INC217374 - RESOLVED - Interac 3.5 service disruption

Update timeline

1. resolved Feb 24, 2026, 05:07 AM UTC

   Central 1 experienced a service disruption on e-Transfer version 3.5 (ISO 20022) between 7:35 pm PT (10:35 pm ET) and 8:47 pm PT (11:47 m ET) that would have affected all transactions. Service has since been restored. Autodeposits received during that time will automatically be retried, requiring no further action. There was no impact to 3.4/ISO8583 transactions. We apologize for any inconvenience caused by this service interruption. Central 1 - [email protected] - 1.888.889.7878, press 1

2. postmortem Mar 20, 2026, 05:18 PM UTC

   **Postmortem: INC217374 – e-Transfer 3.5/ISO20022 Outage** On Monday, February 23, 2026, Central 1 experienced a service disruption to e-Transfer version 3.5 \(ISO 20022\) between 7:35 pm PT \(10:35 pm ET\) and 8:47 pm PT \(11:47 pm ET\), which affected both send and receive transactions. When service was restored, Auto-deposits received during that time were automatically retried, requiring no further action. There was no impact to 3.4/ISO8583 transactions. **Point of Failure:** The outage was caused by a failure within the messaging infrastructure supporting Interac e-Transfer 3.5, specifically related to the Amazon MQ \(ActiveMQ\) PSA Trace broker reaching full storage capacity. This occurred after two trace consumer instances experienced a sustained, unexplained degradation in network throughput beginning on February 19, significantly reducing their ability to process trace messages. As a result, messages accumulated in both the primary trace queue and dead-letter queue, preventing the system from clearing processed data and ultimately exhausting available storage. Once the broker reached capacity, built-in flow control mechanisms halted all message publishing across the platform, which in turn blocked payment processing and led to downstream application failures, including loss of connectivity within the EMT service. Although the issue originated in a non-functional trace processing component, it had a cascading impact on core payment flows. Service was restored by clearing the accumulated backlog and restarting affected services, while AWS continues to investigate the underlying cause of the EC2 network degradation. **Corrective Actions \(PRB011685\):** * Add monitoring & alerts for PSA trace broker – Complete * Evaluate disabling PSA trace queues \(partially or fully\): Q2 – 2026 * AWS Investigation – Ongoing by vendor We apologize for the delay and appreciate your patience while Central 1 works internally to improve system functionality. Central 1 - [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) - 1.888.889.7878