UiPath experienced a notice incident on July 2, 2026 affecting IXP, lasting 1h 38m. The incident has been resolved; the full update timeline is below.
Affected components
Update timeline
- investigating Jul 02, 2026, 05:24 PM UTC
We are currently observing a partial outage on IXP and team is investigating this issue.
- monitoring Jul 02, 2026, 06:21 PM UTC
The issue has been mitigated and we are now monitoring the service currently. Please note that some functionality might take some time to recover as it catches up.
- resolved Jul 02, 2026, 07:02 PM UTC
The issue has been resolved and we are actively monitoring the service.
- postmortem Jul 28, 2026, 09:47 AM UTC
## Customer impact Between **July 2, 2026 at 5:17 pm UTC and July 2, 2026 at 7:03 pm UTC,** a subset of customers experienced a **partial outage of the IXP service in U.S. region**. Parts of IXP functionality were unavailable or delayed, and after mitigation, some functionality needed additional time to recover as processing caught up. The impact was limited to a small subset of customers in the U.S. region using the affected IXP service. Both Communications Mining and Unstructured and Complex Documents capabilities of IXP were affected. The total incident duration was 1 hour and 46 minutes. ## Root cause A preemptive increase in memory allocation for the service to account for planned increased usage was done incorrectly, causing services to compete for memory, pushing critical services out of the stack. One of those services was the network mesh layer, which resulted in multiple internal services being unable to talk to each other. To restore service health, we re-adjusted memory allocation settings to correctly load-balance the system and avoid memory competition. After those changes, the service stabilized. ## Detection The issue was detected as we were monitoring the planned scale-up of the region. On July 2, 2026 at 5:16 pm UTC, and incident was created as we noticed internal service outages. The incident was declared customer-impacting at 5:17 pm UTC. ## Response At 5:24 pm UTC on July 2, 2026, we published a public status update stating that we were investigating a partial outage of IXP. In the meantime, we investigated the failing services and initially thought the cause was low capacity in the underlying infrastructure. Once the failure was isolated to the network mesh, infrastructure, theory was dismissed and resolution followed. At 5:50 pm UTC, we applied a configuration update to increase the memory available to the network mesh at the affected services. At 6:16 pm UTC, service health had improved enough to inform our customers on Status page, and at 6:21 pm UTC the incident was marked mitigated with a public update noting that some functionality might take time to recover as it caught up. At 6:47 pm UTC, we confirmed that the service was stable. At 7:02 pm UTC, we published the resolved status update, and at 7:03 pm UTC the incident was marked resolved. ## Follow-up 1. Persist the memory changes across all regions. 2. A follow up analysis of all memory usage across all services was scheduled to preemptively avoid a similar incident.