4. monitoring Oct 29, 2025, 07:47 PM UTC

   The upstream provider deployed the mitigation and we also implemented mitigation steps. Admins should see workflows run again and file uploads/downloads should work as expected. Images still may not appear. We are monitoring for any issues. Our upstream provider expects full resolution in the next four hours. We will provide more updates as they become available.

5. resolved Oct 30, 2025, 02:11 PM UTC

   The upstream provider has reported full service recovery and Trelica is fully operational. This incident has been resolved.

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Started Oct 28, 2025, 08:41 PM UTC· resolved Oct 29, 2025, 01:37 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 28, 2025, 08:41 PM UTC

   We are actively investigating an issue where MSP users may experience a continuous loading screen when trying to access Managed Companies.

2. identified Oct 28, 2025, 08:58 PM UTC

   We identified the issue and the engineering team is working on a mitigation.

3. identified Oct 28, 2025, 09:22 PM UTC

   The engineering team is continuing to work on a mitigation.

4. identified Oct 28, 2025, 09:50 PM UTC

   The engineering team is preparing to deploy a mitigation.

5. identified Oct 28, 2025, 10:27 PM UTC

   The engineering team is deploying a mitigation.

6. identified Oct 28, 2025, 10:52 PM UTC

   The engineering team tested the mitigation and is in the process of releasing to production. We will provide our next update by 20:00 EDT.

7. identified Oct 28, 2025, 11:59 PM UTC

   The engineering team is in the final stages of releasing the mitigation to production.

8. monitoring Oct 29, 2025, 01:06 AM UTC

   The engineering team released a mitigation to production and MSP users should be able to access Managed Companies successfully. We will continue to monitor performance.

9. resolved Oct 29, 2025, 01:37 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Oct 24, 2025, 05:04 PM UTC· resolved Oct 24, 2025, 06:08 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 24, 2025, 05:04 PM UTC

   We are actively investigating an issue where customers may experience errors or degraded performance when attempting to share items.

2. identified Oct 24, 2025, 05:17 PM UTC

   We identified the issue and the engineering team is deploying a mitigation.

3. monitoring Oct 24, 2025, 05:31 PM UTC

   The engineering team deployed a mitigation and item sharing now appears operational. We will continue to monitor performance.

4. resolved Oct 24, 2025, 06:08 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Oct 20, 2025, 09:05 AM UTC· resolved Oct 21, 2025, 01:51 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 20, 2025, 09:05 AM UTC

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. identified Oct 20, 2025, 10:08 AM UTC

   Customers might encounter intermittent errors when performing various actions on 1Password.com. Retrying these actions may be successful as the service recovers.

3. identified Oct 20, 2025, 05:05 PM UTC

   Due to an upstream provider outage impacting 1Password, customers might encounter intermittent errors when performing various actions on 1Password.com. Retrying these actions may be successful as the service recovers. For updates on the upstream provider outage, follow here: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

4. identified Oct 20, 2025, 05:44 PM UTC

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

5. identified Oct 20, 2025, 05:53 PM UTC

   Due to an upstream provider outage impacting 1Password, customers might encounter intermittent errors when performing various actions on 1Password.com. Retrying these actions may be successful as the service recovers. For updates on the upstream provider outage, follow here: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

6. identified Oct 20, 2025, 07:21 PM UTC

   Due to a widespread outage affecting Amazon Web Services (AWS), customers might encounter intermittent errors when performing various actions on 1Password.com. Retrying these actions may be successful as the service recovers. Components that were previously affected appear to be operational. Our engineering teams are actively working with AWS to restore full functionality. We’ll continue to share updates as more information becomes available.

7. monitoring Oct 20, 2025, 08:18 PM UTC

   Amazon Web Services (AWS) continues to observe improved service recovery, and 1Password components that were previously affected appear to be operational. We will continue to monitor performance.

8. monitoring Oct 20, 2025, 09:41 PM UTC

   Amazon Web Services (AWS) continues to observe improved service recovery, and 1Password components that were previously affected are operational. We will continue to monitor performance and provide another update by 9am EDT tomorrow, October 21st.

9. resolved Oct 21, 2025, 01:51 PM UTC

   Amazon Web Services (AWS) reported all services returned to normal operations. This incident has been resolved. We will publish a post-mortem as soon as we complete it.

10. postmortem Oct 27, 2025, 10:06 PM UTC

    # Incident Postmortem - 1Password Cloud Services Degraded * **Date of Incident:** 2025-10-20 * **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 07:26:00 - 20:55:00 * **Service\(s\) Affected:** [1Password.com](http://1password.com/) website, Sign in, Access to passwords and other items * **Impact Duration:** 13 hours, 29 minutes ## Summary On October 20, 2025 at 07:26:00 UTC, [1Password.com](http://1password.com/) faced intermittent latency, authentication failures, and degraded service availability due to a major outage at [AWS in the us-east-1 region](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/). This was not a security incident and no customer data was affected. As a result, the 1Password server-side application experienced degradation or intermittent failures, affecting up to 50% of traffic in the US region. Complete service restoration occurred in conjunction with AWS’s final mitigations around 18:30 UTC. ## Impact on Customers All US customers accessing 1Password cloud services experienced intermittent latency, authentication failures, and degraded availability on [1Password.com](http://1password.com/). * **File Share:** Sharing of passwords via links could intermittently fail * **Login:** Users logging into vaults experienced timeout errors and slow responses * **Web Access:** Users accessing their vault through the web interface experienced timeout errors and slow responses * **API Access:** CLI users and API requests received timeout errors and slow responses ## What Happened? At 07:11:00 UTC, AWS began experiencing DNS resolution failures in the us-east-1 region, initially affecting DynamoDB and rapidly cascading to multiple AWS services. 1Password monitoring detected impact at 07:26:00 UTC when monitoring alerts fired for inability to scale up clusters, and an incident was declared. 1Password immediately deployed mitigations inside our infrastructure to ensure there was adequate compute capacity to serve our US-based users, which included pausing deployments and scaling down any services not critical to key functionality for our users. **Timeline of Events \(UTC\):** * 06:55:05 - 1Password monitoring triggers warning for unavailable Pods in Deployment \(caused by inability to obtain AWS IAM credentials\) * 07:03:06 - 1Password monitoring alerts for 5xx errors on auth start endpoint \(caused by inability to obtain AWS IAM credentials\) - pages authentication team, but alert recovers within minutes * 07:26:00 - 1Password monitoring alerts for inability to scale clusters, engineers begin investigating, Incident declared * 07:26:41- AWS confirms elevated error rates across multiple services * 07:49:06 - 1Password monitoring alerts for 5xx errors on auth start endpoint \(caused by inability to obtain AWS IAM credentials\) * 07:51:09 - AWS identifies DNS as the root cause, begins mitigation * 08:02:13 - 1Password suspends auto-scaling tooling to retain existing capacity * 09:27:33 - AWS reports significant recovery signs * 10:35:37 - AWS declares DNS issue fully mitigated, services recovering * 14:14:00-15:43:00 - AWS announced full recovery across all services; throttles EC2 launches * 16:42:49 - 1Password tooling and users start reporting 503s and inability to login due to volume of traffic * 16:50:00 - 1Password services restarted to reset and flush connections, prioritizing post-recovery traffic. * 20:53:00 - AWS resolves their incident * 20:55:00 - 1Password engineers overscale deployments for stability and overnight observation * Oct 21, 2025 - Incident resolved after confirmation of complete upstream recovery ## How Was It Resolved? * **Mitigation Steps:** 1Password paused deployments and auto-management of cluster capacity to ensure enough capacity was available to serve users through peak access times. As demand outstripped available capacity, 1Password engineering reset the circuit breaker to allow additional connections to the service. * **Resolution Steps:** AWS announced system restoration and a reduction in throttling of EC2 API calls. To ensure sufficient capacity for peak traffic, 1Password engineers updated the required number of pods for core services the following business day and resumed auto-management of cluster capacity tooling. The following day, 1Password engineers resumed verification of the health of the systems, deployments, and auto-scaling of the services. * **Verification of Resolution:** Engineers observed monitoring systems and cluster management tooling logs to ensure system health. ## **Root Cause Analysis** * **Root Cause Analysis:** The failures in AWS's internal network affected multiple AWS product APIs. This disruption directly impacted 1Password’s ability to scale up infrastructure, deploy applications, and retrieve configuration data. * **Contributing Factors \(if any\):** * Third-party incident response services and paging services were affected by the AWS incident, which complicated communications. * Upstream customer IDPs were affected by the AWS outage, and returned errors that resulted in authentication failures. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * **Improve Incident Response:** Create additional backup protocols for when our incident response tooling is unavailable. * **Improve multi-service outage response:** Create strong break-glass runbooks in the event of a multi-service cloud provider outage. ## Next Steps and Communication No action is required from our customers at this time. We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

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Started Sep 26, 2025, 04:51 PM UTC· resolved Sep 26, 2025, 08:24 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 26, 2025, 04:51 PM UTC

   We are actively investigating an issue where customers may be experiencing degraded performance and slowdowns when accessing 1Password.

2. investigating Sep 26, 2025, 05:06 PM UTC

   The engineering team is restarting key systems in an attempt to alleviate slowdowns.

3. investigating Sep 26, 2025, 05:25 PM UTC

   Overall service is still degraded, but experiencing periods of improvement.

4. investigating Sep 26, 2025, 05:41 PM UTC

   The engineering team is continuing to investigate and actively managing service degradation. Customers may still experience periods of slowdowns when accessing the 1Password service.

5. investigating Sep 26, 2025, 05:57 PM UTC

   The engineering team is actively managing degraded performance and simultaneously attempting to identify root cause. Customers may still experience some slowdowns when accessing 1Password online.

6. investigating Sep 26, 2025, 06:11 PM UTC

   The engineering team is actively managing degraded performance and continuing attempts to identify root cause. Customers may still experience some slowdowns when accessing 1Password online.

7. investigating Sep 26, 2025, 06:32 PM UTC

   Engineering teams have identified a potential cause and are actively managing customer impact. Customers may see some slowdowns, but due to the active management those slowdowns are unlikely.

8. investigating Sep 26, 2025, 06:44 PM UTC

   Engineering teams are testing a mitigation in our non-production environments to verify before rolling it out to our production environments. Customer impact is being actively managed and slowdowns should be rare if they occur at all.

9. identified Sep 26, 2025, 06:57 PM UTC

   The engineering team has identified the issue and we are continuing to test a mitigation in our test environment before rolling it out to production. Customer impact is being actively managed and slowdowns should be increasingly rare.

10. identified Sep 26, 2025, 07:13 PM UTC

    The engineering team is continuing to test a mitigation in our test environment before deploying it to production. Customer impact is being actively managed and instances of slowdowns should continue to decrease.

11. identified Sep 26, 2025, 07:28 PM UTC

    The engineering team is rolling out a mitigation in our production environment.

12. monitoring Sep 26, 2025, 07:53 PM UTC

    The engineering team deployed a mitigation, which has addressed the issue. We will continue to monitor performance.

13. resolved Sep 26, 2025, 08:24 PM UTC

    This incident has been resolved. We will publish a post-mortem as soon as we complete it.

14. postmortem Oct 03, 2025, 07:24 PM UTC

    # Incident Postmortem - Degraded performance when accessing 1Password **Date of Incident:** 2025-09-26 **Time of Incident:** 4:20pm UTC - 5:39pm UTC **Service\(s\) Affected:** SSO, Web Sign In, Sign Up, Web Interface, CLI **Impact Duration:** ~60 minutes ## Summary On September 26, 2025 at 4:20 UTC 1Password’s web interface and APIs experienced degraded performance for all customers in the US region. This was not a result of a security incident and customer data was not affected. ## Impact on Customers During the duration of the incident: * **Web interface, Administration:** Customers experienced delays when accessing the 1Password web interface. * **Single Sign-on \(SSO\), Multi-factor Authentication \(MFA\):** Users with SSO or MFA enabled experienced delays, and in some cases failures to login. * **Command Line Interface \(CLI\):** CLI users faced increased latency and timeouts when attempting to access our web APIs. * **Browser Extension:** Users requiring web interface authentication experienced delays or failures. * **Number of Affected Customers \(approximate\):** ~30% * **Geographic Regions Affected:** [1password.com](http://1password.com) \(US/Global\) ## What Happened? At 4:20PM UTC and 5 PM UTC There were traffic bursts which caused extra load on one of our caches. This cache was under-provisioned to handle that spike of activity, which resulted in it exhausting available CPU. This caused cascading errors/latency which manifested in slow and failed requests. * **Timeline of Events \(UTC\):** * 2025-09-26 4:20pm: Spike in customer traffic began * 2025-09-26 4:29pm: Automated monitoring detects increased errors and latency * 2025-09-26 4:35pm: The team activates our incident protocol and begins investigation * 2025-09-26 4:58pm: The team decides to restart application servers * 2025-09-26 5:00pm: The servers have been restarted, service is still degraded, as a second traffic burst begins * 2025-09-26 5:18pm: Service starts to improve * 2025-09-26 5:25pm: The team detects increased load for the second time * 2025-09-26 5:33pm: The team restarts application servers again * 2025-09-26 5:39pm: Service is back to normal, team continues to investigate * 2025-09-26 7:26pm: Team has found the issue, and proceeds to upgrade cache instance size * 2025-09-26 7:49pm: Cache upgrade completed successfully * 2025-09-26 7:50pm: Team continues to monitor, performance has returned to nominal levels * 2025-09-26 8:24pm: Incident is marked as resolved * **Root Cause Analysis:** A code library installed in July introduced latency issues for cache connections. Authentication operations weren't properly rate-limited, allowing large traffic influxes. During peak traffic periods, the cache infrastructure was operating near maximum CPU capacity. The incident occurred when a burst of authentication traffic pushed the cache CPU utilization to 100%. The increased latency and CPU usage together directly caused the incident. * **Contributing Factors:** * Latency increase due to cache library version upgrade * Inadequate rate limiting allowed traffic bursts to go unchecked * Cache instance size is under-provisioned ## How Was It Resolved? * **Mitigation Steps:** Restarting application servers temporarily mitigated the latency and errors, but the problems returned when traffic spiked again. * **Resolution Steps:** Increasing the instance size for the cache resolved the issue. * **Verification of Resolution:** The incident team tested the upgrade in a staging deployment before executing it in production. They then monitored metrics to confirm the system returned to normal levels. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * **Improve capacity planning for cache:** We will ensure our internal infrastructure is properly sized to handle current traffic volumes and accommodate future growth. We'll implement regular resource evaluations to maintain adequate capacity as our traffic increases. We will also implement proactive alerting systems that notify our teams when resource utilization approaches critical thresholds. * **Update library to a more performant version:** We will upgrade our caching library to the latest stable version to eliminate the current latency issues. * **Improve rate limiting for operations that triggered the traffic burst:** Enhancing our rate limiting system will significantly improve our ability to handle future traffic bursts. * **Timeline for Implementation:** Observability improvements have already been implemented, and we will complete the remaining work by the end of Q1, 2026. ## Next Steps and Communication No action is required from our customers at this time. ‌ We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

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Started Sep 25, 2025, 03:43 PM UTC· resolved Sep 25, 2025, 05:22 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 25, 2025, 03:43 PM UTC

   We are actively investigating an issue where some users are encountering errors when interacting with the admin console, which leads to errors during sign-in.

2. monitoring Sep 25, 2025, 04:33 PM UTC

   Our engineering team has rolled out mitigation to remedy affected users. We are monitoring the results.

3. resolved Sep 25, 2025, 05:22 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Sep 23, 2025, 09:24 PM UTC· resolved Sep 24, 2025, 02:07 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 23, 2025, 09:24 PM UTC

   Invite links are currently returning an error when attempting to accept an invite from provisioning. Our engineering team is actively investigating.

2. identified Sep 23, 2025, 10:10 PM UTC

   Our engineering team has identified the issue and are currently working on deploying a fix.

3. monitoring Sep 24, 2025, 12:51 AM UTC

   A fix has been deployed and we are now monitoring the results.

4. resolved Sep 24, 2025, 02:07 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

5. postmortem Sep 26, 2025, 04:39 PM UTC

   # **Provisioning Invites could not be accepted** **Date of Incident:** 2025-09-23 **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 17:18 - 00:46 **Service\(s\) Affected:** Sign Up **Impact Duration:** 7h 28m ## **Summary** For 7 hours and 28 minutes, 1Password Provisioning invites could not be accepted, presenting to the user as an invite expiry. Invites could not be accepted due to a web browser routing defect that was not caught during development, review, or release. First identified by customer reports approximately two and a half hours after release, the issue was escalated to development teams and an incident was immediately called. The root cause was identified as a defect introduced by a web client modification, and a fix was created, tested, and released. By 00:46 UTC, the fix was deployed to all environments and service was fully restored. ## **Impact on Customers** * **Sign-up:** Provisioning invites could not be accepted. * **Number of Affected Customers \(approximate\):** 100% of provisioning invites could not be accepted * **Customer-facing impact**: Users clicking their invite links encountered a misleading ‘Invite Expired’ message. * **Geographic Regions Affected:** 1Password USA/Canada/EU/Enterprise ## **What Happened?** A change to the web client contained a router defect that incorrectly rendered provisioning invites as expired. Users were presented with an error message that erroneously stated the invite was expired. The change responsible for introducing the defect was able to be released because it was not captured under automatic change notification rules, was lacking automated test coverage, and was not included in the set of manual tests. * **Timeline of Events \(UTC\):** * 17:18: 1Password Release containing defect * 19:53 \(2 hours, 35 minutes later\) First customer report * 20:49 \(56 minutes later\) Escalation to developer teams * 21:01: \(12 minutes later\) Incident called * 22:02: \(1 hour, 1 minute later\) Root cause identified * 22:29: \(27 minutes later\) Fix created and testing initiated * 23:49: \(1 hour, 30 minutes later\) Fix merged * 00:46: \(57 minutes later\) Fix released and service fully restored * **Root Cause Analysis:** A change modified the order in which key provisioning web routes were rendered. As a result, the route handling provisioning invitations failed to use the correct query parameters and the invite rendered as expired. * **Contributing Factors:** Automated tests on this endpoint do not exist. Manual testing missed testing the Provisioning routes. The modified code was not covered by automatic change notification rules to notify the Provisioning team. An existing bug that can fail the resending of invites was an initial red herring during the investigation. ## **How Was It Resolved?** * **Resolution Steps:** The defect in the 1Password web client was corrected so provisioning invites would render correctly. * **Verification of Resolution:** 1Password engineering tested the changes and validated that the functionality was restored, as well as verifying that requests for the affected endpoints were successful after the fix was deployed. ## **What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents** * **Improve automated tests:** We are enhancing our automated tests for the Provisioning Invite routes. * **Expand automatic change notifications:** Expanding coverage of automatic change notification rules for areas of code owned by the Provisioning team. ## **Next Steps and Communication** * No action is required from our customers at this time. Existing invites do not need to be resent and may be accepted. * If you are still experiencing issues, please contact our support team at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]). We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

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Started Sep 18, 2025, 08:19 PM UTC· resolved Sep 19, 2025, 06:17 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 18, 2025, 08:19 PM UTC

   We are having some issues sending email invites to users for some customers. We are investigating the issue and will update this space when we have more information.

2. monitoring Sep 18, 2025, 09:59 PM UTC

   We have made some changes to mitigate the issue and are seeing positive results. We will continue to monitor through tomorrow to confirm the issue is resolved.

3. resolved Sep 19, 2025, 06:17 PM UTC

   We have confirmed resolution of this issue and this incident is now resolved.

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Started Sep 18, 2025, 02:48 PM UTC· resolved Sep 18, 2025, 05:08 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 18, 2025, 02:48 PM UTC

   We are currently experiencing issues on the forms on 1Password.com (Contact Us, Webinars, Resources, Contact Sales, Contact Sales XAM). Customers filling out forms may experience timeouts or receive an error message "Something went wrong. Please try again or contact [email protected]". We are investigating the issue and will update this space when we know more.

2. identified Sep 18, 2025, 04:01 PM UTC

   We have identified an issue with one of our providers. We are monitoring their progress and will update as we get more information.

3. resolved Sep 18, 2025, 05:08 PM UTC

   Our provider has deployed a fix. Error rates have returned to normal. This incident is now resolved.

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Started Sep 03, 2025, 11:00 AM UTC· resolved Sep 03, 2025, 12:01 PM UTC

1. resolved Sep 10, 2025, 09:58 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

2. postmortem Sep 10, 2025, 09:59 PM UTC

   # Performance Degradation **Date of Incident:** 2025-09-03 **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 11:06 - 12:07 **Service\(s\) Affected:** All APIs **Impact Duration:** 61 minutes ## Summary For 61 minutes on the morning of September 3rd, 2025, all 1Password APIs in the US/Global environment had degraded performance or returned an error for approximately 20% of requests. 92% of the impact was mitigated within 13 minutes at 11:19 by automation scaling up infrastructure. By 12:06 a manual restart of the remaining infrastructure completed mitigation. A permanent fix was implemented and deployed to prevent the issue from reoccurring. ## Impact on Customers * **APIs:** High latency, or a 500 Internal Server Error. * **Number of Affected Customers:** 20% of all requests returned errors for 13 minutes, 1% thereafter. * **Geographic Regions Affected \(if applicable\):** 1Password USA/Global ## What Happened? * **Timeline of Events \(UTC\):** * 11:05: A customer started a stream of an unusually high volume of requests to an API with sub-optimal performance. * 11:06: Some servers started consuming abnormally high memory, causing slow response times and high error rates. * 11:19: Automation scaled up infrastructure to service additional load * 11:30: Increased errors trigger escalation, on-call engineer begins investigation * 11:51: Engineers declare an incident and alert response teams * 12:02: Response team begins restarting affected servers. * 12:07: All servers completed restarts, and error rates returned to normal levels * **Root Cause Analysis:** A poorly performing cache operation was triggered repeatedly in a short period of time across multiple servers, leading directly to greatly delayed responses. ## How Was It Resolved? * **Mitigation Steps:** Automatic instance scaling restored over 98% of operational capacity after 13 minutes. Full capacity was restored through manual intervention * **Resolution Steps:** We refactored the poorly performing query. * **Verification of Resolution:** We tested the affected API to confirm refactoring of query produced the desired performance improvement. We deployed the fix and monitored it for 24 hours to assert the issue was resolved. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * We are auditing services for sub-optimal query performance. ## Next Steps and Communication * No action is required from our customers at this time. ‌ We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

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Started Aug 18, 2025, 09:36 PM UTC· resolved Aug 18, 2025, 10:53 PM UTC

1. identified Aug 18, 2025, 09:36 PM UTC

   We have identified an issue causing requests to the Events API to fail for customers in the EU. Our team is in the process of deploying a fix.

2. monitoring Aug 18, 2025, 10:35 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. resolved Aug 18, 2025, 10:53 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 05, 2025, 08:46 PM UTC· resolved Aug 05, 2025, 09:59 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 05, 2025, 08:46 PM UTC

   We are investigating issues affecting sign-ins. Users may see errors such as "Can’t sign in. The request took too long." Our team is working to resolve this as quickly as possible.

2. identified Aug 05, 2025, 09:22 PM UTC

   The issue has been identified and we are working to resolve the issue. In the meantime, if you already have the 1Password app installed on your device, you can still access your saved items in offline mode in the app, if your admin hasn't disabled this feature. Please note that new changes won't sync until the service is resolved.

3. monitoring Aug 05, 2025, 09:30 PM UTC

   We've rolled out changes to mitigate this issue. We're seeing recovery and will continue to monitor the situation.

4. resolved Aug 05, 2025, 09:59 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

5. postmortem Aug 11, 2025, 05:37 PM UTC

   ## **Incident Postmortem - Sign-in Service Degradation** * **Date of Incident:** 2025-08-05 * **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 20:20 - 21:20 * **Service\(s\) Affected:** Sign-in, Web Application, Command Line Interface \(CLI\), Single Sign On \(SSO\), API’s * **Impact Duration:** 1 hour ### **Summary** On August 5, 2025, 1Password experienced a service degradation that impacted customers' ability to sign in and access the web application. The incident was triggered during a planned architectural improvement when a misconfigured rollback attempt caused an overload of traffic and a subsequent database connection bottleneck. The issue was resolved by correcting the misconfiguration and restarting the web application servers, fully restoring service. ### **Impact on Customers** During the service disruption, some customers experienced degraded performance when accessing their 1Password vaults and signing in. * **Sign-in Issues**: Customers may have experienced sign-in slowness or timeouts. * **Error Messages**: Customers may have seen error messages when attempting to sign in, such as "Can't sign in", "Failed to determine sign in methods for email", or "Upstream connect error". * **Vault Access**: Some customers experienced degraded performance when accessing their 1Password vaults. * **Geographic Regions Affected:** USA/Global ### **What Happened?** The incident was part of ongoing improvements to the 1Password infrastructure and was not the result of a security incident. Customer data was not affected. **Timeline of Events \(UTC\):** * **17:12**: A planned, phased rollout of an architectural improvement to authentication systems begins. * **18:20**: Engineers monitoring the rollout begin to observe higher latency during sign-in for a small subset of accounts. * **20:17**: A rollback of the change is initiated. An error in the rollback configuration sends a high volume of traffic to the new code path, causing a database connection bottleneck. Engineers observing the deployment immediately observe service impact. * **20:21**: A corrective action is deployed to revert the system to its previous state before the misconfigured rollback. * **20:39**: While impact is still being observed, a failover from the primary database to a secondary database is initiated. This action has no effect. * **20:58**: A restart of the service that manages incoming traffic to our services is initiated to reset connections. * **21:13**: A rolling restart of the web application servers is initiated. * **21:20**: Service is fully restored for all customers. **Root Cause Analysis:** The root cause was an error in the configuration of an attempted rollback. This misconfiguration incorrectly routed a high volume of sign-in traffic through a new, slower code path, which created a bottleneck of connections to our primary database and made the web application unresponsive. ### **How Was It Resolved?** **Resolution Steps:** The issue was fully resolved through two key actions: 1. The rollback misconfiguration was identified and corrected, which stopped traffic from flowing to the problematic new code. 2. A rolling restart of the web application servers was performed to clear the backlog of stuck database connections. **Verification of Resolution:** Monitoring systems were closely observed for 30 minutes to ensure error rates returned to normal. ### **What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents** We are working to implement the following improvements: * **Improve configuration testing**: We will improve testing procedures of configuration updates and their rollbacks prior to being pushed to production. * **Improve our deployment tooling**: We will add additional validation to our traffic management tools to prevent similar configuration errors. * **Review our incident response procedures**: We have updated the runbook used to respond to this type of incident with guidance that will enable faster recovery. * **Enhance our monitors**: We will add more specific alerts that will help us more quickly distinguish between different application tiers, allowing for faster diagnosis and time to resolution. ### **Next Steps and Communication** No action is required from our customers. 1Password applications are designed to be resilient, with local copies of vault data always available on customer devices, even without a connection to the 1Password service. If you are still experiencing issues, please contact our support team. We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

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Started Jul 29, 2025, 07:51 PM UTC· resolved Jul 29, 2025, 09:03 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 29, 2025, 07:51 PM UTC

   Some users have experienced an inability to upload and download files. This issue is intermittent and our engineering team is currently investigating.

2. resolved Jul 29, 2025, 09:03 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Jul 22, 2025, 11:21 PM UTC· resolved Jul 23, 2025, 07:00 PM UTC

1. identified Jul 22, 2025, 11:21 PM UTC

   There is an issue affecting the Activity Log, which may fail to load or return errors for some users. Our team is actively working to restore full functionality as soon as possible.

2. identified Jul 22, 2025, 11:22 PM UTC

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

3. resolved Jul 23, 2025, 07:00 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

4. postmortem Jul 25, 2025, 04:04 PM UTC

   **Date of Incident:** 2025-07-22 **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 10:40 - 06:30 **Services Affected: Admin Console Activity log and User Details page** **Impact Duration:** 43 hrs ## Summary A change to our internal data model that removed an unused type definition led to multiple failures in the Reports system. ## Impact on Customers * **Events API and Reporting:** The activity log widget failed to display activities. * Admin console: User details page failed to display user details ## What Happened? A software update introduced an API change that caused a mismatch between client and server. The Audit log page in the admin console was still collecting data but was not able to render it. * **Timeline of Events \(UTC\):** * 10:40 : Detected by 1Password personnel and root cause identified * 10:42: Issue Identified * 13:38 Fix created and testing initiated * 06:30: Fix released, Service fully restored * **Root Cause Analysis:** A User State was removed from the [1Password.com](http://1Password.com) server but not the client. This was a breaking API change. ## How Was It Resolved? * **Resolution Steps:** The user state in the 1Password client was removed to get the server and client back into parity. * **Verification of Resolution:** 1Password engineering tested the changes and validated that full system functionality was restored. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * **User State change process: 1Password is investigating how to catch breaking API changes by implementing additional end-to-end tests in the CI pipeline.** * Audit log architecture change: Engineering is investigating a rework of the audit log page to change how it aggregates data so that it is not reliant on an endpoint. This would mitigate future occurrences that caused this issue. ## Next Steps and Communication * No action is required from our customers at this time. * If you are still experiencing issues, please contact our support team at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]). We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

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Started Jul 21, 2025, 02:57 PM UTC· resolved Jul 24, 2025, 05:23 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 21, 2025, 02:57 PM UTC

   Our engineering and product teams are aware of reporting delays regarding the Events API. The data is still being collected but is not currently being reported on.

2. investigating Jul 21, 2025, 03:26 PM UTC

   Our teams are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. identified Jul 21, 2025, 04:42 PM UTC

   Our engineering team has identified the root cause and is actively working on a resolution. In the meantime, customers may continue to experience delays in event delivery.

4. identified Jul 21, 2025, 06:04 PM UTC

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

5. monitoring Jul 21, 2025, 07:29 PM UTC

   Our engineering team has mitigated the issue, and all events should now be returned properly.

6. monitoring Jul 23, 2025, 02:17 AM UTC

   The original issue remains mitigated. Our engineering team is continuing to address the root cause.

7. resolved Jul 24, 2025, 05:23 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Jul 14, 2025, 10:56 PM UTC· resolved Jul 14, 2025, 11:30 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 14, 2025, 10:56 PM UTC

   SSO logins are impacted due to a downstream provider experiencing a major outage that is impacting our authentication services. Our internal systems are operational, but are intermittently failing due to this downstream dependency. We are monitoring the provider's status and will post updates as they become available.

2. monitoring Jul 14, 2025, 11:05 PM UTC

   The downstream provider has deployed a fix. We are seeing reduced failure rates and will continue to monitor the results.

3. resolved Jul 14, 2025, 11:30 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

4. postmortem Aug 07, 2025, 03:04 PM UTC

   # **Incident Postmortem - Intermittent SSO Availability** **Date of Incident:** 2025-07-14 **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 22:00UTC - 11:23UTC **Service\(s\) Affected:** SSO **Impact Duration:** 1 hour and 23 minutes ## **Summary** On July 14, 2025 1Password’s SSO services were intermittently slow or unavailable for approximately 1 hour and 23 minutes. This was due to an outage with an upstream provider which 1Password backend services rely on to verify DNS lookups for SSO authentication. You can read the provider’s incident report [here](https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-1-1-1-1-incident-on-july-14-2025/), which outlines in detail what occurred and how they remediated the issue. For the duration of the incident 1Password customers would have experienced failed or slow SSO login attempts. We apologize for any inconvenience this issue may have caused our users. ‌ ## **Impact on customers** Customers accessing 1Password cloud services experienced delayed responses and timeout error messages. * **SSO Login:** Users logging in via SSO experienced failures, timeout errors or slow responses ## **Scope** * **Number of affected Customers \(approximate\):** Most users attempting to authenticate using SSO * **Geographic Regions Affected:** All ## **What Happened?** At 22:00UTC on July 14, 2025 1Password engineers were alerted to customer timeouts and failures when trying to use SSO as an authentication method. After diagnosing the issue, engineers discovered the source of the issue was an outage with an upstream provider when looking up and verifying OIDC provider hostnames. ‌ * **Timeline of Events \(UTC\):** * 22:00 - Incident initially detected by 1Password * 22:13 - Upstream provider identifies issue * 22:59 - Upstream provider implements a fix * 23:30 - Incident resolved * **Root Cause Analysis:** The third party provider 1Password uses for DNS lookup and verification failed. ## **How Was It Resolved?** * **Resolution Steps:** Our third party provider mitigated the issue. * **Verification of Resolution:** We closely monitored systems to ensure SSO logins were successful. ## **What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents** * We are investigating the addition of an additional DNS provider to provide redundancy.

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Started Jul 07, 2025, 04:14 PM UTC· resolved Jul 07, 2025, 07:18 PM UTC

1. identified Jul 07, 2025, 04:14 PM UTC

   Our engineering team have identified an issue causing a delay in processing billing updates and are currently working on a fix.

2. monitoring Jul 07, 2025, 06:02 PM UTC

   A fix for this issue has been deployed and we are now monitoring the results.

3. resolved Jul 07, 2025, 07:18 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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