Artie Technologies incident

Streaming degraded for some customers in us-east-1

Resolved after 20 minutes, on September 30, 2026.

monitoring Oct 09, 2026, 12:58 AM UTC

From 5:56 to 6:16 PM PDT on September 29, streaming was degraded for pipelines in our us-east-1 data plane. Right after a planned migration of our compute nodes, an engineer applied an unrelated infrastructure change built on an outdated configuration which undid the migration and replaced those nodes in bulk, causing new nodes to come up that were not attached to public IPs and sending data processing alerts for affected pipelines. We identified the issue internally at 5:58 PM, and most pipelines recovered by 6:16 PM as the replacement nodes came online with our static egress IPs. We restarted the few remaining pipelines by hand and confirmed all pipelines were healthy by 6:45 PM. Data was delayed, not lost, and no action is required. We apologize for the disruption and have implemented the following changes to ensure it doesn't happen again: \- additional guardrails on the infrastructure deploy process to catch rogue changes that aren't based on the latest configuration or introduce unintended drift \- process improvements to tighten infrastructure reviews across the team \- exploring foundational infrastructure improvements to reduce pipeline time to recovery when underlying nodes are replaced.

Started
Sep 30, 2026, 12:56 AM UTC
Resolved
Sep 30, 2026, 01:16 AM UTC
Duration
20m
Detected by Pingoru
Sep 30, 2026, 12:56 AM UTC

Update timeline

  1. identified Sep 30, 2026, 12:56 AM UTC

    Some customers received data processing alerts for running pipelines in us-east-1 -- we've identified the issue and are actively monitoring pipelines to restore availability..

  2. resolved Sep 30, 2026, 01:16 AM UTC

    The incident has been resolved and streaming is operational -- we will follow up with an incident breakdown shortly..

  3. monitoring Oct 09, 2026, 12:58 AM UTC

    From 5:56 to 6:16 PM PDT on September 29, streaming was degraded for pipelines in our us-east-1 data plane. Right after a planned migration of our compute nodes, an engineer applied an unrelated infrastructure change built on an outdated configuration which undid the migration and replaced those nodes in bulk, causing new nodes to come up that were not attached to public IPs and sending data processing alerts for affected pipelines. We identified the issue internally at 5:58 PM, and most pipelines recovered by 6:16 PM as the replacement nodes came online with our static egress IPs. We restarted the few remaining pipelines by hand and confirmed all pipelines were healthy by 6:45 PM. Data was delayed, not lost, and no action is required. We apologize for the disruption and have implemented the following changes to ensure it doesn't happen again: \- additional guardrails on the infrastructure deploy process to catch rogue changes that aren't based on the latest configuration or introduce unintended drift \- process improvements to tighten infrastructure reviews across the team \- exploring foundational infrastructure improvements to reduce pipeline time to recovery when underlying nodes are replaced.

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