Central 1 Outage History

Postmortem: INC216463 – Missed outgoing AFT files for third exchange On Wednesday, February 4, Central 1 missed the 6:00 p.m. PT \(9:00 p.m. ET\) AFT transfer cut-off for sending outgoing items to be processed via the exchange for seven financial institutions \(approximately 2,500 transactions\). As a result, some client AFT transactions were processed in the next batch cycle at 6:30 a.m. PT \(9:30 a.m. ET\) on February 5. **Point of Failure:** The failure was caused by an automated FTP process that transfers files to the exchange application, Direct Connect, which did not execute as expected. Monitoring and alerting for this FTP process relies on a manual pop-up notification. The alert was not handled in time, and as a result, the issue was not resolved before the last cutoff on February 4. **Corrective Actions \(PRB011675\):** * Explore automation and alerting, including log generation where none exists, and possible integration with monitoring tools – DUE end of Q1 2026 * Analyze file arrival patterns by trading partner to see if they can identify which files should arrive by which times. This will enable smarter, earlier warnings and help computer operators with validation and early awareness to any potential for missing files - DUE end of Q1 2026 * Software Management team to cross-train Computer Operators on critical procedures. To prevent further incidents, transfer practical knowledge and validate SOPs in real conditions - DUE end of Q1 2026 * Update procedures to: Define earlier and more realistic check times and focus on critical AFT windows, not continuous monitoring - DUE end of Q1 2026 We apologize for the delay and appreciate your patience while Central 1 works internally to improve system functionality. Central 1 - [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) - 1.888.889.7878

Following investigation of PRB011671, Central 1 determined that a full service outage did not occur during the reported incident window. At approximately 11:30 PM PT on February 2, network connectivity on a data centre router entered a bad state during scheduled maintenance performed by our vendor. Although the affected router was not handling traffic between 11:30 p.m. to 12:25 a.m. PT \(February 3\), traffic automatically continued to flow through the secondary router as part of the active-active configuration, allowing core payment services such as PaymentStream Direct, e-Transfers, and Bill Payments to remain available. During the event, monitoring alerts incorrectly indicated broader service disruption, which led Central 1 to communicate potential degradation across multiple applications including PaymentStream Direct, e-Transfers, MemberDirect, Forge, and Originations. Post-incident review confirmed that payment services remained operational, with the only verified impact being an estimated ~30% degradation in availability for Forge/MemberDirect during the investigation window.