Multiple Regions - Multiple Services - [Some services may be unavailable]

Update timeline

1. monitoring Mar 05, 2026, 12:38 AM UTC

   Affected Regions: - Europe - US - Japan - Australia - Canada - Singapore - Delayed US - Delayed EU - India - UK - Switzerland

2. resolved Mar 05, 2026, 01:01 AM UTC

   Affected Regions: - Europe - US - Japan - Australia - Canada - Singapore - Delayed US - Delayed EU - India - UK - Switzerland

3. postmortem Apr 20, 2026, 07:37 PM UTC

   ## Customer Impact On 2026-03-05 between 00:00 and 00:10 UTC, customers in the **United States** region experienced approximately 10 minutes of sign-in delays, temporary access issues, and intermittent functionality errors across Orchestrator, Automation Cloud, Test Manager, and Studio Web. Customers whose organization data is hosted in other regions were not affected. Service behavior returned to normal automatically at 00:10 UTC. No data was lost and no customer action was required. Total customer-impacting duration: **~10 minutes**, 00:00 – 00:10 UTC. ## Root Cause During a routine software update, a temporary reduction in capacity occurred at a transition point in the update. For a brief window, the available capacity could not keep up with normal request volume, which produced the sign-in delays and intermittent errors customers observed. Capacity restored automatically and service returned to normal behavior within ten minutes. ## Detection The incident was detected through automated monitoring. Alerts covering customer-facing response codes, request latency, and underlying service health fired within three minutes and paged the on-call team immediately. No monitoring gaps contributed to the incident. ## Response On-call engineering and site-reliability engaged within one minute of the alerts firing and convened on an incident bridge. By the time the team was assembled, monitoring showed service recovering on its own, no manual mitigation was needed. The team held the bridge to verify stability, confirmed a clean 30-minute observation window with no recurrence, marked the incident mitigated at 00:37 UTC, updated the public status page to resolved at 01:01 UTC, and closed the incident at 01:29 UTC. A full post-incident investigation opened the next day identified the underlying cause. Timeline: * 00:13 UTC — Automated alerts fired; on-call teams paged. * 00:14 UTC — Engineers acknowledged and joined the incident bridge. * 00:10 – 00:37 UTC — Self-recovery confirmed; stability verified against live traffic. * 00:37 UTC — Incident marked mitigated. * 01:01 UTC — Public status page set to resolved. * 01:29 UTC — Incident closed. ## Follow-Up We have already increased the minimum capacity running in production so there is more headroom during future updates. As a longer-term improvement, we are moving this workload onto our modern deployment platform, which rolls out new versions gradually and supports automatic rollback if any issue is detected. This migration is a top engineering priority and is the change that fully addresses the underlying cause.