Linode incident

Emerging Service Issue - [DNS] - [eu-west]

Notice Resolved View vendor source →

Linode experienced a notice incident on September 21, 2026 affecting Hosted DNS Service and EU-West (London), lasting 7h 14m. The incident has been resolved; the full update timeline is below.

Started
Sep 21, 2026, 04:50 PM UTC
Resolved
Sep 22, 2026, 12:04 AM UTC
Duration
7h 14m
Detected by Pingoru
Sep 21, 2026, 04:50 PM UTC

Affected components

Hosted DNS ServiceEU-West (London)

Update timeline

  1. investigating Sep 21, 2026, 04:50 PM UTC

    Our team is investigating an emerging service issue affecting our DNS service in the London 1 (EU-West) region. We will share additional updates as we have more information.

  2. identified Sep 21, 2026, 06:41 PM UTC

    Our team has identified the issue affecting our DNS service in the London 1 (EU-West) region. We are working quickly to implement a fix, and we will provide an update as soon as the solution is in place.

  3. identified Sep 21, 2026, 08:07 PM UTC

    We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

  4. identified Sep 21, 2026, 09:15 PM UTC

    We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

  5. monitoring Sep 21, 2026, 10:06 PM UTC

    At this time 21:45 UTC September 21st, 2026 we have been able to correct the issue affecting our DNS service in the London 1 (EU-West) region. We will be monitoring this to ensure that connectivity remains stable. Customers can apply this fix by enabling Network Helper (https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/automatically-configure-networking) and rebooting the effected Linode or please open a ticket with our Support Team.

  6. resolved Sep 22, 2026, 12:04 AM UTC

    This incident has been resolved.

  7. postmortem Sep 24, 2026, 05:45 PM UTC

    On September 21, 2026, starting at approximately 16:10 UTC, Akamai observed degraded DNS resolution performance affecting a subset of Linode instances within the London \(`LON1`\) region. Platform-wide DNS resolution remained functional, and no other regions were affected. The disruption occurred during a drive transplant of a compute host at the London \(lon1\) data center, which temporarily took a customer-facing DNS resolver offline. Due to a software logic flaw, customer workload configurations deployed in the last year across the region were disproportionately reliant on this single resolver, causing DNS failures when it became unavailable. At 21:45 UTC, engineering teams deployed an emergency configuration update to rebalance and reorder active DNS resolver assignments in the region, returning DNS query performance to baseline levels. Post-remediation monitoring confirmed stable operations across `LON1`. Long-term engineering updates are currently being deployed to ensure provisioning utilities dynamically assign distinct, active DNS resolvers across all regions to prevent recurrence. This summary reflects our current understanding of the incident based on available details. Our investigation remains ongoing, and findings may be updated as further information is reviewed.