Service Issue - Longview

Update timeline

1. monitoring Feb 12, 2026, 02:29 AM UTC

   Starting around 11:04 UTC on February 10, 2026, Longview graph dashboard became unavailable. The investigation revealed that an internal certificate expiry caused the issue. The impact was limited to reading the existing reporting data, and there was no permanent reporting data loss due to this issue. The affected certificate was rotated to mitigate the impact. The impact was mitigated at 23:44 UTC on February 10, 2026. We will continue to monitor to ensure that the impact has been fully mitigated.

2. resolved Feb 12, 2026, 04:23 AM UTC

   We haven’t observed any additional issues with the Longview service, and will now consider this incident resolved. If you continue to experience problems, please open a Support ticket for assistance.

3. postmortem Feb 16, 2026, 01:52 AM UTC

   Starting around 11:04 UTC on February 10, 2026, some customers were unable to access the Longview graph dashboard. Longview is a system data graphing service that tracks metrics for CPU, memory, and network bandwidth on both an aggregate and per-process basis. It also provides real-time graphs that can help expose performance problems \(more details about Longview are available [here](https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/longview)\). The investigation revealed that the issue was caused by an internal certificate expiry for the [longview.linode.com](http://longview.linode.com) hostname. The impact was limited to reading the existing reporting data only, while the write operations remained unaffected, and there was no permanent reporting data loss due to this issue. Akamai's internal automated tool rotated the expiring certificate before the certificate expired; however, the internal certificate tool which was supposed to auto-reload the system, did not reload the Longview servers after the previous certificate was rotated. The issue started when the previous certificate expired. To mitigate the impact, we manually reloaded the Longview servers for the new certificate to take effect. The impact was mitigated at 23:44 UTC on February 10, 2026, following this action. We will continue to investigate the root cause and will take appropriate preventive actions. We apologize for the impact and thank you for your patience and continued support. We are committed to making continuous improvements to make our systems better and prevent recurrence. This summary provides an overview of our current understanding of the incident given the information available. Our investigation is ongoing, and any information herein is subject to change.