Pinpoint Outage History

**Date:** 19 March 2026 **Duration:** Approximately 35 minutes \(11:46 to 12:21 UTC\). ### What Happened Pinpoint experienced a service outage beginning at approximately 11:46 UTC on 19 March. Users were unable to access the platform and received 503 errors. Full service was restored by approximately 12:21 UTC. No data was lost or corrupted. ### Timeline \(UTC\) * **11:46** - Automated monitoring alerts triggered for service unavailability. * **11:47** - Engineering team began investigating. * **12:01** - Status page updated to reflect the incident. * **12:10** - Root cause identified as a database firewall misconfiguration introduced during an infrastructure change. * **12:20** - Fix applied; service restored. * **12:21** - Incident marked as resolved. ### Why It Happened During an infrastructure configuration change, a database firewall rule was inadvertently applied with an overly restrictive scope. This prevented our application servers from connecting to the primary database, causing all requests to fail. ### What We're Doing About It * **Immediate fix:** The firewall configuration has been corrected and verified. * **Hardening:** We are making production database firewall rules explicitly immutable and tightening API token permissions to prevent unexpected firewall modifications. We sincerely apologise for the disruption and appreciate your patience.

**Date:** 12 February 2026 **Duration:** Approximately 30 minutes \(14:00 - 14:35 UTC\), with a brief secondary disruption during recovery. ### What Happened Pinpoint experienced a service outage beginning at approximately 14:00 UTC on 12 February. Most users were unable to access the platform and received 504 timeout errors, though partial capacity meant some requests were still being served. Full service was restored by approximately 14:35 UTC. Some outbound emails were delayed due to background workers also being affected. All queued emails were delivered by approximately 16:15 UTC. No data was lost or corrupted. ### Timeline \(UTC\) * **14:00** - Automated monitoring alerts triggered for service unavailability. * **14:02** - Engineering team began investigating. * **14:08** - Root cause identified as a network configuration conflict introduced by a third-party infrastructure provider. * **14:20** - Initial fix applied; service stabilising. * **14:22** - Third-party provider's automation reinstated the conflicting configuration, causing a brief secondary disruption. * **14:30** - Fix reapplied with additional safeguards to prevent recurrence. * **14:35** - Full service restored. * **16:15** - All delayed outbound emails delivered. ### Why It Happened A third-party infrastructure provider applied an automated network configuration change to our servers. The change was overly broad and conflicted with our own networking configuration, causing the majority of inbound traffic to be dropped. During initial recovery, the provider's automation re-applied the conflicting change before we implemented stronger protections. ### What We're Doing About It * **Immediate Safeguards:** Protections are in place to prevent this specific change from affecting our infrastructure again. * **Removing the Dependency:** We are accelerating work to bring the affected networking functionality fully in-house, removing the third-party dependency entirely. We sincerely apologise for the disruption and appreciate your patience.