ch-dk-2 connectivity issue

Update timeline

1. investigating Apr 07, 2026, 12:45 PM UTC

   We currently experiencing an issue with SKS in ch-dk-2. We’re investigating the issue and will communicate when we have more information.

2. investigating Apr 07, 2026, 12:53 PM UTC

   The issue is being escalated to partial outage

3. investigating Apr 07, 2026, 12:56 PM UTC

   We keep investigating the root cause

4. investigating Apr 07, 2026, 01:07 PM UTC

   The issue may be related to some underlying network issues. We are still investigating

5. investigating Apr 07, 2026, 01:14 PM UTC

   The issue seems to be related to some partial IPv6 connectivity issue. We are still investigating

6. investigating Apr 07, 2026, 01:16 PM UTC

   Impact of the incident has been extended to the following services: SOS, Block storage as a side effect of the underlying connectivity issue

7. investigating Apr 07, 2026, 01:21 PM UTC

   Some SKS clusters have their API fully unavailable. We are still investigating

8. investigating Apr 07, 2026, 01:36 PM UTC

   We are still investigating the origin of the IPv6 network issue.

9. investigating Apr 07, 2026, 01:49 PM UTC

   We are still investigating the origin of the IPv6 network issue. During the investigation some brief connection reset may be experienced

10. investigating Apr 07, 2026, 02:16 PM UTC

    We are applying a set of mitigation, which is improving the current situation

11. monitoring Apr 07, 2026, 02:30 PM UTC

    Mitigation has been applied. Affected services are converging. We are monitoring the recovery

12. monitoring Apr 07, 2026, 02:36 PM UTC

    All services are back available. We are monitoring the situation

13. monitoring Apr 07, 2026, 02:46 PM UTC

    Services are nominal. We keep monitoring the situation

14. resolved Apr 07, 2026, 03:00 PM UTC

    Incident has been resolved. The exact root cause remain to be identified at this stage. The issue affected mostly IPv6 connectivity of a subset of hypervisor hosts. While we are still evaluating the exact impact of this incident, the following services have been affected: SKS control planes: Some SKS control plane backends where hosted on the affected hosts. This resulted in downtime of a subset of SKS control plane clusters SOS: Experienced an increase number of error 500. Issue has been fully mitigated by 16:15 CET Block storage: Experienced a brief connection drop. It may have resulted in some I/O errors returned to a subset of volumes. As a result some of the affected volumes may have been switched to read-only mode by the instance kernel. In such situation a manual remount will be required to bring back the affected volumes in write mode. Some IPv4/IPv6 connection reset may have been experienced on instances while we were applying the mitigation