GitHub Enterprise Cloud JP Outage History

Started Nov 02, 2026, 05:46 PM UTC· resolved Nov 02, 2026, 06:24 PM UTC

1. investigating Nov 02, 2026, 05:46 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Nov 02, 2026, 05:46 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of elevated errors on GPT-5.4 Nano

3. investigating Nov 02, 2026, 05:58 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the GPT-5.4 Nano model in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider.

4. investigating Nov 02, 2026, 06:10 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Copilot AI Model Providers has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

5. resolved Nov 02, 2026, 06:24 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 29, 2026, 10:19 AM UTC· resolved Oct 29, 2026, 12:49 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 29, 2026, 10:19 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 29, 2026, 10:22 AM UTC

   We are experiencing increased failures and latency on our agent sessions service, including creating and listing sessions. This can impact cloud based agent sessions on web, mobile, VS Code, CLI and the GitHub Copilot app.

3. investigating Oct 29, 2026, 11:01 AM UTC

   We continue to experience failure rates of 1-2% and increased latency on our agent sessions service, including creating and listing sessions. This can impact cloud based agent sessions on web, mobile, VS Code, CLI and the GitHub Copilot app.

4. investigating Oct 29, 2026, 11:37 AM UTC

   We continue to experience failure rates of 1-2% and increased latency on our agent sessions service, including creating and listing sessions. This can impact cloud based agent sessions on web, mobile, VS Code, CLI and the GitHub Copilot app. We are actively applying mitigations and monitoring for recovery.

5. investigating Oct 29, 2026, 12:33 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

6. resolved Oct 29, 2026, 12:49 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 28, 2026, 02:12 PM UTC· resolved Oct 28, 2026, 03:28 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 02:12 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 02:15 PM UTC

   We are experiencing issues with upstream model providers resulting in a degraded experience across Copilot services. The team is actively investigating the issue.

3. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 02:33 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the GPT-5.3-Codex, GPT-5.6 Luna, GPT-6.1 Sol, GPT-5.6 Terra, GPT-6 Luna, and MAI Code 1.1 Flash models in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. While we work with them to resolve the issue we recommend choosing another model to continue using Copilot.

4. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 02:55 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the GPT-5.3-Codex, GPT-5.6 Luna, GPT-6.1 Sol, GPT-5.6 Terra, GPT-6 Luna, and MAI Code 1.1 Flash models in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We have identified the root cause and working to apply a mitigation. While we work to resolve the issue we recommend choosing another model to continue using Copilot.

5. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 03:15 PM UTC

   We have applied the mitigation and are seeing signs of recovery. We will continue to monitor and expect full resolution soon.

6. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 03:24 PM UTC

   Copilot is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

7. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 03:26 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Copilot has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

8. resolved Oct 28, 2026, 03:28 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 23, 2026, 11:41 PM UTC· resolved Oct 24, 2026, 12:23 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 11:41 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 11:42 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the Grok 4.6 and Grok 4.7 models in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. While we work with them to resolve the issue, we recommend choosing another model or selecting 'Auto' to continue using Copilot.

3. investigating Oct 24, 2026, 12:23 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting Copilot AI Model Providers has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

4. resolved Oct 24, 2026, 12:23 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

5. postmortem Oct 27, 2026, 11:17 PM UTC

   Between 23:28 and 00:23 UTC on October 27, 2026, GitHub Copilot experienced degradation affecting Grok 4.6 and Grok 4.7 models. Users encountered elevated error rates when using these models. The degradation was caused by an issue with an upstream model provider. GitHub engineers detected the issue through automated monitoring and coordinated with the provider. Our automated model-warning system activated in-product warnings for affected models during the incident. Service returned to normal after the provider implemented a mitigation.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 23, 2026, 10:43 AM UTC· resolved Oct 23, 2026, 10:57 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 10:43 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions

2. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 10:52 AM UTC

   We’re rolling back a recent change to address issues resolving actions in some data residency environments. We’re monitoring recovery and will share updates as we learn more.

3. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 10:54 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

4. resolved Oct 23, 2026, 10:57 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

5. postmortem Oct 29, 2026, 03:27 PM UTC

   On October 23, 2026, between 10:15 and 10:50 UTC, the Actions service was degraded for GitHub Enterprise Cloud customers with data residency in the EU, Australia, and US regions. Jobs failed while downloading actions. On average, 15.2% of workflow runs in these regions failed, peaking at 17.7%. GitHub.com was not affected. This was due to a configuration change in the service that serves action downloads, which caused it to load outdated credentials in these regions. We mitigated the incident by rolling back the change. We have removed the outdated credentials, and we are working to improve deployment safeguards and monitoring for this service to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 22, 2026, 03:28 PM UTC· resolved Oct 23, 2026, 02:30 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 03:28 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Pull Requests

2. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 04:26 PM UTC

   API Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

3. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 04:27 PM UTC

   API Requests is operating normally.

4. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 12:55 AM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

5. resolved Oct 23, 2026, 02:30 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 15, 2026, 06:31 PM UTC· resolved Oct 15, 2026, 06:56 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 15, 2026, 06:31 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 15, 2026, 06:34 PM UTC

   CCA Automations are experiencing delays when users start an Automation

3. investigating Oct 15, 2026, 06:53 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

4. resolved Oct 15, 2026, 06:56 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

5. postmortem Oct 15, 2026, 07:00 PM UTC

   We suspected that CCA Automations were experiencing delays when users start an Automation, but further investigation found that there was no delay or impact to CCA Automations.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 07, 2026, 05:17 PM UTC· resolved Oct 07, 2026, 06:04 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 05:17 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Issues and Pull Requests

2. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 05:27 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

3. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 05:50 PM UTC

   We observed widespread impact across GitHub services from 16:52 UTC to 17:01 UTC, and are investigating the root cause. All systems have recovered. This incident is a reoccurrence of the incident from earlier in the day https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7. Durable mitigation is in progress. We will provide another update in 30 minutes.

4. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 06:00 PM UTC

   All systems have recovered. We have applied mitigations and do not anticipate another recurrence.

5. resolved Oct 07, 2026, 06:04 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

6. postmortem Oct 12, 2026, 07:19 PM UTC

   On October 7, 2026, from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC, GitHub experienced a recurrence of the write-operation outage from earlier that day. Both outages shared the same root cause. Please refer to the combined summary covering both incidents, their impact, and our prevention measures: https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 06, 2026, 07:57 PM UTC· resolved Oct 06, 2026, 11:40 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 06, 2026, 07:57 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Pull Requests

2. investigating Oct 06, 2026, 08:26 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

3. resolved Oct 06, 2026, 11:40 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

4. postmortem Oct 12, 2026, 06:18 PM UTC

   On October 6, 2026, from 19:44 to 19:50 UTC, GitHub experienced a service outage with elevated error rates peaking at 1.30% of all requests, totaling approximately 1.16 million failed requests. This impacted 12 services across GitHub, including Pull Requests, Webhooks, Repos, OAuth, Git over SSH, Codespaces, and Gists. The incident was triggered by GitHub Enterprise Importer (GEI) making multiple, long duration queries which saturated a database connection pool. Recovery was seen at approximately 19:50 UTC once the migration's calls stopped; GEI migrations were reenabled at 23:32 UTC after a code fix was merged. We have completed a detailed root-cause review and are implementing improved database-health safeguards. We will continue to review and add additional safeguards to prevent future recurrence.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 05, 2026, 08:06 PM UTC· resolved Oct 05, 2026, 09:30 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 08:06 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 08:39 PM UTC

   We’re continuing to investigate job failures and delays affecting GitHub-hosted runner assignment and workflow start times. Our teams are actively working to mitigate the impact and will provide another update as we learn more.

3. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 08:47 PM UTC

   Actions is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.

4. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 08:55 PM UTC

   Actions is operating normally.

5. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 09:09 PM UTC

   In addition to ongoing issues with Actions and Hosted Runners, some customers are also unable to access repository list, licensing and billing pages within their GitHub accounts. We continue to investigate and are working on mitigation.

6. resolved Oct 05, 2026, 09:30 PM UTC

   Everything is operating normally.

7. resolved Oct 05, 2026, 10:49 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

8. postmortem Oct 06, 2026, 10:48 PM UTC

   On October 5, 2026, between 18:48 and 22:49 UTC, GitHub Actions and Hosted Runners experienced degraded performance. Over the full incident, 14.3% of workflow runs using GitHub-hosted runners and 26.5% of individual GitHub-hosted jobs did not start within five minutes. During the roughly 90-minute period of highest impact, 47.0% of workflow runs using GitHub-hosted runners failed and 71.9% of GitHub-hosted jobs did not start within five minutes, while existing Pages sites continued to serve normally. A portion of customers also encountered intermittent errors in repository lists, licensing and billing pages, and some Copilot features. Self-hosted runners were not affected. The incident was caused by a partial networking failure that disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database and storage services. We mitigated the incident by shifting database and storage traffic to healthy regions and endpoints and increasing capacity for affected compute services. GitHub Actions and Hosted Runners recovered by 21:54 UTC, and all affected services recovered by 22:49 UTC. We are partnering with our cloud provider to understand the network failure and identify improvements to network-path resilience, detection, and recovery for similar incidents.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 16, 2026, 07:21 AM UTC· resolved Sep 16, 2026, 05:48 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 16, 2026, 07:21 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Sep 16, 2026, 08:28 AM UTC

   Copilot AI Model Providers is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

3. investigating Sep 16, 2026, 11:45 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting Copilot AI Model Providers has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

4. resolved Sep 16, 2026, 05:48 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

5. postmortem Sep 22, 2026, 09:37 AM UTC

   On September 16, 2026, between 04:40 and 11:45 UTC, the Gemini 3.8 Flash model in GitHub Copilot experienced degraded availability. Requests to this model failed at an average rate of 6.4%, and the impact was highest during peak traffic hours. Other Copilot models were not affected. Users could continue to work with a different model or with 'Auto'. The degradation was caused due to a capacity issue with an upstream model provider. Failure rates returned to normal as the daily traffic peak passed. We monitored the model until it was healthy and resolved the incident at 17:48 UTC. We are working to make our systems resilient to cover peak demand for all the Copilot models.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 15, 2026, 10:20 AM UTC· resolved Sep 15, 2026, 11:17 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 10:20 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 10:32 AM UTC

   We continue to investigate intermittent errors affecting Claude Fable 5.1 in some Copilot products and integrated development environments. Customers can use another model or select Auto while we monitor the situation.

3. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 11:09 AM UTC

   We continue to monitor intermittent errors affecting Claude Fable 5.1 in some Copilot products and integrated development environments. Customer-facing metrics have recovered, and we are awaiting confirmation from our upstream provider that the issue will not recur. Customers can select another model or Auto in the meantime.

4. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 11:17 AM UTC

   The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and Claude Fable 5.1 is once again available in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.

5. resolved Sep 15, 2026, 11:17 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

6. postmortem Sep 22, 2026, 12:41 PM UTC

   On September 15, 2026, between 05:45 and 09:50 UTC, the Claude Fable 5.1 model in GitHub Copilot experienced intermittently degraded availability, with an average error rate of 2.8%. During brief recurring 15 minute periods that recurred every ~45 minutes, availability for Claude Fable 5.1 dropped to a maximum of ~40% before recovering completely. Other Copilot models were not affected. Users could continue to work with a different model or with 'Auto'. The cause was an issue with an upstream model provider that intermittently rejected requests while overloaded. GitHub worked with the provider, who acknowledged and then resolved the underlying issue at 9:50 UTC, after which the model returned to constant normal availability. Once recovery was guaranteed, we resolved the incident at 11:17 UTC. To reduce the chance of recurrence and customer impact, GitHub is reviewing per-model availability alerting and automatic in-product fallback so that requests to a degraded model can shift to a healthy alternative more quickly.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 13, 2026, 09:29 AM UTC· resolved Sep 13, 2026, 10:44 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 13, 2026, 09:29 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Sep 13, 2026, 09:36 AM UTC

   We're seeing increased database replication delays on collab which is causing increased error rates in authorization endpoints and follow-on increased error rates across the system - we are investigating

3. investigating Sep 13, 2026, 10:26 AM UTC

   We have reduced load on this cluster with internal load-shedding and are seeing signs of recovery but continue to monitor

4. resolved Sep 13, 2026, 10:44 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

5. postmortem Sep 15, 2026, 09:47 PM UTC

   On September 13, 2026, between 08:43 and 10:44 UTC, GitHub experienced degraded availability across approximately 28 services, including Issues, Pull Requests, Actions, Codespaces, Pages, Notifications, Code Scanning, Git LFS, and new account signup. At peak, 8.8% of requests to create GitHub App installation access tokens failed. Token issuance for Actions workflows was also affected, impacting approximately 4% of workflows during the incident time frame. Creating issues through the web interface failed for about 96% of attempts, and signup failures were above 90%. The cause was an internal data-cleanup job that began writing to a shared database cluster at 07:33 UTC. That cluster stores permission data read on nearly every authenticated request. The safeguard that was pacing the background job watched only one health signal — how far the database replicas were lagging — and that signal stayed low the whole time. It did not account for the load building on the primary itself, so the job kept writing while the primary quietly ran toward its limit. When the primary ran out of available connections, requests that needed it could not complete. First, there was no quick timeout on these database calls, so request handlers waited on the stalled database instead of failing fast, and the shared request-handling capacity degraded into site-wide errors. Second, a retry loop around token creation kept re-sending the writes that were already failing, which held the database saturated rather than letting it recover. Monitoring declared the incident at 08:50 UTC, but due to the broad impact and amplification from token creation, it took time to identify the source of the load. First responders mitigated by shedding internal load and pausing the job, and all services recovered by 10:44 UTC. To prevent recurrence, we are rate-limiting background jobs against shared, customer-serving databases by default, and adding automatic pausing and paging on primary-server load rather than replication lag alone. We are also surfacing running background work directly alongside database health signals so responders can see and pause it without leaving those dashboards, bounding retries in the token-issuing path, and adding request-level timeouts so one unhealthy database cannot consume shared web server capacity. In addition, we are breaking apart this database cluster to remove the single point of failure. We will be moving various service-specific data, including the authorization data, out of this shared cluster in the next two weeks.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 04, 2026, 09:18 PM UTC· resolved Sep 04, 2026, 10:26 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 04, 2026, 09:18 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Sep 04, 2026, 09:20 PM UTC

   Some users may be experiencing failures when using Copilot code review. We have identified the root cause and are working on a mitigation.

3. investigating Sep 04, 2026, 09:54 PM UTC

   We are applying the mitigation and expect recovery within approximately 30 minutes.

4. investigating Sep 04, 2026, 10:25 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

5. resolved Sep 04, 2026, 10:26 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

6. postmortem Sep 09, 2026, 05:07 PM UTC

   On September 4, 2026, between 20:04 and 22:26 UTC, GitHub Copilot code review experienced an increased failure rate. Affected pull request reviews failed to complete or post review comments. The incident was caused by a change to the service’s authentication permissions that prevented it from submitting affected reviews to the GitHub API. We reverted the change and restored normal operation by 22:26 UTC. We apologize for the disruption.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 03, 2026, 02:17 PM UTC· resolved Sep 03, 2026, 05:11 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 02:17 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 02:20 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the Grok 4.6 model in Copilot Chat, VS Code and other Copilot products. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. We are working with them to resolve the issue.

3. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 02:22 PM UTC

   The Grok 4.5 model has degraded availability as well. We are working with the upstream provider to resolve the issue.

4. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 05:11 PM UTC

   The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and Grok models are once again available in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.

5. resolved Sep 03, 2026, 05:11 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

6. postmortem Sep 09, 2026, 05:12 PM UTC

   Between 13:22 and 17:11 UTC on September 03, 2026, GitHub Copilot experienced degradation affecting several Grok models, including Grok 4.5 and Grok 4.6. Users encountered elevated error rates, but other models were not affected. The degradation was caused by an issue with an upstream model provider. GitHub engineers detected the issue through automated monitoring, displayed in-product warnings for the affected models, and coordinated with the provider. Service returned to normal after the provider implemented a mitigation.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 31, 2026, 09:15 AM UTC· resolved Aug 31, 2026, 09:58 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 31, 2026, 09:15 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Aug 31, 2026, 09:22 AM UTC

   Copilot is experiencing a higher rate of errors for OpenAI models, including gpt-5.2, gpt-5.3-codex, gpt-5.4, gpt-5.4, and the gpt-5.6 family of models. Other models are not impacted.

3. investigating Aug 31, 2026, 09:48 AM UTC

   One of our model providers has confirmed an incident on their end. We have provided them details to help identify the issue. We are starting to see recovery.

4. investigating Aug 31, 2026, 09:51 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting Copilot AI Model Providers has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

5. investigating Aug 31, 2026, 09:58 AM UTC

   The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and gpt-5.3-codex, gpt-5.4-mini, gpt-5.4-nano, gpt-5.5, and the gpt-5.6 family of models are once again available in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.

6. resolved Aug 31, 2026, 09:58 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

7. postmortem Sep 03, 2026, 09:39 PM UTC

   Between 08:37 and 09:41 UTC on August 31, 2026, GitHub Copilot experienced degradation affecting several GPT models, including gpt-5.2, gpt-5.3-codex, gpt-5.4, gpt-5.4-mini, gpt-5.4-nano, and the gpt-5.6 family (Luna, Sol, and Terra). Users encountered elevated error rates and interrupted streaming responses. Other models were not affected. The degradation was caused by an issue with an upstream model provider. GitHub engineers detected the issue through automated monitoring, displayed in-product warnings for the affected models, and coordinated with the provider. Service returned to normal after the provider implemented a mitigation.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 27, 2026, 10:04 AM UTC· resolved Aug 27, 2026, 12:12 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 10:04 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 10:43 AM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the Kimi K3 model in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. While we work with them to resolve the issue, we recommend choosing another model or selecting 'Auto' to continue using Copilot.

3. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 11:58 AM UTC

   Copilot AI Model Providers is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

4. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 12:12 PM UTC

   The issues with our upstream model provider have been mitigated, and Kimi K3 is once again available in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We will continue monitoring to ensure stability.

5. resolved Aug 27, 2026, 12:12 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

6. postmortem Sep 01, 2026, 09:12 AM UTC

   On August 27th, 2026, between approximately 09:20 and 12:14 UTC, the Copilot service experienced a degradation of the Kimi K3 model due to an issue with our upstream provider. Users encountered elevated error rates when using Kimi K3. No other models were impacted. The issue was resolved by a mitigation put in place by our provider. GitHub is working with our provider to further improve the resiliency of the service to prevent similar incidents in the future.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 24, 2026, 07:12 AM UTC· resolved Aug 24, 2026, 07:58 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 24, 2026, 07:12 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Aug 24, 2026, 07:12 AM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the Fable model in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with the upstream model provider. While we work with them to resolve the issue, we recommend choosing another model or selecting 'Auto' to continue using Copilot.

3. resolved Aug 24, 2026, 07:58 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

4. postmortem Aug 27, 2026, 02:51 PM UTC

   On August 24th, 2026, between approximately 06:35 and 07:25 UTC, the Copilot service experienced a degradation of the Claude Fable 5 model due to an issue with our upstream provider. Users encountered elevated error rates when using Claude Fable 5, with requests sometimes failing mid-response. No other models were impacted. The issue was resolved by a mitigation put in place by our provider. GitHub is working with our provider to further improve the resiliency of the service to prevent similar incidents in the future.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 18, 2026, 06:36 AM UTC· resolved Aug 18, 2026, 11:51 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 18, 2026, 06:36 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions

2. investigating Aug 18, 2026, 06:49 AM UTC

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting some GitHub Enterprise Cloud (GHEC) with data residency customers.

3. investigating Aug 18, 2026, 08:37 AM UTC

   The team continues to investigate issues with some Actions jobs being queued for a long time and a percentage of jobs failing. We will continue providing updates on the progress towards mitigation.

4. investigating Aug 18, 2026, 09:38 AM UTC

   The team continues to investigate issues related to Larger Runners, with some Actions jobs being queued for a long time and a percentage of jobs failing. We will continue providing updates on the progress towards mitigation.

5. investigating Aug 18, 2026, 10:22 AM UTC

   We have identified the source of a communication issue between Actions services and are working toward mitigation. Larger Runners remain impacted, with some Actions jobs being queued for a long time and a percentage of jobs failing.

6. investigating Aug 18, 2026, 11:05 AM UTC

   We have applied a mitigation and are seeing recovery signals in the target region. We are now working to apply the mitigation to the remaining regions and will continue to monitor for recovery.

7. investigating Aug 18, 2026, 11:49 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

8. resolved Aug 18, 2026, 11:51 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

9. postmortem Aug 21, 2026, 10:46 PM UTC

   On August 18, 2026, between 05:02 UTC and 11:30 UTC, customers were unable to run jobs on Actions Larger Runners and were unable to view or manage Actions Runners and Runner Groups through the GitHub UI and API. These issues were caused by failures in backend requests resolving essential metadata for starting Larger Runner workflow runs and for reading runner and runner group data. The failures were caused by an expired authentication certificate unique to this service. The certificate had been rotated in KeyVault, but a step to enable use at runtime had been paused to prevent recurrence of previous incidents that had been triggered by this operation. We mitigated the issues by completing the enablement of the new certificate in the backend system. We have added additional monitoring to this and other certificates. The relevant service is also in the process of being replaced as part of our availability and scale work, bringing this authentication path and secret management in line with patterns across all GitHub services.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 17, 2026, 01:54 PM UTC· resolved Aug 17, 2026, 09:15 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 01:54 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions

2. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 01:58 PM UTC

   Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

3. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 02:45 PM UTC

   Pull Requests is operating normally.

4. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 03:08 PM UTC

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting some GitHub Enterprise Cloud (GHEC) with data residency customers. Workflows that resolve Actions hosted on GitHub.com may fail to successfully download actions.

5. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 04:59 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

6. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 05:36 PM UTC

   Issues is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

7. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 05:50 PM UTC

   Issues is operating normally.

8. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 06:11 PM UTC

   We identified the problematic component and have taken corrective actions, but we are seeing residual impact in the form of sporadic authentication failures. We are continuing to apply additional mitigations and investigate the remaining impact.

9. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 06:48 PM UTC

   API Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

10. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 07:01 PM UTC

    API Requests is operating normally.

11. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 07:13 PM UTC

    We are continuing to investigate sporadic authentication failures. We have partially disabled authentication token retries and have seen improvement, and we are monitoring impact before fully applying this mitigation.

12. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 08:08 PM UTC

    We are continuing to investigate sporadic failures affecting Copilot authentication in some applications. Copilot usage via the GitHub CLI and GitHub App are unaffected.

13. investigating Aug 17, 2026, 08:45 PM UTC

    We are continuing to apply mitigations to address sporadic Copilot authentication failures in some applications. We expect full recovery within the next 30 minutes. Copilot usage via the GitHub CLI and GitHub App are unaffected.

14. resolved Aug 17, 2026, 09:15 PM UTC

    This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

15. postmortem Aug 18, 2026, 07:21 PM UTC

    On August 17, 2026, from 13:28–21:15 UTC (7h 47m), GitHub.com experienced elevated errors and latency across Issues, Pull Requests, APIs, Actions, and Copilot. At peak, web/API error rates were approximately 20%, while archive and raw-content downloads reached approximately 50%. SAML/OIDC authentication, SCIM, and Team Sync were also affected, as well as Actions workflows in GHEC with Data Residency that depend on public workflow step definitions hosted on GitHub.com. Most services recovered by 16:36 UTC as our Central US datacenter recovered; Actions was degraded until approximately 18:03 UTC; and Copilot Token Service fully recovered by 21:02. Some of the failing traffic was moved from Central US to Northern Virginia where it was served successfully until the network failure in Central US was debugged and resolved. Delayed replies to a single internal endpoint triggered a latent retry bug in VS Code that amplified traffic by approximately 10x and caused delayed recovery for the Copilot Token Service. The immediate cause of the failure was network saturation on load balancers in Central US due to a new peak in traffic. Originally this was caused by an Istio sidecar pod reaching its concurrency limits and failing to auto scale correctly because of a misconfigured policy that watched host service but not sidecar limits. One failure cascaded to more and eventually four HAProxy nodes exhausted their flow limits, degrading the gateway auth path and causing widespread authentication latency and failures. The problem was worsened by optimistic retry logic which overloaded internal load balancers. Pausing HAProxy on those nodes simultaneously produced immediate broad recovery. The retry storm in Northern VA was fixed by 1) temporarily reducing gateway retry logic with a PR and 2) blocking inbound Copilot Token Service token requests at the load balancers with a 403, and then gradually ramping back up traffic per-site to allow callers to succeed. Residual Copilot authentication failures continued because client retry behavior amplified load: a failed token operation could generate many extra requests and enter a retry loop. Copilot Token Service traffic increased from a normal 7–9K RPS to 70–100K RPS. Reducing gateway authentication retries and blocking retry-triggering responses stabilized Copilot Token Service and completed recovery. Complicating factors that impeded recovery included a number of scraping attacks on codeload endpoints. To prevent recurrence, our follow-up actions include: - Correcting autoscaling policies to account for service-mesh sidecar concurrency and capacity. - Auditing Istio request, concurrency, and scaling limits across affected services. - Reviewing retry limits and backoff behavior across gateways and clients. - Addressing the VS Code retry behavior that amplified Copilot token traffic. - Improving load-balancer capacity monitoring and regional failover safeguards.

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Started Aug 13, 2026, 02:43 PM UTC· resolved Aug 13, 2026, 03:47 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 13, 2026, 02:43 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Aug 13, 2026, 02:50 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the Fable 5 model in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. While we work with them to resolve the issue, we recommend choosing another model or selecting 'Auto' to continue using Copilot.

3. investigating Aug 13, 2026, 03:23 PM UTC

   We are seeing modest recovery, but are still experiencing degraded availability for the Fable 5 model in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. While we work with them to resolve the issue, we recommend choosing another model or selecting 'Auto' to continue using Copilot.

4. investigating Aug 13, 2026, 03:47 PM UTC

   The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and Fable 5 is once again available in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.

5. resolved Aug 13, 2026, 03:47 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

6. postmortem Aug 25, 2026, 12:08 PM UTC

   On August 13th, 2026, between approximately 14:06 and 15:47 UTC, the Copilot service experienced a degradation of the Claude Fable 5 model due to an issue with our upstream provider. Users encountered elevated error rates, peaking at 43% and averaging 12%. Users who selected Auto or alternative models were unaffected. The issue was resolved by a mitigation put in place by our provider. GitHub is working with our provider to further improve the resiliency of the service to prevent similar incidents in the future.

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Started Aug 10, 2026, 08:47 PM UTC· resolved Aug 10, 2026, 09:50 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 10, 2026, 08:47 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Aug 10, 2026, 08:49 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

3. investigating Aug 10, 2026, 09:19 PM UTC

   The issue has been mitigated across all affected environments. We are currently deploying on a fix to prevent reoccurrence. We will provide another update once the fix has been deployed.

4. investigating Aug 10, 2026, 09:50 PM UTC

   We have deployed and validated the fix to prevent immediate reoccurrence. We will be performing additional work to limit these kinds of failures in the future.

5. resolved Aug 10, 2026, 09:50 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

6. postmortem Aug 25, 2026, 09:02 PM UTC

   On August 10, 2026, between 19:48 UTC and 20:49 UTC, GitHub Copilot users saw an incomplete list of available models. During this window, the service could return as few as one model instead of the full catalog. Requests that tried to use a model missing from that shortened list failed with a "model not found" error. Copilot requests that used an available model were not affected. This did not affect customers on data-residency (Proxima) environments. The issue was caused by a change to how model data was published, which our systems could not read back correctly and fell back to a limited default list. We mitigated the incident by 20:49 UTC and deployed a fix to prevent immediate recurrence by 21:50 UTC. We are adding validation and retry safeguards so that model data is verified before it is served. We apologize for the disruption.

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Started Aug 10, 2026, 06:02 PM UTC· resolved Aug 10, 2026, 06:46 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 10, 2026, 06:02 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Aug 10, 2026, 06:09 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of users being unable to create fine-grained Personal Access Tokens. Attempting to create a new token redirects the user back to the token overview page without an error message, but the token was not created.

3. investigating Aug 10, 2026, 06:21 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

4. investigating Aug 10, 2026, 06:22 PM UTC

   We identified the source of the issue affecting creation of fine-grained personal access tokens and have applied a mitigation. Users should now be able to create new fine-grained tokens successfully. We are continuing to monitor to confirm full recovery.

5. resolved Aug 10, 2026, 06:46 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

6. postmortem Aug 13, 2026, 03:56 PM UTC

   On August 10, 2026, between 17:16 and 18:21 UTC, users were unable to create new fine-grained personal access tokens (FG PAT) through the GitHub website. When a user submitted the FG PAT creation form, they were returned to the FG PAT list without an error message and no FG PAT was created. Creating classic personal access tokens, as well as editing or deleting existing FG PAT were not affected. The cause was a change to how the website loads certain front-end JavaScript that was enabled for all users at 17:15 UTC; the change interacted with an issue in the token creation form's confirmation step that prevented it from running, so the final submission that actually creates the token never completed. Because the page still loaded and the server returned a normal response, the failure produced no error message. GitHub mitigated the incident by disabling the change at 18:21 UTC, at which point token creation recovered immediately, and the incident was resolved at 18:46 UTC. To reduce the chance of recurrence, GitHub is adding monitoring and alerting for anomalies in the FG PAT creation success rate and is removing the issue in the FG PAT creation form that prevented the confirmation step from running. GitHub is also adding automated detection of the issue so other areas of the GitHub front end do not repeat the problem.

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Started Aug 01, 2026, 06:03 PM UTC· resolved Aug 01, 2026, 06:44 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 01, 2026, 06:03 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Aug 01, 2026, 06:03 PM UTC

   We are seeing increased error rates from specific upstream AI Model Providers

3. investigating Aug 01, 2026, 06:20 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the Fable 5 model in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. While we work with them to resolve the issue, we recommend choosing another model or selecting 'Auto' to continue using Copilot.

4. investigating Aug 01, 2026, 06:20 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Copilot AI Model Providers has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

5. investigating Aug 01, 2026, 06:23 PM UTC

   The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and Fable 5 is once again available in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.

6. resolved Aug 01, 2026, 06:44 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

7. postmortem Aug 12, 2026, 04:18 PM UTC

   On August 1, 2026, between 17:47 UTC and 18:20 UTC, users of the Fable 5 model in GitHub Copilot experienced increased request failures and latency. The average failure rate across all Copilot requests was 0.007%, while failures for Fable 5 peaked at 5.6%. Other models remained available. This was caused by degradation of an upstream model provider. The affected endpoint recovered, and we monitored the service until error rates and latency returned to normal levels. We are working to add endpoint redundancy to mitigate similar provider issues in the future.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jul 29, 2026, 08:07 PM UTC· resolved Jul 29, 2026, 09:51 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 29, 2026, 08:07 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Jul 29, 2026, 08:07 PM UTC

   We are seeing increased error rates with requests to specific model providers.

3. investigating Jul 29, 2026, 08:18 PM UTC

   We are investigating increased error rates affecting GitHub Copilot requests to external AI model providers. Some users may experience failures or degraded performance when using Copilot features.

4. investigating Jul 29, 2026, 08:38 PM UTC

   The external AI model provider has identified the issue and is working to resolve.

5. investigating Jul 29, 2026, 09:08 PM UTC

   The external AI model provider is continuing to investigate.

6. investigating Jul 29, 2026, 09:51 PM UTC

   The external ai model provider has resolved the issues, and we have verified Copilot's traffic is fully recovered.

7. resolved Jul 29, 2026, 09:51 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

8. postmortem Aug 12, 2026, 05:25 PM UTC

   On July 29, 2026, between 19:45 UTC and 21:51 UTC, users of the Fable 5 model in GitHub Copilot experienced increased request failures and latency. The average failure rate across all Copilot requests was 0.006%, while failures for Fable 5 peaked at 21%. Other models remained available. This was caused by degradation of an upstream model provider. The affected endpoint recovered, and we monitored the service until error rates and latency returned to normal levels. We are working to add endpoint redundancy to mitigate similar provider issues in the future.

Read the full incident report →