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Description: We are experiencing an issue with multiple services in europe-west2 beginning on Monday, 2026-10-19 23:08 PDT. Our engineering team continues to investigate the issue. We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 01:30 PDT with current details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. Symptoms: Multiple Google Cloud services are experiencing elevated errors and intermittent network failures in europe-west2 region. Workaround: None for now

Description: We are experiencing an issue with multiple services in europe-west2 beginning on Monday, 2026-10-19 23:08 PDT. Our engineering team continues to investigate the issue. We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 04:00 PDT with current details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. Symptoms: Multiple Google Cloud services are experiencing elevated errors and intermittent network failures in europe-west2 region. Note: Looker Studio is not impacted by this outage. Workaround: If feasible, the impacted customer may try to migrate their workload impacted to another available location (zone or region).

Description: We are experiencing an issue with multiple services in europe-west2 beginning on Monday, 2026-10-19 23:08 PDT. Our engineering team continues to investigate the issue. We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 05:00 PDT with current details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. Symptoms: Multiple Google Cloud services are experiencing elevated errors and intermittent network failures in europe-west2 region. Note: Looker Studio is not impacted by this outage. Workaround: If feasible, the impacted customer may try to migrate their workload impacted to another available location (zone or region).

Description: We are experiencing an issue with multiple services in europe-west2 beginning on Monday, 2026-10-19 23:08 PDT. Due to a power event we had suffered an outage within europe-west2-b zone. The power event is mitigated. Partial mitigation to infrastructure services will be observed within the next 30 minutes and the remaining services will be mitigated there after. We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 05:00 PDT with current details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. Symptoms: Google Cloud services are unavailable in europe-west2-b zone; some services in europe-west2 region may experience elevated errors and intermittent network issues. Workaround: If feasible, the impacted customer may try to migrate their workload impacted to another available location (zone or region).

Description: We are experiencing an issue with multiple services in europe-west2 beginning on Monday, 2026-10-19 23:08 PDT. A power event caused an outage within europe-west2-b zone. The power event is mitigated. We are seeing the recovery of services and are prioritizing the recovery of existing workloads.Customers may not be able to yet create new workloads. Full recovery of existing workloads should be completed, tentatively by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 06:00. We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 06:00 PDT with current details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. Symptoms: Google Cloud services are unavailable in europe-west2-b zone; some services in europe-west2 region may experience elevated errors and intermittent network issues. Workaround: If feasible, the impacted customer may try to migrate their workload impacted to another available location (zone or region).

Description: We are seeing the recovery of services for most workloads in europe-west2 as of Tuesday, 2026-10-20 05:10 PDT. We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 07:00 PDT with current details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. Symptoms: Google Cloud services are unavailable in europe-west2-b zone; some services in europe-west2 region may experience elevated errors and intermittent network issues. Workaround: If feasible, the impacted customer may try to migrate their workload impacted to another available location (zone or region).

Description: The issue with impacted GCP products has been mitigated for most of the customers and it is believed to be affecting currently a very small number of customers and our Engineering Team is working on it. If you have questions or are impacted, please open a case with the Support Team and we will work with you until this issue is resolved. No further updates will be provided here. We will publish an analysis of this incident once we have completed our internal investigation. We thank you for your patience while we're working on resolving the issue. Symptoms: Google Cloud services were unavailable in europe-west2-b zone; some services in europe-west2 region might experienced elevated errors and intermittent network issues. Workaround: None as the issue has been mitigated.

Preliminary incident report: We recognize that Google Cloud services are critical to your organization, and we sincerely apologize for the disruption this incident may have caused to your business. We are working to address the root cause and prevent this from occurring in the future. Please note, this information is based on our best knowledge at the time of posting and is subject to change as our investigation continues. A final Incident Report with preventative actions will be posted once our investigation is complete. If you have experienced impact outside of what is listed below, please reach out to Google Cloud Support using https://cloud.google.com/support. Date/time of the issue (all time us/pacific): Incident Start: 19 October 2026 23:00 Incident End: 20 October 2026 05:10 Duration: 6 hours, 10 minutes Preliminary root cause: The incident was triggered when a power grid disruption occurred at the datacenter facility hosting availability zone europe-west2-b. To maintain continuous power during the disruption, automatic transfer to facility backup power systems was triggered immediately. The facility load was transferred to the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) battery banks during the start up sequence of on-site emergency diesel generators. The Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) automation system (both primary and backup PLCs) failed to initiate the logical automatic start/transfer operations of the generators, preventing backup generators from assuming the load. When UPS battery reserves were depleted, physical host servers, network switching fabric, and local storage arrays dedicated to europe-west2-b lost power and went offline. The sequence of events leading to customer impact was as follows: - At 22:53 US/Pacific, an electrical power disruption occurred at the datacenter facility hosting availability zone europe-west2-b, and a PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) startup fault prevented facility emergency generators from assuming the electrical load. Facility load continued to be supported by UPS battery banks until the batteries were depleted, starting at 23:00 US/Pacific. - When the physical host servers, local storage infrastructure, and network aggregation hardware in europe-west2-b lost power, it caused instances, database replicas, and worker nodes in that zone to become immediately unreachable. - Regional traffic-routing mechanisms and client applications initiated automated failover toward available infrastructure in adjacent availability zones within the region. - Cross-zone remote procedure calls from regional service control planes directed to metadata and catalog components in the offline zone encountered timeouts, causing initial job submission stalls and API latency spikes. - The sudden influx of redirected query executions, high-availability database failovers, and compute workloads saturated available compute slots and processing capacity in other availability zones, creating elevated admission queues, delayed database failover completions, and intermittent 500 and 503 API errors across the region. Google engineers have begun a full root cause analysis (RCA) and will provide additional information once it is available. Remediation: Google engineers were alerted to the disruption via automated monitoring systems and probers at 23:08 US/Pacific on Monday, 19 October 2026, which detected elevated API error ratios, job submission timeouts, and loss of infrastructure reachability in europe-west2-b. Engineering teams immediately mobilized to isolate the affected infrastructure and commence recovery: - Traffic Isolation: Google engineers isolated the offline availability zone (europe-west2-b) by adjusting regional service routing away from the affected infrastructure, preventing cross-zone client requests from timing out against offline endpoints. - Workload Reprioritization and Resource Safeguards: Engineers adjusted scheduler allocations and capacity limits across unimpacted infrastructure to prioritize active customer reservations, reduce resource contention on execution slots, and relieve queue backlogs for regional workloads. - Power Grid Restoration: On-site facility engineers conducted graceful restoration of a stable utility power feed once utility supply was back, within 1 hour. Following this, they focused and completed a reset and tested the emergency backup generator automation controllers to restore facility power. - Progressive Infrastructure Re-activation: Google engineers systematically restarted core Google Cloud infrastructure and services. - Controlled Traffic Re-admission: Once system health and storage integrity were verified, engineers executed gradual, controlled traffic re-admission back to zone europe-west2-b allowing accumulated job backlogs to clear smoothly. By 05:10 US/Pacific on Tuesday, 20 October 2026, service availability had recovered for the vast majority of customer workloads, and resolution for most of the customers across Google Cloud Platform services in the region was confirmed. Following the recovery of a small tail of remaining isolated workloads, the closure notification for the incident was posted by 07:03 US/Pacific. Description of impact: Between Monday, 19 October 2026, 23:00 and Tuesday, 20 October 2026, 05:10 US/Pacific, customers utilizing Google Cloud Platform services in the europe-west2 region experienced service disruptions across two consecutive phases, lasting a total duration of 6 hours, 10 minutes. During the initial phase from 23:00 to 04:29 US/Pacific (duration 5 hours, 29 minutes), customers experienced elevated error rates, API timeouts, and processing delays until most Google Cloud Platform services recovered. Following platform service restoration, some customer workloads running on Compute Engine instances experienced a longer recovery tail. By 04:46 US/Pacific new Virtual Machine creation resumed and by 05:10 US/Pacific over 99% of Compute Engine Virtual Machines were in a healthy state. Any remaining customers that are experiencing Virtual Machine problems should file a customer support issue as per normal procedure. While the physical power outage was isolated strictly to datacenter facilities in europe-west2-b, some customers running workloads in unimpacted zones (europe-west2-a and europe-west2-c) or across regional architectures also experienced unexpected impact. The primary causes were 1) instantaneous demand surges on unimpacted compute capacity and 2) synchronous control-plane validation dependencies across zonal boundaries. Affected products included: BigQuery, Looker, Google Compute Engine, Google Kubernetes Engine, Regional Persistent Disk, and Cloud SQL. These services experienced unexpected degradation and failover issues driven by sudden compute capacity exhaustion from surging demand, and control-plane API timeouts waiting on validations from the offline zone. Workloads and resources hosted entirely within europe-west2-b became unreachable. Data storage services with failover capability such as Cloud SQL, AlloyDB, Memorystore for Redis, and Cloud Bigtable failed over into nearby unimpacted zones during the europe-west2-b outage. Multi-zonal and regional services that spanned across the europe-west2 region experienced elevated latency, transient API errors (such as HTTP 500 and 503 errors), and task admission queuing as failover traffic concentrated onto unimpacted regional resources and cross-zone calls to offline components timed out. Storage write operations in the region experienced a transient error rate during the initial failover period, and regional query admission queues temporarily peaked before rapidly subsiding as capacity re-balanced. The following Google Cloud Platform services experienced impact: - AlloyDB for PostgreSQL - Apigee - BigQuery Data Transfer Service - Cloud Data Fusion - Cloud Filestore - Cloud Firestore - Cloud Load Balancing - Cloud Memorystore - Cloud NAT - Cloud Run - Cloud Spanner - Cloud Workstations - Datastream - Dialogflow CX - Google App Engine - Google BigQuery - Google Cloud Bigtable - Google Cloud Dataflow - Google Cloud Dataproc - Google Cloud NetApp Volumes - Google Cloud Pub/Sub - Google Cloud SQL - Google Cloud Storage (GCS) - Google Compute Engine (GCE) - Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) - Google SecOps (Security Information and Event Management [SIEM] and Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response [SOAR]) - Looker (Google Cloud core) - Looker Studio - Managed Airflow (Google Cloud Composer) - Managed Service for Apache Kafka - Memorystore for Memcached - Memorystore for Redis - Memorystore for Redis Cluster - Memorystore for Valkey - Network Connectivity Center - Persistent Disk - Private Service Connect - Speech-to-Text - Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) - VMWare engine

Facility architecture and background: The data center facility in the UK region hosts Cloud clusters serving the europe-west2-b zone, which form part of the multi-zonal europe-west2 Cloud region. The site relies on a 2N utility power architecture—meaning the facility has complete duplicate power paths for every critical load—backed by a central high-voltage generator bank managed by a dual-redundant Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). Primary utility power is supplied to the facility via two independent feeders (A and B), supplemented by a standby utility connection configured for manual campus-wide transfer during maintenance operations or emergency events. The two high-voltage primary feeders terminate at separate primary intake switchboards capable of closed-loop operation if either board is taken offline. Switching between the primary and standby utility providers utilizes open transitions and key interlocks to prevent parallel connections across sources. Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) battery systems provide 5 minutes of autonomous runtime. This bridge power ensures uninterrupted operation while the PLC detects utility undervoltage events, initiates diesel generator startup, synchronizes the generators, and transfers the site load. Prior to the utility disruption, the facility had been placed in a temporary single-feed (1N) bridged maintenance posture on the primary utility. Circuit breaker feeder B was physically opened and key-interlocked (Locked Out Tagged Out) to allow for corrective repairs following issues identified during a quarterly generator load test on 14 Oct 2026. Consequently, primary utility feed A was supporting the total critical load while repairs were conducted on the B feeder pathway. Root cause: On Monday, 19 Oct 2026 at 22:53 US/Pacific (Tuesday, 20 Oct 06:53 BST), the primary utility provider experienced an outage on primary utility feed A, caused by an external underground cable fault on the utility network outside the data center facility.   When the primary utility feed A was lost, the facility’s generator plant failed to receive a signal to automatically start and take critical load due to a design voltage-sensing and misconfiguration in the PLCs. The facility's static UPS battery banks carried the critical load as designed until their battery reserves depleted resulting in a complete power loss across data halls. The investigation of the PLC configuration identified the root cause as a misconfiguration of the PLC logic that did not verify both an undervoltage condition and physical breaker position for both utility feeders. Instead, the PLC undervoltage sensing inputs were wired upstream (line side) of the isolated utility feed B breaker. The PLC was programmed to verify whether voltage was present on the feeder before commanding a generator start. As the utility feed B remained energized upstream, both PLCs sensed live upstream voltage on the disconnected path. As a result, the PLC logic indicated that a healthy utility source was available, even though the primary and secondary distribution feeds were de-energized, and did not issue a start command to the generator plant.; The onsite facilities team attempted to execute a remote load transfer via the PLC; however, the system inhibited the action. Recognizing that the UPS battery reserves would be exhausted before further remote operations could be resolved, the team transferred the facility load to the standby utility source, restoring the critical load that was lost once batteries depleted during this process. Once utility power was restored via the standby utility source, and UPS batteries started recharging, the onsite facility teams and OEM vendors reconfigured and validated PLC functionality on both undervoltage and breaker status. After the power loss was initially detected, Google engineers began work to mitigate failover failures and prepare service recovery. Upon restoration of the utility source, UPS and generator capabilities, they began the process to re-enable services in europe-west2-b. Remediation and Prevention The sequence of events leading to customer impact was as follows: * 19 Oct 22:53 US/Pacific (20 Oct BST 06:53 BST) - An electrical power disruption occurred at the data center facility hosting availability zone europe-west2-b, and a PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) startup fault prevented facility emergency generators from assuming the electrical load. Facility load continued to be supported by UPS battery banks until the batteries were depleted. * 19 Oct 23:00 US/Pacific (20 Oct 07:00 BST) Impact start - As battery backups were exhausted, physical host servers, local storage infrastructure, and network aggregation hardware in availability zone europe-west2-b lost power, causing instances, database replicas, and worker nodes in that zone to become immediately unreachable. * 19 Oct 23:04 US/Pacific (20 Oct 07:04 BST) - Google engineers were alerted to the disruption via automated monitoring systems and probers, which detected elevated API error ratios, job submission timeouts, and loss of infrastructure reachability in zone europe-west2-b. Engineering teams immediately mobilized to isolate the affected infrastructure and commence recovery. * 19 Oct 23:09 US/Pacific (20 Oct 07:09 BST) - Regional traffic-routing mechanisms and client applications initiated automated failover toward available infrastructure in adjacent availability zones within the region. * Cross-zone remote procedure calls from regional service control planes directed to metadata and catalog components in the offline zone encountered timeouts, causing initial job submission stalls and API latency spikes. * The sudden influx of redirected query executions, high-availability database failovers, and compute workloads saturated available compute slots and processing capacity in other availability zones, creating elevated admission queues, delayed database failover completions, and intermittent 500 and 503 API errors across the region. * Traffic Isolation: Google engineers isolated the offline availability zone (europe-west2-b) by adjusting regional service routing away from the affected infrastructure, preventing cross-zone client requests from timing out against offline endpoints. * Workload Reprioritization and Resource Safeguards: Engineers adjusted scheduler allocations and capacity limits across unimpacted infrastructure to prioritize active customer reservations, reduce resource contention on execution slots, and relieve queue backlogs for regional workloads. * 19 Oct 23:54 US/Pacific (20 Oct 07:54 BST) Utility Power Restoration - Power supply from the standby utility source was restored and power restoration to the data hall began. * 20 Oct 00:20 US/Pacific (08:20 BST) Datahall Power Restoration - Utility power was re-established to the datahalls. Mains utility power normalized; power feed to data hall verified. Following this, the site operations and engineering teams focused on and completed a reset and tested the emergency backup generator automation controllers to restore facility power. * 20 Oct 00:40 US/Pacific (08:40 BST) - Clusters began to recover, cluster manager systems started rescheduling compute jobs.  * 20 Oct 00:45 US/Pacific (08:45 BST) - Network devices were back online.  * 20 Oct 00:50 US/Pacific (08:50 BST) - Due to the immediacy of power loss, storage devices with unclean shutdowns began recovery. Responders recognized this and chose not to restore services that would otherwise make this worse. Because of the large volume of storage devices involved, this process required a substantial period to finish prior to restoring service to customers. * 20 Oct 03:13 US/Pacific (11:06 BST) - Power redundancy was verified and the storage infrastructure was sufficiently restored to prepare the initiation of controlled traffic re-admission. The remaining storage systems continued recovery operations. * 20 Oct 03:45 US/Pacific (11:45 BST) Controlled Traffic Re-admission - Once system health and storage integrity were verified, engineers executed gradual, controlled traffic re-admission back to zone europe-west2-b allowing accumulated job backlogs to clear smoothly. * 20 Oct 04:11 US/Pacific (12:11 BST) - Google Cloud Platform services and APIs were made fully available to customers. Some Google Compute Engine virtual machines were still not yet available. * 20 Oct 04:29 US/Pacific (12:29 BST) - Regional services and backend compute management systems were fully undrained, marking the end of core platform-level disruption. * 20 Oct 05:08 US/Pacific (13:08 BST) Majority Workload Recovery - GCE virtual machines were 99.5% operational and healthy, and creating new VMs was fully supported. Service availability was restored for most customer workloads, with resolution confirmed for the majority of users across Google Cloud Platform services in the region. Following the recovery of a small tail of remaining isolated workloads, the closure notification for the incident was posted by 07:03 US/Pacific (15:03 BST). Google is committed to preventing a repeat of this issue in the future and is completing the following actions: Data center action items: * Restoration of normal utility configuration (both A & B feeds) * Utility provider to locate the damaged cable fault, using low-frequency radar penetration testing procedures. [Completed 26 Oct] * Utility provider to send on-site engineers to repair the cable fault and restore the impacted primary utility feed A source. [Estimated Completion Date 30 Oct] * Onsite Operations teams with a controlled method of procedure (MOP) to transfer the facility to its primary utility source (feeds A and B) from standby utility feed through coordinated switching with the utility provider [Estimated Completion Date 31 Oct] * Generator confidence testing * Full generator load transfer tests with utility power cutover of the active utility feed. Test automatic startup of generators through PLC signals within the backup battery timer and detailed review of backup procedures [Completed on 20 Oct and 26 Oct (full critical load transfer test including updated EOPs)] * Full generator load transfer tests in coordination with the primary utility source feeds (A and B) after restoration work completed by the primary utility provider. [Estimated Completion Date 31 Oct] * PLC configuration fix  * Reconfigured and validated the PLC after the outage on 20 Oct and then again on 26 Oct [Completed 26 Oct] * Google engineers to work in collaboration with the facility vendor teams to perform a comprehensive PLC code review and system resiliency to multiple failure scenarios. [Estimated Completion Date (prior to generator transfer test) estimated 31 Oct] * Validate PLC telemetry once primary utility feed A and B lineup is restored. [Estimated Completion Date 31 Oct] * Validate global PLC configurations at all global sites with similar topologies and PLC manufacturers, to ensure confidence in automatic generator starts. [Estimated Completion Date 15 Nov] * Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) documentation update: * Comprehensive update to the EOP for site’s response to unexpected loss of active utility source. Update includes - manual steps to attempt to restore active utility feed, manual restart of generators and manual transfer to other utility sources within the UPS battery run time. [Completed 26 Oct] * Ensure updated EOP is practiced twice per shift by on-site facility team. [Completed 24 Oct and checked with Google DC Operations daily] * Strengthen change management:  * Freeze planned maintenance activities at other sites with similar topologies, and implement elevated approvals and reviews for data center configuration changes which are outside their standard designs. [Estimated Completion Date 30 Oct] Cloud service action items: * Communications Enhancement: Bolster notification speed by developing an automated alert-to-communication mechanism for location-impacting incidents. * Platform Testing: Expand platform-wide testing outcomes for infrastructure-level events. Detailed Description of Impact Between Monday, 19 Oct 2026, 23:00 US/Pacific (Tuesday, 20 Oct 2026, 07:00 BST) and Tuesday, 20 Oct 2026, 05:08 US/Pacific (13:08 BST), customers utilizing Google Cloud Platform services in the europe-west2 region experienced service disruptions across two consecutive phases, lasting a total duration of 6 hours, 08 minutes. During the initial phase from 23:00 to 04:29 US/Pacific (07:00 to 12:29 BST) (duration 5 hours, 29 minutes), customers experienced unavailability of zone-scoped resources in products, including: * Compute Engine - VM instances, zonal MIGs, unmanaged instance groups, zonal NEGs, sole-tenant node groups, zonal reservations, target instances, zonal API operations.  * Persistent Disk / Hyperdisk - Zonal PD, zonal Hyperdisk, Hyperdisk storage pools, instant snapshots. * GKE - Zonal clusters (control plane), node pool nodes in -b, PVs on zonal disks. * Cloud SQL - Non-HA instances, read replicas in -b. * AlloyDB - Basic (non-HA) primaries in -b. * Bigtable - Single-cluster instances in -b. * Other products with affected zonal resources: Cloud Batch, Cloud Build, Cloud Storage, Cloud Workstations, Composer, Dataproc, Filestore, Managed Lustre, Migrate to VMs, NetApp Volumes, Pub/Sub Lite, Vertex AI Workbench, VMware Engine. The unavailability of those resources scoped to a zone that undergoes disruption is working within the design of a zonally-scoped system. Requests made to these resulted either in a timeout or error code during the disruption. Any workloads and resources hosted entirely within europe-west2-b became unreachable due to this event. Google Compute Engine's zonal resources such as VMs require customers to provision failover or cross-zone recovery resources if needed, and to set up a recovery mechanism that matches their needs. Some failovers were unsuccessful due to capacity constraints and difficulty in replicating the underlying storage mechanism.  Following platform service restoration, some customer workloads running on Compute Engine instances as well as products that rely on Compute Engine experienced a longer recovery. By 04:46 US/Pacific (12:46 BST) new Virtual Machine creation resumed and by 05:08 US/Pacific (13:08 BST) over 99% of Compute Engine Virtual Machines were in a healthy state. Any remaining customers that were experiencing Virtual Machine problems were directed to file a customer support case as per normal procedure. While the physical power outage was isolated strictly to data center facilities in zone europe-west2-b, some customers running workloads in unimpacted zones (europe-west2-a and europe-west2-c) or across regional architectures also experienced unexpected impact. The primary causes of impact outside of zone europe-west2-b were: 1) Instantaneous demand surges on neighboring zones (a and c) and 2) Control-plane dependencies across zonal boundaries Affected products included: AlloyDB, Apigee Infra and Apigee Edge, BigQuery, Cloud Dataflow, Cloud Pub/Sub, Cloud SQL, Google Compute Engine, Google Kubernetes Engine, Looker, Regional Persistent Disk, Vertex AI Prediction, and Cloud Speech-to-Text. These services experienced unexpected degradation and failover issues driven by sudden compute capacity exhaustion from surging demand, and control-plane API timeouts. Customers would have experienced the inability to create, update, or delete some regional resources during this period. This was not a full regional control-plane outage, but certainly a degraded state. Multi-zonal and regional services that spanned across the europe-west2 region experienced elevated latency, transient API errors (such as HTTP 500 and 503 errors), and task admission queuing as failover traffic concentrated onto unimpacted regional resources and cross-zone calls to offline components timed out.  Storage write operations in the region experienced a transient error rate during the initial failover period, and regional query admission queues temporarily peaked before rapidly subsiding as capacity re-balanced. We did not identify any impact of the outage outside of the europe-west2 region. The following Google Cloud Platform services experienced impact within europe-west2: * AlloyDB for PostgreSQL * Apigee * BigQuery Data Transfer Service * Cloud Data Fusion * Cloud Filestore * Cloud Firestore * Cloud Load Balancing * Cloud Memorystore * Cloud NAT * Cloud Run * Cloud Spanner * Cloud Workstations * Datastream * Dialogflow CX * Google App Engine * Google BigQuery * Google Cloud Bigtable * Google Cloud Dataflow * Google Cloud Dataproc * Google Cloud NetApp Volumes * Google Cloud Pub/Sub * Google Cloud SQL * Google Cloud Storage (GCS) * Google Compute Engine (GCE) * Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) * Google SecOps (Security Information and Event Management [SIEM] and Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response [SOAR]) * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Looker Studio * Managed Airflow (Google Cloud Composer) * Managed Service for Apache Kafka * Memorystore for Memcached * Memorystore for Redis * Memorystore for Redis Cluster * Memorystore for Valkey * Network Connectivity Center * Persistent Disk * Private Service Connect * Speech-to-Text * Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) * VMWare engine ----------

Description: We are experiencing an issue with Google Cloud Storage beginning on Thursday, 2026-10-08 05:19 PDT. Our engineering team continues to investigate the issue. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-10-08 11:50 PDT with current details. Customer symptoms: * Customers are experiencing elevated latencies and error rates when performing upload or write operations. * A smaller subset of read operations may also experience increased latency and errors Workaround: None at this time.

Description: We are experiencing an issue with Google Cloud Storage beginning on Thursday, 2026-10-08 05:19 PDT. Initial mitigations applied by our engineering team leading to observable improvements in error rates in our internal monitoring. Work remains underway to roll out further mitigations. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-10-08 12:00 PDT with current details. Customer symptoms: * Customers are experiencing elevated latencies and error rates when performing upload or write operations. * A smaller subset of read operations may also experience increased latency and errors Workaround: None at this time.

Description: We are experiencing an issue with Google Cloud Storage beginning on Thursday, 2026-10-08 05:19 PDT. Initial mitigations applied by our engineering team leading to observable improvements in error rates in our internal monitoring beginning 10:57 PDT. Work remains underway to roll out further mitigations. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-10-08 12:45 PDT with current details. Customer symptoms: * Customers are experiencing elevated latencies and error rates when performing upload or write operations. * A smaller subset of read operations may also experience increased latency and errors Workaround: None at this time.

Description: We are continuing to mitigate the issue with Google Cloud Storage in the us-central1 region that began on Thursday, 2026-10-08 05:19 PDT. The initial mitigations applied by our engineering team continue to show observable improvements in error rates. Our engineering team is actively monitoring the environment and rolling out further mitigations to fully stabilize the service. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-10-08 14:00 PDT with current details. Customer symptoms: * Customers are experiencing elevated latencies and error rates when performing upload or write operations. * A smaller subset of read operations may also experience increased latency and errors Workaround: None at this time.

Description: We are continuing to mitigate the issue with Google Cloud Storage in the us-central1 region that began on Thursday, 2026-10-08 05:19 PDT. The initial mitigations applied by our engineering team continue to show observable improvements in error rates. Our engineering team is actively monitoring the environment and rolling out further mitigations to fully stabilize the service. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-10-08 16:00 PDT with current details. Customer symptoms: * Customers are experiencing elevated latencies and error rates when performing upload or write operations. * A smaller subset of read operations may also experience increased latency and errors Workaround: None at this time.

Preliminary Incident Report We sincerely apologize for the disruption this incident caused to your business. We know how much you rely on Google Cloud, and we regret the impact on your productivity. We are working to address the root cause and prevent this from occurring in the future.  Please note, this information is based on our best knowledge at the time of posting and is subject to change as our investigation continues. A final Incident Report with preventative actions will be posted once our investigation is complete.  If you have experienced impact outside of what is listed below, please reach out to Google Cloud Support using https\://cloud.google.com/support (https://cloud.google.com/support)   Date/Time of the Issue (All time US/Pacific) Incident Start: 08 October 2026 04:00 Incident End: 08 October 2026 16:30 Duration: 12 hours, 30 minutes Summary On Thursday, 08 October 2026, Google Cloud Storage experienced elevated write latency and write error rates in the us-central1 region for a duration of 12 hours, 30 minutes. We are taking immediate steps to ensure this doesn’t happen again. Preliminary Root Cause Google Cloud Storage relies on a highly distributed backend architecture to process and store incoming data. During the incident window, specific storage backend nodes within the us-central1 region experienced a localized capacity shortfall. The sequence of events leading to customer impact was as follows: * A traffic sorting optimization intended to address localized capacity constraints caused severe resource exhaustion on specific backend storage nodes in the affected region. * This resource exhaustion caused backend services handling object data ingestion to begin timing out. * As a result, incoming upload and write requests routed to these nodes experienced elevated latency and failed to complete, resulting in errors surfaced to customers. * Concurrently, a separate issue with the underlying database service contributed to additional metadata processing errors during a portion of the incident window. Google engineers have begun a full root cause analysis (RCA) and will provide additional information once it is available. Remediation  The issue was initially detected by Google engineering teams actively monitoring system telemetry early in the incident window.  To mitigate the issue, Google engineers executed the following step-by-step strategy: * Engineers initially attempted to dynamically allocate additional emergency capacity to the affected region, but this was blocked by systemic regional capacity limits. * To relieve immediate pressure, engineers selectively drained traffic from the most overloaded backend storage nodes. * A configuration change was deployed to disable the traffic sorting optimization, significantly reducing resource overhead on the storage backend. * For the concurrent metadata issue, engineers rolled back a recent update to the underlying metadata database service. Once traffic levels stabilized and resource utilization returned to normal baseline levels, the previously drained nodes were restored to active service, successfully restoring normal operations. Description of Impact On 08 October, 2026, from 04:00 to 16:30 US/Pacific, customers utilizing the us-central1 region experienced elevated latency and error rates during Cloud Storage upload and write operations. * Customers primarily observed HTTP 503 UNAVAILABLE errors on WriteObject operations and client-side timeouts. * A minor impact was also observed on read operations during this timeframe. * Cloud Storage operations in all other regions, as well as all other Google Cloud services, remained unaffected by this specific event.

Incident first occurrence: Incident Start: 08 October 2026 04:00 Incident End: 08 October 2026 16:30 Duration: 12 hours, 30 minutes Incident recurrence: Recurrence Start: 09 October 2026 04:05 Recurrence End: 09 October 2026 09:46 Duration: 5 hours, 41 minutes Total Duration: 18 hours, 11 minutes Summary On Thursday, 08 October 2026, Google Cloud Storage experienced elevated write latency and write error rates while performing upload or write operations in the us-central1 region for a duration of 12 hours, 30 minutes. This was followed by a recurrence on Friday, 09 October 2026 in the us-central1-b zone for a duration of 5 hours, 41 minutes. We are taking immediate steps to ensure this doesn’t happen again. Root Cause Google Cloud Storage relies on a highly distributed backend architecture to process and store incoming data. During the incident window, specific storage backend nodes within the us-central1 region experienced a localized capacity shortfall due to increased traffic. The sequence of events leading to customer impact was as follows: * A traffic sorting optimization configuration update to the Google Cloud Storage load balancing layer intended to address localized capacity constraints caused severe resource exhaustion on specific storage backend nodes in the affected region by inadvertently bypassing the standard capacity-aware routing logic, resulting in a severe load imbalance. * Consequently, a small fraction of storage backend nodes in the us-central1 region received an overwhelming proportion of incoming write traffic despite having low available serving capacity. This concentration of traffic led to resource exhaustion on the affected backend servers causing backend services handling object data ingestion to begin timing out. * Because the underlying instances could not process the high volume of requests quickly enough, the incoming upload and write requests routed to these nodes experienced elevated latency and failed to complete, resulting in errors surfaced to customers. * Concurrently, a separate issue with the underlying database service contributed to additional metadata processing errors during a portion of the incident window. * The recurrence of the issue on October 9 was caused by an incomplete rollback of an upload planner feature, which broke the load balancing mechanism and overloaded a few smaller storage backend nodes. Remediation and Prevention The issue was initially detected on 08 October 2026 at 04:50 by Google engineering teams actively monitoring system telemetry early in the incident window.  To mitigate the issue, Google engineers executed the following step-by-step strategy: * Engineers initially attempted to dynamically allocate additional emergency capacity to the affected region, but this was blocked by systemic regional capacity limits. * To relieve immediate pressure, engineers selectively drained traffic from the most overloaded storage backend nodes. * A configuration change was deployed to disable the traffic sorting optimization, significantly reducing resource overhead on the storage backend. * For the concurrent metadata issue, engineers rolled back a recent update to the underlying metadata database service. * While these steps provided temporary relief, a recurrence of the load imbalance required further traffic redirection and draining of affected storage components. The incident was permanently resolved when engineering fully reverted the problematic load balancing configuration change, restoring the previous capacity-aware routing behavior and allowing traffic to distribute evenly across the region. Once traffic levels stabilized and resource utilization returned to normal baseline levels, the previously drained nodes were restored to active service, successfully restoring normal operations. Preventative actions: To ensure this issue does not recur, we are implementing the following improvements: - Safe Configuration Rollouts: We are updating our deployment protocols to ensure that load balancing logic changes are rigorously validated in alternative, smaller regions before being rolled out to larger, highly utilized regions. - Intelligent Operational Controls: We are enhancing the storage load balancing architecture to strictly enforce capacity constraints, ensuring that traffic distribution logic cannot bypass pre-spilling safeguards and route traffic to clusters lacking sufficient serving resources. - Resilient Scaling Logic: We are implementing targeted improvements to accelerate internal data movement within highly utilized storage cells, enabling the system to process data more efficiently and handle temporary load spikes with greater resilience. Description of Impact On 08 October 2026, from 04:00 to 16:30 in us-central1 region and 09 October 2026, from 04:05 to 09:46 in us-central1-b zone, customers experienced elevated latency and error rates during Cloud Storage upload and write operations. * Upload & Write Failures: Customers primarily observed HTTP 503 UNAVAILABLE errors on WriteObject operations and client-side timeouts. * Increased Write Latency: Write operations that did succeed experienced significantly higher latencies than normal. * Cloud Storage operations in all other regions, as well as all other Google Cloud services, remained unaffected by this specific event.

Description: We are experiencing a networking issue starting Tuesday, 2026-09-01 07:41 US/Pacific. The issue is affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region are unaffected. Our network engineering team has put in mitigations and we are seeing services starting to recover. We will provide more information by Tuesday, 2026-09-01 09:30 US/Pacific with current details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. Customer symptoms: Customers are experiencing elevated packet loss and errors. * BigQuery * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud SQL * App Engine * Cloud Run * AlloyDB * Cloud Bigtable * Cloud Spanner * Compute Engine * Cloud VPN * Cloud Interconnect * Cloud NAT * Cloud Filestore * Cloud Hybrid Connectivity * Virtual Private Cloud * Google Kubernetes Engine * Looker (Google Cloud core) Workaround: * Customers with service layer retries may see successful completions as only a portion of the zone is affected. * Customers that are severely affected and have services available in alternate zones can failover to alternate zones.

Description: The issue is affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region are unaffected. Following network-level mitigation efforts, the underlying network infrastructure has fully recovered. Product engineering teams across Cloud are currently validating the recovery status of individual services. We will provide more information by Tuesday, 2026-09-01 10:00 US/Pacific with current details. Customer symptoms: Customers are experiencing elevated packet loss and errors. * BigQuery * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud SQL * App Engine * Cloud Run * AlloyDB * Cloud Bigtable * Cloud Spanner * Compute Engine * Cloud VPN * Cloud Interconnect * Cloud NAT * Cloud Filestore * Cloud Hybrid Connectivity * Virtual Private Cloud * Google Kubernetes Engine * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Apigee * Google SecOps SOAR Workaround: * Customers with service layer retries may see successful completions as only a portion of the zone is affected. * Customers that are severely affected and have services available in alternate zones can failover to alternate zones.

Description: The issue is affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region are unaffected. Most of the products have recovered and the engineering team is still validating a few remaining product impacts. We will provide more information by Tuesday, 2026-09-01 11:00 US/Pacific with current details. Customer symptoms: Customers are experiencing elevated packet loss and errors. * Cloud Run * App Engine Following products have recovered * BigQuery * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Bigtable * Compute Engine * Cloud Hybrid Connectivity * Cloud Filestore * Virtual Private Cloud * Cloud Spanner * Google Kubernetes Engine * Cloud SQL * AlloyDBCloud VPN * Apigee * Cloud Interconnect * Cloud NAT * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Google SecOps SOAR * Cloud Firestore Workaround: * Customers with service layer retries may see successful completions as only a portion of the zone is affected. * Customers that are severely affected and have services available in alternate zones can failover to alternate zones.

Description: The issue is affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region are unaffected. Most of the products have recovered and the engineering team is still validating a few remaining product impacts. Routine network maintenance triggered issues in us-central1-b. We have recovered the network capacity that was impacted and restored all zonal and regional services. Maintenance in the region has been halted while proactive audits are carried out. We will provide more information by Tuesday, 2026-09-01 12:30 US/Pacific with current details. Customer symptoms: Customers are experiencing elevated packet loss and errors. * Cloud Run * App Engine Following products have recovered * BigQuery * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Bigtable * Compute Engine * Cloud Hybrid Connectivity * Cloud Filestore * Virtual Private Cloud * Cloud Spanner * Google Kubernetes Engine * Cloud SQL * AlloyDBCloud VPN * Apigee * Cloud Interconnect * Cloud NAT * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Google SecOps SOAR * Cloud Firestore Workaround: * Customers with service layer retries may see successful completions as only a portion of the zone is affected.

Description: The issue is affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region are unaffected. Most of the products have recovered. The impacted products Cloud Run and App Engine are also seeing recovery and the errors have lowered pre-incident levels. Engineering continues to monitor and validate. Routine network fabric path maintenance triggered unexpected issues in two clusters in us-central1-b. We have recovered the network capacity that was impacted and restored all zonal and regional services. Maintenance in the region has been halted while proactive audits are carried out. We will provide more information by Tuesday, 2026-09-01 12:30 US/Pacific with current details. Customer symptoms: Customers are experiencing elevated packet loss and errors. * Cloud Run * App Engine Following products have recovered * BigQuery * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Bigtable * Compute Engine * Cloud Hybrid Connectivity * Cloud Filestore * Virtual Private Cloud * Cloud Spanner * Google Kubernetes Engine * Cloud SQL * AlloyDBCloud VPN * Apigee * Cloud Interconnect * Cloud NAT * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Google SecOps SOAR * Cloud Firestore Workaround: * Customers with service layer retries may see successful completions as only a portion of the zone is affected.

Description: The issue was affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region were unaffected. All the impacted products have recovered. From preliminary analysis, routine network fabric path maintenance triggered unexpected issues in one cluster in us-central1-b. We have recovered the network capacity that was impacted and restored all zonal and regional services. Maintenance in the region has been halted while proactive audits are carried out. We thank you for your patience while we worked on resolving the issue. Customer symptoms: Customers experienced elevated packet loss and errors. Workaround: The issue has been mitigated.

Affected services and features: * Google Compute Engine: Inability to access virtual machines externally, and inability for VMs to reach remote resources. * Google Kubernetes Engine: Unreachable regional/zonal clusters and nodes within the affected zone, prompting delayed cluster recovery times. * Cloud Run / Google App Engine: Temporary latency spikes and pending queue aborts as backend workloads automatically evacuated and shifted to healthy capacity. A subset of workloads in the specifically impacted area experienced degradation until 11:52 US/Pacific. * Cloud SQL, AlloyDB for PostgreSQL, Cloud Spanner, Google Cloud Bigtable, Cloud Filestore: Data access and connectivity severed for instances localized strictly to the impacted infrastructure. * Virtual Private Cloud (VPC), Cloud NAT, Apigee, Google BigQuery, Google Cloud Dataflow, Looker, Google SecOps SOAR, Hybrid Connectivity, Cloud Interconnect: Elevated network packet loss, connectivity drops, and API timeouts in the impacted zone.

Affected services and features: * Google Compute Engine: Inability for users in the affected portion of us-central1-b and us-central1-f zones to access virtual machines externally, and inability for VMs to reach remote resources. * Cloud SQL, AlloyDB for PostgreSQL, Google Cloud Bigtable, Cloud Filestore: Data access and connectivity severed for instances localized strictly to the impacted infrastructure. * Cloud Spanner, Cloud Firestore: Elevated Remote Procedure Call (RPC) error rates, write timeouts, and latency spikes for the nam5 multi-region instances due to severed connectivity to components running in the impacted zone. * Virtual Private Cloud (VPC), Cloud NAT, Apigee, Google BigQuery, Google Cloud Dataflow, Looker, Google SecOps SOAR, Hybrid Connectivity, Cloud Interconnect: Elevated network packet loss, connectivity drops, and API timeouts in the impacted zone. * Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE): Between 07:40 and 09:15 US/Pacific on 2026-09-01, customers experienced errors and timeouts on requests to their GKE cluster control planes (Kubernetes API servers) in us-central1. This could have caused new or updated workloads to fail scheduling and Kubernetes API operations to fail. * Cloud Run / Google App Engine: Temporary latency spikes and pending queue aborts as backend workloads automatically evacuated and shifted to healthy capacity. A subset of workloads in the specifically impacted area experienced degradation until 11:52 US/Pacific. Customer impact: Customers with resources hosted in the specific affected clusters within us-central1-b and us-central1-f experienced a complete loss of network connectivity starting at 07:41 US/Pacific. During this time, virtual machines and associated services became unreachable from the internet and from other Google Cloud regions, and those internal resources could not initiate outbound connections. The issue was detected almost immediately and engineers took traffic diversion actions at 07:45 and 08:00 US/Pacific to reduce impact to regional products. By 08:50 US/Pacific, the majority of physical connections were restored and traffic began recovering, and the traffic diversion actions were removed at 09:19 US/Pacific. Full recovery across nearly all affected services and long-running operations was confirmed by 11:52 US/Pacific. Because the network isolation was strictly limited to specific clusters within us-central1-b and us-central1-f, multi-zonal deployments correctly utilizing redundancy across other zones in us-central1 were largely able to bypass the physical hardware failure and continue serving traffic. Customers with projects in both us-central1-b and us-central1-f would not have seen multi-zonal impact - at most one of their zones would have capacity in the affected data center.

Addendum to Incident Report This addendum extends the Detailed Description of Impact from the previous message. Though only two clusters in a datacenter in us-central1-b and us-central1-f experienced network isolation, a few regional products with a dependency on the affected datacenter were also affected. Between 07:41 and 11:52 US/Pacific on Tuesday, September 1, 2026, the following products were affected: - Compute Engine VMs: VMs running in the affected data center lost network connectivity to resources located outside of their datacenter. From a Compute Engine perspective, this incident only affected a subset of VMs in us-central1-b and us-central1-f. - Zonal and Regional Products Based on Compute Engine Products with dependencies on VMs in the affected datacenter experienced symptoms like connection timeouts or service unavailability because the underlying VMs lost network connectivity. Examples of products that are based on Compute Engine VMs include: Apigee, Cloud SQL, AlloyDB for PostgreSQL, Dataflow, Cloud Filestore, and Looker. - Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE): GKE clusters whose control plane had dependencies on Compute Engine VMs in the affected clusters experienced errors and timeouts when administrators or nodes attempted to connect to the Kubernetes API server. Consequently, deployments might have been delayed, Kubernetes API operations might have failed, and new nodes might not have registered with the control plane (causing node pool operational delays). - Cloud Run and App Engine: Workloads in the us-central1 region experienced elevated serving latency, 5xx aborted request errors, and outbound connectivity degradation. To prevent severe request failures, traffic was diverted to other clusters. Diverting requests to other clusters temporarily caused elevated latency or errors in those clusters.Once the impacted cluster was restored, workload demand for these new backends created a 'thundering herd' of concurrent instance initializations. This sudden surge bypassed warm caches and overwhelmed internal file-serving tiers, extending symptoms until emergency capacity was provisioned. - Other Google APIs and Services, in us-central1 or a multi-region that includes us-central1, were affected if they had dependencies on software tasks in the affected clusters and weren't able to use software tasks in an unaffected cluster. Symptoms included connection timeouts or service unavailability. Examples of other Google APIs and services are: Google Cloud Bigtable, BigQuery, Google SecOps SOAR, Cloud Spanner, and Cloud Firestore. For some services, symptoms were limited to temporary latency spikes and service unavailability until workloads shifted to unaffected clusters. - Private Service Connect: Clients (in any region) experienced connectivity issues involving PSC endpoints with dependencies in us-central1, in specific circumstances: - PSC endpoints for Google APIs were affected in the same way as noted in the Google APIs and services section. - Producer/consumer PSC endpoints were affected if the producer had load balancers or backend VMs in the affected clusters of us-central1. - Hybrid Connectivity: Some Cloud Router, Cloud VPN, and Cloud Interconnect VLAN attachments in us-central1 were affected in specific circumstances: - Cloud Router BGP software tasks for some Cloud Routers in us-central1 experienced a Cloud Router maintenance event if their BGP software tasks were running in the affected clusters. - Cloud VPN tunnel software tasks running in the affected clusters lost network connectivity. This caused some Cloud VPN tunnels in us-central1 to go down until a replacement tunnel task in a different cluster was assigned. - Resources (in any region) sending packets through Cloud Interconnect VLAN attachments in us-central1 might have experienced intermittent connectivity issues in certain situations where network flows weren’t already programmed. - Envoy-based load balancers and other products: Load balancers and other products that depended on managed Envoy tasks of a proxy-only subnet in us-central1 experienced increased latency or connectivity issues if enough Envoy tasks were in the affected clusters. The following products were affected: - Regional external application load balancers in us-central1 - Regional internal application load balancers in us-central1 - Cross-region internal application load balancers with proxies in us-central1 - Regional external proxy network load balancers in us-central1 - Regional internal proxy network load balancers in us-central1 - Cross-region internal proxy network load balancers with proxies in us-central1 - Secure Web Proxy in us-central1

Description: We are experiencing an issue with multiple products, beginning on Thursday, 2026-08-20 08:40 PDT. Our engineering team continues to investigate the issue. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 10:30 PDT with details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. Diagnosis / customer symptoms: Customers in us-west1 may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. Workaround: None at this time.

Description: Mitigation actions are implemented by our engineering teams, recovery trends have been observed across infrastructure layers. Active efforts remain underway to bring impacted cloud services back to full operation. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 10:45 PDT with details. Diagnosis / customer symptoms: Mitigation actions are implemented by our engineering teams, recovery trends have been observed across infrastructure layers. Active efforts remain underway to bring impacted cloud services back to full operation. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 10:45 PDT with details. Workaround: We recommend customers to failover to other regions where feasible.

Description: Mitigation actions are implemented by our engineering teams, recovery trends have been observed across infrastructure layers. Active efforts remain underway to bring impacted cloud services back to full operation. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 11:00 PDT with details. Diagnosis / customer symptoms: Customers in us-west1 may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. Workaround: We recommend customers to failover to other regions where feasible.

Description: Mitigation actions have been completed by our engineering teams and we are seeing recovery from multiple products. We are continuing to work to recover the remaining products. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 11:45 PDT with details. Diagnosis / customer symptoms: Customers in us-west1 may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. Workaround: No workarounds needed at this time.

Description: Mitigation actions have been completed by our engineering teams and we are seeing recovery from multiple products. We are continuing to work to recover the remaining products. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 12:30 PDT with details. Diagnosis / customer symptoms: Customers in us-west1 may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. Workaround: No workarounds needed at this time.

Description: Mitigation actions have been completed by our engineering teams and we are seeing recovery from multiple products. We are continuing to work to recover the remaining products. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 13:30 PDT with details. Diagnosis / customer symptoms: Customers in us-west1 may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. Workaround: No workarounds needed at this time.

Description: We have mitigated the issue impacting multiple products in our us-west1 region as of Thursday, 2026-08-20 10:22 PDT. Our engineering teams have restored capacity on a planned optical maintenance that caused unexpected congestion in Dalles, Oregon metro /us-west1 region. Our systems stabilized and services have recovered once capacity was restored. Our teams are continuing to monitor for any residual impact. We will publish an analysis of this incident once we have completed our internal investigation. We thank you for your patience while we worked on resolving the issue. Diagnosis / customer symptoms: Customers in us-west1 may have experienced timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. Workaround: This issue is now mitigated.

Affected services and features: The following services experienced elevated latencies and/or increased error rates, across their respective data planes and control planes: * AlloyDB * Apache Kafka * Apigee Edge Public Cloud * Apigee X * Artifact Registry * BigQuery & BigQuery Data Transfer Service * Cloud Build * Cloud Data Fusion * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Filestore * Cloud Key Management Service (KMS) * Cloud Monitoring * Cloud Run * Cloud SQL * Contact Center AI Platform * Dataproc Metastore * Google App Engine * Google Cloud Bigtable * Google Cloud Pub/Sub * Google Cloud Storage (GCS) * Google Compute Engine (GCE) * Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) * Identity and Access Management (IAM) * Managed Airflow (Cloud Composer) *Managed Service for Apache Spark (Dataproc) Persistent Disk

Affected services and features: The following services experienced elevated latencies and/or increased error rates, across their respective data planes and control planes: * AlloyDB * Apache Kafka * Apigee Edge Public Cloud * Apigee X * Artifact Registry * BigQuery & BigQuery Data Transfer Service * Cloud Build * Cloud Data Fusion * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Filestore * Cloud Key Management Service (KMS) * Cloud Monitoring * Cloud Run * Cloud SQL * Contact Center AI Platform * Dataproc Metastore * Google App Engine * Google Cloud Bigtable * Google Cloud Pub/Sub * Google Cloud Storage (GCS) * Google Compute Engine (GCE) * Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) * Identity and Access Management (IAM) * Managed Airflow (Cloud Composer) * Managed Service for Apache Spark (Dataproc) * Persistent Disk The regional incident in us-west1 followed a structured three-phase recovery dictated by platform dependency layers: While core platform connectivity and live request serving were restored by 10:22 US/Pacific, certain services took additional time to fully recover due to asynchronous backlog processing and localized control-plane state reconciliation for a very small set of customers. For event-driven and pipeline services, inbound error rates dropped to 0 immediately, but some operations experienced elevated latency while workers processed through backlogs accumulated during the outage, clearing later for Cloud Pub/Sub, Cloud Build & Deploy, Cloud Dataflow, and Cloud Storage lifecycle deletions. Concurrently, while primary read/write traffic was healthy across the region, specific long-running lifecycle workflows required extra time to clear locks and reconcile distributed state machines. Compute Engine VM provisioning in zone us-west1-c and Cloud Filestore control plane instance allocation locks and resource validation checks took longer to normalize across regional storage backends.