Quick NZ Outage History

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Quick NZ had 17 outages in the last 2 years totaling 318h 48m of downtime — averaging 0.7 incidents per month.

There were 17 Quick NZ outages since August 5, 2025 totaling 318h 48m of downtime. Each is summarised below — incident details, duration, and resolution information.

Source: https://status.quic.nz

Minor June 30, 2026

Incident - Connectivity disruption - 30/06

Detected by Pingoru
Jun 30, 2026, 04:19 AM UTC
Resolved
Jun 30, 2026, 04:39 AM UTC
Duration
19m
Affected: UFB Internet
Timeline · 3 updates
  1. investigating Jun 30, 2026, 04:19 AM UTC

    Some customers may be experiencing an interruption or degradation of connectivity. Our team are investigating.

  2. monitoring Jun 30, 2026, 04:23 AM UTC

    Affected connectivity has been restored, or is restoring. The team are continuing their investigations.

  3. resolved Jun 30, 2026, 04:39 AM UTC

    Engineers have identified the cause of this disruption to a firmware bug. Maintenance is being planned to complete updates on two network elements and will be posted on our status page once confirmed. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

Read the full incident report →

Minor June 25, 2026

Incident - pe2-akl1 lockup - 25/06

Detected by Pingoru
Jun 25, 2026, 03:24 AM UTC
Resolved
Jun 25, 2026, 03:41 AM UTC
Duration
17m
Affected: Cloud Servers
Timeline · 3 updates
  1. identified Jun 25, 2026, 03:24 AM UTC

    We have been alerted to a process lockup on network element pe2-akl1, causing potential interruption to service or suboptimal routing for customers connected via this device. Engineers have concluded a restart of the device is necessary, which may cause a brief interruption to directly connected and singlehomed equipment for approximately 5-10 minutes. We apologise for the inconvenience, and will post updates once completed and restored to normal operation.

  2. monitoring Jun 25, 2026, 03:33 AM UTC

    Device restart has been completed and engineers are monitoring to ensure service restoration.

  3. resolved Jun 25, 2026, 03:41 AM UTC

    Network element and associated services have remained stable since manual intervention. If you are experiencing issues with your service, please reach out to our team for further assistance.

Read the full incident report →

Minor May 27, 2026

Degradation - International connectivity - 28/05

Detected by Pingoru
May 27, 2026, 02:24 PM UTC
Resolved
May 27, 2026, 03:05 PM UTC
Duration
41m
Affected: UFB InternetCloud Servers
Timeline · 3 updates
  1. investigating May 27, 2026, 02:24 PM UTC

    Some customers may be experiencing degraded international connectivity. Our team are investigating and updates to follow.

  2. monitoring May 27, 2026, 02:48 PM UTC

    Issue has been isolated to an upstream transit path, which has now been temporarily removed from our network. Affected destinations, seemingly Europe-specific are now functioning.

  3. resolved May 27, 2026, 03:05 PM UTC

    Issue has been confirmed as major congestion within a single transit providers network. This provider has been temporarily removed from our network and traffic re-routed, which has resolved affected traffic destinations. We apologise for any inconvenience.

Read the full incident report →

Minor May 13, 2026

Incident - Chorus connection authentication - 13/05

Detected by Pingoru
May 13, 2026, 01:36 AM UTC
Resolved
May 13, 2026, 02:05 AM UTC
Duration
28m
Affected: UFB Internet
Timeline · 3 updates
  1. identified May 13, 2026, 01:36 AM UTC

    We are experiencing an issue impacting some customers with Chorus connections authenticating onto the Vetta network. The team are investigating and resolving as quickly as possible.

  2. monitoring May 13, 2026, 01:38 AM UTC

    Rollback has been performed from a change and impacted connections are recovering. The team are monitoring to ensure resolution.

  3. resolved May 13, 2026, 02:05 AM UTC

    Incident has been resolved. If you are without connectivity, please reach out to our team. This incident was caused by an erroneous setting pushed into our authentication backend, which resulted in some service disruption for some customers, which will be investigated to analyse the root cause. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

Read the full incident report →

Minor May 3, 2026

Incident - Selective international traffic disruption - 03/05

Detected by Pingoru
May 03, 2026, 10:24 AM UTC
Resolved
May 03, 2026, 10:46 AM UTC
Duration
21m
Affected: UFB InternetCloud Servers
Timeline · 3 updates
  1. investigating May 03, 2026, 10:24 AM UTC

    Our team are currently investigating a disruption to some international traffic paths, which appears to be an issue with an upstream transit provider. Updates to follow.

  2. monitoring May 03, 2026, 10:38 AM UTC

    Affected traffic has been moved to alternate paths and service has been restored. Initial analysis was correct in that a transit provider was distributing routes, but traffic was unable to pass. Team is monitoring for any additional impacts before resolution.

  3. resolved May 03, 2026, 10:46 AM UTC

    No further impacts have been identified since traffic paths have been moved. An incident has been raised with the affected transit provider for them to advise once their network is restored to normal function. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

Read the full incident report →

Minor April 9, 2026

Incident - Sydney traffic increased latency - 09/04

Detected by Pingoru
Apr 09, 2026, 08:08 AM UTC
Resolved
Apr 09, 2026, 09:30 AM UTC
Duration
1h 22m
Affected: UFB Internet
Timeline · 4 updates
  1. identified Apr 09, 2026, 08:08 AM UTC

    Due to an ongoing upstream vendor issue, there is currently increased latency to/from traffic destined to or through our Sydney network PoP. Our NOC is monitoring this closely, and have also engaged the impacted vendor’s NOC for further information/investigation, which will be used in conjunction with our own monitoring for any further actions which our team may take as part of this incident response. Next update as new information becomes available or on status change.

  2. identified Apr 09, 2026, 08:14 AM UTC

    Vendor NOC has confirmed issue has been identified within their network and is under action.

  3. monitoring Apr 09, 2026, 09:06 AM UTC

    We are observing latency starting to restore to normal levels following NOC intervention. We are continuing to monitor to ensure resolution. Next update on status change or resolution confirmation.

  4. resolved Apr 09, 2026, 09:30 AM UTC

    Latency and backhaul pathing for traffic transiting our Sydney network PoP has been restored to normal levels, and this incident is now resolved. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

Read the full incident report →

Minor March 31, 2026

Incident - Credit Card Payments - 01/04

Detected by Pingoru
Mar 31, 2026, 07:35 PM UTC
Resolved
Mar 31, 2026, 08:20 PM UTC
Duration
45m
Affected: Website & Portal
Timeline · 3 updates
  1. identified Mar 31, 2026, 07:35 PM UTC

    We are aware of an issue being experienced with our credit card payment gateway provider, resulting in some customers being unable to make credit card payments through the portal, or are receiving credit card payment failure emails for automated payments. Our gateway provider has been notified and we are awaiting their resolution. Next update on status change.

  2. identified Mar 31, 2026, 07:50 PM UTC

    Our gateway vendor has identified the issue and is working to resolve now. ETR 20~30 minutes.

  3. resolved Mar 31, 2026, 08:20 PM UTC

    Issue has been resolved, and credit card processing is now completing as normal. Failed automated recurring charges are in the process of being retried. We apologise for any inconvenience or confusion caused.

Read the full incident report →

Minor February 22, 2026

Incident - 23/02 - Degraded DC connectivity

Detected by Pingoru
Feb 22, 2026, 06:54 PM UTC
Resolved
Feb 22, 2026, 07:41 PM UTC
Duration
46m
Affected: Cloud Servers
Timeline · 3 updates
  1. investigating Feb 22, 2026, 06:54 PM UTC

    Our team are currently investigating a connectivity issue at one of our datacentre sites, which may be impacting services based at this location. We’re continuing to investigate and will update as we continue investigations and isolate the problem. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.

  2. monitoring Feb 22, 2026, 07:14 PM UTC

    Services are now appearing stable and are under monitoring observation. At this stage, it appears as though only our internal monitoring observability was impacted, and not customer services. Our team are continuing to look through logs.

  3. resolved Feb 22, 2026, 07:41 PM UTC

    No further occurrences or irregular observations have been detected. Impacted device was within our management network, and we do not believe customer services were impacted by this incident.

Read the full incident report →