JumpCloud incident

Authentication Service Failures

Notice Resolved View vendor source →

JumpCloud experienced a notice incident on April 30, 2025 affecting LDAP and User Console and 1 more component, lasting 9m. The incident has been resolved; the full update timeline is below.

Started
Apr 30, 2025, 01:05 PM UTC
Resolved
Apr 30, 2025, 01:15 PM UTC
Duration
9m
Detected by Pingoru
Apr 30, 2025, 01:05 PM UTC

Affected components

LDAPUser ConsoleSSO

Update timeline

  1. monitoring Apr 30, 2025, 01:05 PM UTC

    We have identified an issue that was affecting authentication and SSO and have implemented a fix. Services have recovered and we are monitoring.

  2. resolved Apr 30, 2025, 01:15 PM UTC

    This incident has been resolved.

  3. postmortem May 06, 2025, 02:25 AM UTC

    ![](https://lh7-rt.googleusercontent.com/docsz/AD_4nXdJTDHu6nwjsVpc24PfPik9fNRnfkb2sBFefB-1HYs_wnxUsJ0-IK1zbL1gKs04ARc2-vsSp_nQnSoe6yNYTEsMn4WGfj9WhaKd_h8JP2eKDNXVk5C26nAawvYlx-nl7kXr0Zpj_A?key=58dfg4GavX6z3tye_szSU7MN) # Incident Report **Date**: May 5, 2025 **Date of Incident:** Apr 30, 2025 **Description**: RCA for User Portal / SSO Failed Authentication ‌ **Summary:** On April 30th at 12:35 UTC our monitors detected a significant increase in errors across our User Console API endpoints. The increased errors manifested as failed authentication for new attempts to the User Portal, SSO and other services. Existing connections to applications continued uninterrupted. At 12:41 UTC a formal incident was declared and multiple teams were paged. The issue was resolved at 12:58 UTC ‌ **Root Cause:** A state transition anomaly occurred during the credential rotation process for a database within our authentication infrastructure, resulting in connection failures by dependent services to that layer. Consequently, end-users experienced authentication errors when attempting to establish new sessions with specific applications. ‌ The authentication service team was able to identify a failure with secondary credentials during the rotation and quickly failed back to valid secrets. ‌ ‌ **Corrective Actions / Risk Mitigation:** 1. Fail back to primary secrets - DONE 2. Increased automation for secrets rotation at this layer - IN PROGRESS