GitHub Outage History

Started Sep 28, 2026, 09:16 PM UTC· resolved Sep 28, 2026, 10:08 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 28, 2026, 09:16 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Sep 28, 2026, 09:23 PM UTC

   Revert of the impacted change is in flight, expect full recovery once the deployment is done.

3. investigating Sep 28, 2026, 10:08 PM UTC

   Copilot Code review has recovered, for reviews that were previously not successful you can re-request review from your PR.

4. resolved Sep 28, 2026, 10:08 PM UTC

   On September 28, 2026, between 19:23 UTC and 22:08 UTC the Copilot Code Review service was degraded and pull request reviews did not complete in all environments. On average, approximately 70% of requested reviews did not complete. Reviews requested during this window were not automatically retried, and users needed to re-request a review from their pull request. This was due to a change in a dependent service that stopped delivering data Copilot Code Review needs to complete a review. Review completion is an inherently delayed signal, because each review job takes time to start and finish, so it took longer to detect the impact. We mitigated the incident by reverting the change. We are working to add a faster signal for reviews that fail to complete, add deployment validation that confirms a Copilot Code Review completes end to end, improve how we track internal dependencies between services, and make our deployment pipeline more reliable to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 24, 2026, 04:51 PM UTC· resolved Sep 24, 2026, 08:41 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 24, 2026, 04:51 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Sep 24, 2026, 04:51 PM UTC

   We are investigating failures on billing information updates. Customers may be unable to create or update their billing information in the meantime.

3. investigating Sep 24, 2026, 05:40 PM UTC

   We have identified the problem and are actively working on mitigation.

4. investigating Sep 24, 2026, 06:22 PM UTC

   We are continuing to work on mitigation. We will post another update in approximately one hour.

5. investigating Sep 24, 2026, 08:10 PM UTC

   We have applied the mitigation and are seeing signs of recovery. We are continuing to monitor the system closely.

6. monitoring Sep 24, 2026, 08:24 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

7. resolved Sep 24, 2026, 08:41 PM UTC

   Beginning on September 22, 2026 at 11:51 UTC, approximately 1,700 users experienced delays and errors when adding or updating billing address information because requests to the address validation service timed out or failed. Within the affected address validation flow, requests failed at an average rate of 69.3%, reaching 100% at peak. An operating system upgrade exposed a compatibility issue in an adapter used by our HTTP client library, causing requests to stall. A subsequent change to shorten request timeouts caused stalled requests to return connection errors and increased the failure rate. We mitigated the incident on September 24, 2026 at 20:24 UTC by changing the HTTP client used for address validation. We have added alerting to detect similar issues sooner and are extending the fix to other integrations.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 23, 2026, 10:11 AM UTC· resolved Sep 24, 2026, 04:55 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 10:11 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for API Requests

2. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 10:20 AM UTC

   Database replicas have detached. We're working to restore the database replicas. Users may experience issues beyond creating organizations and a degraded experience with the GitHub API and Projects.

3. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 10:57 AM UTC

   Database replicas have been restored. Org creation and the GitHub API are no longer degraded.

4. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 10:58 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting API Requests has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

5. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 11:38 AM UTC

   We are seeing recovery for Projects. Users may experience stale search results for Projects while indexing catches up.

6. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 01:35 PM UTC

   Users may experience stale Project search results. We are working to increase indexing speed. All other services are available.

7. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 05:01 PM UTC

   Updates to issue labels may be delayed in being reflected in Projects by about ~10 minutes. We have added some capacity to work through the backlog more quickly, but it'll likely be a few hours to complete processing the full backlog of messages. All other services are available.

8. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 05:30 PM UTC

   We will post another update in approximately one hour to share our progress.

9. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 06:42 PM UTC

   Continuing to investigate the lag that may be experienced in issue labels being accurately reflected in Projects. We are working on alternate solutions to process the backlog of label updates.

10. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 08:26 PM UTC

    We are preparing to deploy a change that will mitigate the impact.

11. investigating Sep 23, 2026, 09:39 PM UTC

    Updates to issue labels may be delayed in being reflected in Projects. We are continuing to deploy a change that will accelerate processing of the backlog of label updates. All other services are available. We will provide another update within the next hour.

12. investigating Sep 24, 2026, 12:16 AM UTC

    We've deployed a change intended to accelerate processing of the backlog of issue label updates in Projects. A sizable backlog still remains and we continue working through it. All other services are operating normally. We will provide another update within the next hour.

13. investigating Sep 24, 2026, 02:00 AM UTC

    We are continuing to process the backlog of issue label updates for Projects. Users may still see delays before label changes are reflected in Projects. All other services are operating normally.

14. investigating Sep 24, 2026, 03:14 AM UTC

    We are continuing to process the backlog of issue label updates for Projects. Label changes may still be delayed. All other services are operating normally.

15. monitoring Sep 24, 2026, 04:55 AM UTC

    The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

16. resolved Sep 24, 2026, 04:55 AM UTC

    Starting at 07:57 UTC on September 23, GitHub experienced elevated 500 and 404 responses across several application pages. This caused failures when installing GitHub Apps, creating organizations, and making some organization membership changes. Customers also experienced delayed label updates and stale search results in Projects. The infrastructure failure was isolated to our Azure Central US region. The API errors were mitigated by 10:58 UTC on September 23. Projects' processing continued to recover while an accumulated backlog was drained, and full service was restored at 04:55 UTC on September 24. The incident was caused by a failed planned maintenance operation on a primary database. Automated recovery initiated an emergency database failover, after which several replicas in the affected region were unable to resume replication correctly. This reduced available database capacity and caused the API errors and downstream Projects processing delays. We have mitigated the immediate failure mode. We are also improving maintenance safety checks, database failover handling, post-failover replica validation, and downstream processing resilience to reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 20, 2026, 10:13 PM UTC· resolved Sep 20, 2026, 11:22 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 20, 2026, 10:13 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Pull Requests

2. monitoring Sep 20, 2026, 10:27 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Pull Requests has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

3. monitoring Sep 20, 2026, 10:32 PM UTC

   A git fileserver issue caused a brief delay in creating some merge commits - we've isolated the underlying server and already observed recovery.

4. resolved Sep 20, 2026, 11:22 PM UTC

   On September 20, 2026, between 21:46 and 22:24 UTC the Pull Requests service was degraded and pull request merge and test-merge commits were created late, with delays reaching approximately four minutes at peak. Merge commits were delayed rather than lost. Because some Actions workflow runs start only after a pull request's merge commit is created, a subset of workflow runs for pull request events were also delayed. This was due to a routine repository maintenance job for an unusually large repository consuming nearly all of the memory on a single Git storage server, which left that server unable to serve the Git operations used to create merge commits. We mitigated the incident by removing the affected server from service at 22:18 UTC, after which the queued merge commits were created within six minutes. We have capped the memory a single repository maintenance job may consume so that one repository cannot exhaust a server, and we have improved monitoring and alerting on storage server health to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 17, 2026, 08:59 PM UTC· resolved Sep 17, 2026, 09:49 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 17, 2026, 08:59 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. monitoring Sep 17, 2026, 09:39 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for GPT-5.6 Luna, GPT-5.6 Terra, GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, GPT-5.3-Codex in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. The provider is working to mitigate the problem and we are monitoring recovery. We recommend choosing another model or selecting 'Auto' to continue using Copilot.

3. resolved Sep 17, 2026, 09:49 PM UTC

   Between 20:26 and 21:17 UTC on September 17, 2026, GitHub Copilot experienced degradation affecting several GPT models, including GPT-5.6 Luna, GPT-5.6 Terra, GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-5.3-Codex, and GPT-6 Astra. Users encountered elevated error rates when using these models. The degradation was caused by an issue with an upstream model provider. GitHub engineers detected the issue through automated monitoring and coordinated with the provider. Our automated model-warning system activated in-product warnings for affected models during the incident. Service returned to normal after the provider implemented a mitigation.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 16, 2026, 07:21 AM UTC· resolved Sep 16, 2026, 05:48 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 16, 2026, 07:21 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Sep 16, 2026, 08:28 AM UTC

   Copilot AI Model Providers is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

3. investigating Sep 16, 2026, 10:58 AM UTC

   Copilot AI Model Providers is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

4. monitoring Sep 16, 2026, 11:45 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting Copilot AI Model Providers has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

5. resolved Sep 16, 2026, 05:48 PM UTC

   On September 16, 2026, between 04:40 and 11:45 UTC, the Gemini 3.8 Flash model in GitHub Copilot experienced degraded availability. Requests to this model failed at an average rate of 6.4%, and the impact was highest during peak traffic hours. Other Copilot models were not affected. Users could continue to work with a different model or with 'Auto'. The degradation was caused due to a capacity issue with an upstream model provider. Failure rates returned to normal as the daily traffic peak passed. We monitored the model until it was healthy and resolved the incident at 17:48 UTC. We are working to make our systems resilient to cover peak demand for all the Copilot models.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 15, 2026, 07:11 PM UTC· resolved Sep 15, 2026, 08:00 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 07:11 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. monitoring Sep 15, 2026, 07:48 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

3. resolved Sep 15, 2026, 08:00 PM UTC

   On September 15, 2026 between 15:30 and 20:00 UTC, some Copilot code reviews on pull requests failed to complete. The cause was increased latency in an internal caching service that GitHub Copilot Code Review relies on to coordinate its review jobs. This caused a timeout in lock acquisition, which interrupted the job. We reverted the change to the internal caching service and restored normal operation by 20:00 UTC. We sincerely apologize for the disruption.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 15, 2026, 09:47 AM UTC· resolved Sep 15, 2026, 11:17 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 09:47 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. monitoring Sep 15, 2026, 09:48 AM UTC

   We are investigating degraded availability for Claude Fable 5.1, affecting some Copilot products and integrated development environments. The issue is caused by a problem with our upstream model provider. Customers can use another model or select Auto while we investigate.

3. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 10:20 AM UTC

   Copilot AI Model Providers is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

4. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 10:32 AM UTC

   We continue to investigate intermittent errors affecting Claude Fable 5.1 in some Copilot products and integrated development environments. Customers can use another model or select Auto while we monitor the situation.

5. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 11:09 AM UTC

   We continue to monitor intermittent errors affecting Claude Fable 5.1 in some Copilot products and integrated development environments. Customer-facing metrics have recovered, and we are awaiting confirmation from our upstream provider that the issue will not recur. Customers can select another model or Auto in the meantime.

6. investigating Sep 15, 2026, 11:17 AM UTC

   The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and Claude Fable 5.1 is once again available in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.

7. resolved Sep 15, 2026, 11:17 AM UTC

   On September 15, 2026, between 05:45 and 09:50 UTC, the Claude Fable 5.1 model in GitHub Copilot experienced intermittently degraded availability, with an average error rate of 2.8%. During brief recurring 15 minute periods that recurred every ~45 minutes, availability for Claude Fable 5.1 dropped to a maximum of ~40% before recovering completely. Other Copilot models were not affected. Users could continue to work with a different model or with 'Auto'. The cause was an issue with an upstream model provider that intermittently rejected requests while overloaded. GitHub worked with the provider, who acknowledged and then resolved the underlying issue at 9:50 UTC, after which the model returned to constant normal availability. Once recovery was guaranteed, we resolved the incident at 11:17 UTC. To reduce the chance of recurrence and customer impact, GitHub is reviewing per-model availability alerting and automatic in-product fallback so that requests to a degraded model can shift to a healthy alternative more quickly.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 14, 2026, 06:40 PM UTC· resolved Sep 14, 2026, 07:35 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 14, 2026, 06:40 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. monitoring Sep 14, 2026, 07:01 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

3. resolved Sep 14, 2026, 07:35 PM UTC

   On September 14, 2026, between 16:10 and 19:01 UTC, some customers using GitHub Actions larger runners experienced longer-than-normal wait times for jobs to start. During this period, 5.7% of larger-runner jobs were affected. A routine expansion of our compute capacity exposed a bug in how our provisioning system handled capacity records when selecting where to create runner virtual machines. This slowed the creation of new runners, leaving insufficient runner capacity to start affected jobs promptly. We restored normal provisioning by correcting the affected capacity records. We have fixed the underlying capacity-selection bug to prevent this failure from recurring. We have also added alerts for VM-record creation failures associated with this capacity issue.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 13, 2026, 09:16 AM UTC· resolved Sep 13, 2026, 10:44 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 13, 2026, 09:16 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded availability for API Requests, Issues, Pages and Pull Requests

2. investigating Sep 13, 2026, 09:25 AM UTC

   Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

3. investigating Sep 13, 2026, 09:36 AM UTC

   We're seeing increased database replication delays on collab which is causing increased error rates in authorization endpoints and follow-on increased error rates across the system - we are investigating

4. investigating Sep 13, 2026, 10:26 AM UTC

   We have reduced load on this cluster with internal load-shedding and are seeing signs of recovery but continue to monitor

5. investigating Sep 13, 2026, 10:28 AM UTC

   Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

6. resolved Sep 13, 2026, 10:44 AM UTC

   On September 13, 2026, between 08:43 and 10:44 UTC, GitHub experienced degraded availability across approximately 28 services, including Issues, Pull Requests, Actions, Codespaces, Pages, Notifications, Code Scanning, Git LFS, and new account signup. At peak, 8.8% of requests to create GitHub App installation access tokens failed. Token issuance for Actions workflows was also affected, impacting approximately 4% of workflows during the incident time frame. Creating issues through the web interface failed for about 96% of attempts, and signup failures were above 90%. The cause was an internal data-cleanup job that began writing to a shared database cluster at 07:33 UTC. That cluster stores permission data read on nearly every authenticated request. The safeguard that was pacing the background job watched only one health signal — how far the database replicas were lagging — and that signal stayed low the whole time. It did not account for the load building on the primary itself, so the job kept writing while the primary quietly ran toward its limit. When the primary ran out of available connections, requests that needed it could not complete. First, there was no quick timeout on these database calls, so request handlers waited on the stalled database instead of failing fast, and the shared request-handling capacity degraded into site-wide errors. Second, a retry loop around token creation kept re-sending the writes that were already failing, which held the database saturated rather than letting it recover. Monitoring declared the incident at 08:50 UTC, but due to the broad impact and amplification from token creation, it took time to identify the source of the load. First responders mitigated by shedding internal load and pausing the job, and all services recovered by 10:44 UTC. To prevent recurrence, we are rate-limiting background jobs against shared, customer-serving databases by default, and adding automatic pausing and paging on primary-server load rather than replication lag alone. We are also surfacing running background work directly alongside database health signals so responders can see and pause it without leaving those dashboards, bounding retries in the token-issuing path, and adding request-level timeouts so one unhealthy database cannot consume shared web server capacity. In addition, we are breaking apart this database cluster to remove the single point of failure. We will be moving various service-specific data, including the authorization data, out of this shared cluster in the next two weeks.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 04, 2026, 10:02 PM UTC· resolved Sep 04, 2026, 10:23 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 04, 2026, 10:02 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. resolved Sep 04, 2026, 10:23 PM UTC

   On September 4, 2026, between approximately 21:45 and 22:07 UTC, some users experienced errors and elevated latency for repository operations. The incident was fully resolved at 22:23 UTC. The cause was a capacity change that spread one of our clusters across additional availability zones; our zone-aware traffic routing kept sending requests to the original zone for performance, overloading a small set of servers while the new capacity sat idle. We resolved the incident by reverting the change and letting traffic rebalance. We are improving per-zone capacity guarantees, cross-zone load-shedding, and pre-production testing of multi-zone changes to prevent recurrence.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 04, 2026, 08:39 PM UTC· resolved Sep 04, 2026, 10:26 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 04, 2026, 08:39 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Sep 04, 2026, 08:57 PM UTC

   Some users may be experiencing failures when using Copilot code review. We have identified the root cause and are working on a mitigation.

3. investigating Sep 04, 2026, 09:54 PM UTC

   We are applying the mitigation and expect recovery within approximately 30 minutes.

4. monitoring Sep 04, 2026, 10:25 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

5. resolved Sep 04, 2026, 10:26 PM UTC

   On September 4, 2026, between 20:04 and 22:26 UTC, GitHub Copilot code review experienced an increased failure rate. Affected pull request reviews failed to complete or post review comments. The incident was caused by a change to the service’s authentication permissions that prevented it from submitting affected reviews to the GitHub API. We reverted the change and restored normal operation by 22:26 UTC. We apologize for the disruption.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 03, 2026, 02:17 PM UTC· resolved Sep 03, 2026, 05:11 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 02:17 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 02:20 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the Grok 4.6 model in Copilot Chat, VS Code and other Copilot products. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. We are working with them to resolve the issue.

3. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 02:22 PM UTC

   The Grok 4.5 model has degraded availability as well. We are working with the upstream provider to resolve the issue.

4. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 05:11 PM UTC

   The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and Grok models are once again available in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.

5. resolved Sep 03, 2026, 05:11 PM UTC

   Between 13:22 and 17:11 UTC on September 03, 2026, GitHub Copilot experienced degradation affecting several Grok models, including Grok 4.5 and Grok 4.6. Users encountered elevated error rates, but other models were not affected. The degradation was caused by an issue with an upstream model provider. GitHub engineers detected the issue through automated monitoring, displayed in-product warnings for the affected models, and coordinated with the provider. Service returned to normal after the provider implemented a mitigation.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 01, 2026, 03:00 PM UTC· resolved Sep 01, 2026, 04:01 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 03:00 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Pull Requests

2. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 03:00 PM UTC

   Diffs in the PR view may be stale for several minutes. We are investigating and scaling up resources.

3. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 04:00 PM UTC

   Time to update pull request diffs have improved to normal thresholds.

4. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 04:01 PM UTC

   On September 1, 2026, between approximately 14:01 and 16:01 UTC, updates in response to pushes were delayed, temporarily showing stale diffs. The median time to refresh a diff after a push rose from the normal level of about 3 seconds to over 2 minutes at the peak, and more than 140,000 customer accounts had at least one delayed refresh during the most affected 75 minutes. Pushing commits and opening pull requests continued to work normally. The incident was caused by a sharp, concentrated surge in push volume that saturated worker pools and job queueing infrastructure. Autoscaling did not increase capacity as intended, so the backlog did not clear on its own. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling the affected worker pools and increasing push-processing capacity. This allowed the system to process the backlog, after which refresh times returned to normal. To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents, we are adding quotas and throttling earlier in the push path so a single concentrated source of load cannot saturate shared capacity, improving worker-pool autoscaling so capacity is added automatically, and improving monitors for background job processing so on-call is paged before customers experience delayed pull request updates.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 31, 2026, 09:15 AM UTC· resolved Aug 31, 2026, 09:58 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 31, 2026, 09:15 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Aug 31, 2026, 09:22 AM UTC

   Copilot is experiencing a higher rate of errors for OpenAI models, including gpt-5.2, gpt-5.3-codex, gpt-5.4, gpt-5.4, and the gpt-5.6 family of models. Other models are not impacted.

3. investigating Aug 31, 2026, 09:48 AM UTC

   One of our model providers has confirmed an incident on their end. We have provided them details to help identify the issue. We are starting to see recovery.

4. monitoring Aug 31, 2026, 09:51 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting Copilot AI Model Providers has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

5. monitoring Aug 31, 2026, 09:58 AM UTC

   The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and gpt-5.3-codex, gpt-5.4-mini, gpt-5.4-nano, gpt-5.5, and the gpt-5.6 family of models are once again available in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.

6. resolved Aug 31, 2026, 09:58 AM UTC

   Between 08:37 and 09:41 UTC on August 31, 2026, GitHub Copilot experienced degradation affecting several GPT models, including gpt-5.2, gpt-5.3-codex, gpt-5.4, gpt-5.4-mini, gpt-5.4-nano, and the gpt-5.6 family (Luna, Sol, and Terra). Users encountered elevated error rates and interrupted streaming responses. Other models were not affected. The degradation was caused by an issue with an upstream model provider. GitHub engineers detected the issue through automated monitoring, displayed in-product warnings for the affected models, and coordinated with the provider. Service returned to normal after the provider implemented a mitigation.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 27, 2026, 10:04 AM UTC· resolved Aug 27, 2026, 12:12 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 10:04 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 10:43 AM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the Kimi K3 model in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. While we work with them to resolve the issue, we recommend choosing another model or selecting 'Auto' to continue using Copilot.

3. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 11:58 AM UTC

   Copilot AI Model Providers is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

4. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 12:12 PM UTC

   The issues with our upstream model provider have been mitigated, and Kimi K3 is once again available in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We will continue monitoring to ensure stability.

5. resolved Aug 27, 2026, 12:12 PM UTC

   On August 27th, 2026, between approximately 09:20 and 12:14 UTC, the Copilot service experienced a degradation of the Kimi K3 model due to an issue with our upstream provider. Users encountered elevated error rates when using Kimi K3. No other models were impacted. The issue was resolved by a mitigation put in place by our provider. GitHub is working with our provider to further improve the resiliency of the service to prevent similar incidents in the future.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 26, 2026, 11:37 PM UTC· resolved Aug 27, 2026, 07:44 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 11:37 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 11:42 PM UTC

   We are currently investigating increased errors with billing services. Customers may observe failed billing budget page loads, and users of the Copilot CLI may observe failures starting or continuing sessions.

3. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 12:31 AM UTC

   We've applied a mitigation to unblock Copilot usage and have observed recovery for this particular impact. We're continuing to investigate and apply mitigations for the billing page disruption while monitoring to ensure Copilot remains recovered.

4. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 01:35 AM UTC

   We are continuing to monitor the mitigation that we have applied for the billing page disruption.

5. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 02:49 PM UTC

   Our mitigation is still holding as we continue to investigate to find the root cause.

6. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 04:20 PM UTC

   Our mitigation continues to hold, and service conditions remain stable. We are continuing to investigate the concentrated workload responsible for the issue and are preparing additional preventative improvements. We have not identified a material change in customer impact since the previous update. We will provide another update as the investigation progresses.

7. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 05:58 PM UTC

   No material change since the previous update. Service conditions remain stable following the mitigation, and we have not observed any further customer impact. We are actively monitoring the service while implementing targeted fixes to address the underlying root cause.

8. resolved Aug 27, 2026, 07:44 PM UTC

   On August 26, 2026, between 20:40 UTC and 00:51 UTC on August 27, GitHub Billing experienced degraded performance affecting billing budget pages and GitHub Copilot CLI sessions. Affected customers encountered failed budget page loads or failures when starting or continuing CLI sessions. We confirmed this impact for a small number of customers (<1%). This was caused by a concentrated workload that created processing delays in our data storage layer. Automated retries increased the load and prolonged the degradation. We mitigated the incident by rebalancing traffic within our infrastructure. We are improving workload isolation, retry behavior, and detection of concentrated load to reduce the likelihood of recurrence and shorten our time to detect and mitigate similar incidents.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 26, 2026, 10:56 PM UTC· resolved Aug 27, 2026, 12:26 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 10:56 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions and Pull Requests

2. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 10:57 PM UTC

   We are investigating elevated delays and timeouts affecting Actions workflow runs triggered by pull request events. 20% of actions runs have delayed starts of more than 5 minutes and up to 4% of runs failed to trigger. We are actively working on mitigation and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 12:01 AM UTC

   We've applied mitigations and are seeing recovery in Actions workflow runs and blocked pull request merges. We're continuing to monitor for sustained health of merge commit creates before resolving.

4. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 12:25 AM UTC

   We confirmed full recovery beginning at 23:58 UTC. Actions workflow runs and pull request merges are operating normally. We will now resolve the incident while continuing to monitor service health.

5. monitoring Aug 27, 2026, 12:26 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions and Pull Requests has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

6. resolved Aug 27, 2026, 12:26 AM UTC

   On August 26, 2026, from 21:55 UTC to 23:58 UTC, 2.6% of workflow runs triggered by pull request events were delayed, with the impact rising as high as 25% at its peak. Some users also experienced delays in pull request merge-commit generation, mergeability information, and merge-button availability. Actions and Pull Requests fully recovered by 23:58 UTC; the incident was resolved at 00:26 UTC after normal operation was confirmed. Background jobs that process pull request updates and generate merge commits were impacted by timeouts reaching a single partition of git data. This resulted in a backlog in pull request merge-commit processing, delaying pull request-triggered GitHub Actions workflows and some mergeability information. We reduced workload, shifted traffic away from affected infrastructure, and restored the affected service component to a healthy state. Together, these actions helped drain the backlog and restore normal operations. We are working to improve resource saturation detection and to eliminate customer impact in this scenario by isolating impact, placing better bounds on retries, and strengthening backpressure to make our systems more resilient under load.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 26, 2026, 03:11 PM UTC· resolved Aug 26, 2026, 06:01 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 03:11 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Actions

2. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 03:12 PM UTC

   Pages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

3. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 03:23 PM UTC

   We've identified an issue with a database primary and are failing over to a replica immediately

4. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 03:48 PM UTC

   primary failover briefly improved performance but did not fully mitigate, we've throttled inbound traffic and are investigating upstream Vitess issues

5. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 04:14 PM UTC

   We believe we've identified and addressed the issue and are ramping traffic back up slowly to ensure it doesn't recur. Some customers will continue to see delays as we ramp up.

6. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 04:49 PM UTC

   Pages is operating normally.

7. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 04:50 PM UTC

   We are continuing to observe recovery and delayed queues are burning down. Some customers will continue to see increased delays until all throttled work has been completed - we expect this within the next hour.

8. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 05:32 PM UTC

   We are continuing to observe recovery and expect actions inbound queues to be back to normal in <30min. Work will continue to flow through the system subject to per-customer concurrency limits.

9. monitoring Aug 26, 2026, 05:54 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

10. monitoring Aug 26, 2026, 06:00 PM UTC

    All inbound queues have recovered and Actions is operating as expected. 3.7% of jobs assigned to larger runners during the early stage of this incident are stuck waiting for runner assignment. Those will be canceled within the hour. Other runners are successfully processing all new jobs.

11. resolved Aug 26, 2026, 06:01 PM UTC

    On August 26, 2026 from 15:02 to 15:45 UTC, Actions jobs failed to start. The following 2 hours until 17:40 UTC, Actions runs were delayed starting by more than 5 minutes as the system caught up with delayed load. This impact was triggered by saturation of writes to the database primary used by the service processing triggers for Actions workflows. The primary was failed over, but the system did not fully recover. The saturation was caused by growing daily peak load combined with an upstream issue in GitHub’s event processing infrastructure, https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/hcbtzksccj2f, which caused burst amplification of already-high load. Downstream throttles that were later used to recover were set ~10% too high to protect the system. At 15:45 UTC, throttling combined with service restarts recovered the service’s core health. Those throttles were gradually raised between 15:54 and 17:22 to restore full webhook processing for Actions runs. This ramp was deliberately slow to ensure we did not re-overwhelm the system given our original throttling was now known to be incorrectly set. The queue of webhook events was fully burned down at 17:40 UTC. 3.7% of larger-runner jobs, along with some scale-set self-hosted jobs, remained stuck in queued or “waiting for runner” state. We deployed a change to force-revoke jobs in this state, and they transitioned to failed at 18:40 UTC, about 50 minutes after incident mitigation. Releasing these jobs also freed hosted concurrency for larger-runner jobs. Customers using concurrency groups saw longer impact due to a separate issue where runners assigned to a subset of jobs disconnected before the force-revoke mitigation was deployed, which prevented runner acquisition from progressing and left jobs in a waiting-for-runner state. This was resolved at 01:00 UTC on August 27. Some runs triggered during the 15:02-15:45 UTC incident window encountered a bug that left them showing as queued even after service recovery. In the backend, these runs had already failed and will automatically move to canceled state 24 hours after creation. As follow-up, we are fixing the root cause of this queued state and improving our ability to bulk-cancel affected runs. Several changes to improve the general scalability of this part of Actions were already complete and deploying to production. Rollout of those changes will be complete within the next 24 hours. Further work to improve scale, resiliency, and more graceful degradation of Actions workflows are in flight. We are also taking a repair item to accelerate clearing of stuck queued or waiting jobs in similar future cases.

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Started Aug 26, 2026, 03:09 PM UTC· resolved Aug 26, 2026, 04:07 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 26, 2026, 03:09 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. resolved Aug 26, 2026, 04:07 PM UTC

   Please refer to the combined summary in this related incident: https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/y1t7p9fzrlj2

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Started Aug 24, 2026, 01:56 PM UTC· resolved Aug 24, 2026, 02:34 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 24, 2026, 01:56 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions

2. investigating Aug 24, 2026, 02:22 PM UTC

   Failures while queuing and running Actions jobs for a subset of customers are now resolving. We are monitoring for full recovery.

3. monitoring Aug 24, 2026, 02:26 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

4. resolved Aug 24, 2026, 02:34 PM UTC

   On August 24, 2026, between 13:33 UTC and 14:04 UTC, 3.8% of Actions runs experienced start delays over 5 minutes with 1.25% of Actions runs failing outright. The incident was caused by a disk failure on a node hosting one of many service instances responsible for processing runner assignment events. Typically, pods on unhealthy nodes are removed and replaced automatically without impact. In this case, although the node was severely degraded and unable to perform disk operations, it continued sending healthy signals, preventing the system from immediately moving its work elsewhere. During this period, events assigned to the affected component accumulated until an automatic rebalance redirected processing to healthy components at 13:54 UTC. The queue backlog was cleared at 14:00 UTC, and processing returned to normal by 14:04 UTC. To prevent a recurrence, we are improving detection and automated remediation for unhealthy nodes that aren’t fully offline. We are also strengthening application-level resiliency, so stalled consumers are automatically removed quickly and their work reassigned without waiting for the affected node to recover.

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Started Aug 24, 2026, 07:12 AM UTC· resolved Aug 24, 2026, 07:58 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 24, 2026, 07:12 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Aug 24, 2026, 07:12 AM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the Fable model in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with the upstream model provider. While we work with them to resolve the issue, we recommend choosing another model or selecting 'Auto' to continue using Copilot.

3. resolved Aug 24, 2026, 07:58 AM UTC

   On August 24th, 2026, between approximately 06:35 and 07:25 UTC, the Copilot service experienced a degradation of the Claude Fable 5 model due to an issue with our upstream provider. Users encountered elevated error rates when using Claude Fable 5, with requests sometimes failing mid-response. No other models were impacted. The issue was resolved by a mitigation put in place by our provider. GitHub is working with our provider to further improve the resiliency of the service to prevent similar incidents in the future.

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Started Aug 21, 2026, 02:00 PM UTC· resolved Aug 21, 2026, 02:07 PM UTC

1. resolved Aug 21, 2026, 02:00 PM UTC

   On August 21, 2026, between 14:00 and 14:07 UTC, dotcom Git operations over SSH were degraded. Successful Git operations over SSH fell by more than 95% for during the peak impact window, making clone, fetch, or push over SSH effectively unavailable to most users for approximately four minutes. Git operations over HTTPS were not affected. The incident was caused by a software defect in our load-balancing infrastructure that was triggered by a configuration change. The defect only occurred when connections passed through multiple layers of load balancers running the new configuration, which meant it was not detected during canary testing. We mitigated the incident by rolling back the configuration change. We are adding regression coverage for multi-layer load-balancer configurations and improving monitoring and alerting for Git operations over SSH to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of similar issues in the future.

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Started Aug 20, 2026, 02:43 PM UTC· resolved Aug 21, 2026, 12:37 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 02:43 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 02:51 PM UTC

   Users may experience delays when starting tasks using Copilot Cloud Agent. We are actively investigating the issue and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 03:01 PM UTC

   We have identified the problematic component and are working to fail over to a healthy instance. Further updates will be provided as we perform mitigations.

4. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 03:41 PM UTC

   We are experiencing issues with Copilot Cloud Agent tasks, resulting in newly started tasks not properly displaying on-going progress. These Copilot Cloud Agent tasks are still being completed correctly but lack proper visibility. We are actively investigating the issue and will provide updates as we learn more.

5. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 04:14 PM UTC

   Users are experiencing delays when starting tasks using Copilot Cloud Agent and are not be able to see the status of these tasks. Copilot Cloud Agent tasks are still being completed. We have identified the cause of the issue and are putting mitigations in place to return service to normal levels. We will provide another update about the expected recovery time shortly.

6. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 05:05 PM UTC

   We are seeing signs of recovery for Copilot Cloud Agent task status visibility, but this recovery is slower than anticipated. We are pursuing additional mitigating measures to accelerate recovery.

7. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 05:32 PM UTC

   We are observing gradual recovery for Copilot Cloud Agent task status visibility, with session output delayed approximately 1 hour. We have taken additional steps to accelerate the recovery and are continuing to monitor the impact.

8. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 06:04 PM UTC

   We are continuing to observe gradual recovery for Copilot Cloud Agent task status visibility, with session output delayed by approximately 1 hour. We have taken additional steps to accelerate the recovery and are continuing to monitor the impact.

9. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 06:45 PM UTC

   We are continuing to observe gradual recovery for Copilot Cloud Agent task status visibility, with session output delayed by approximately 1 hour. We have taken additional steps to accelerate the recovery and expect this to take effect within the next hour.

10. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 07:35 PM UTC

    We are continuing to observe gradual recovery for Copilot Cloud Agent task status visibility. Session output continues to be delayed by approximately 1 hour as our remediation steps take effect.

11. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 08:37 PM UTC

    We are seeing gradual recovery in Copilot Cloud Agent task status visibility as we deploy a fix for the root cause. Session output remains delayed by approximately one hour while remediation continues.

12. resolved Aug 21, 2026, 12:37 AM UTC

    Between 13:57 UTC on August 20 and 00:37 UTC on August 21, 2026, some users of the Copilot Cloud Agent experienced delays of up to 60 to 90 minutes in seeing the status and results of their agent tasks. The agent tasks themselves continued to run and complete during this time; only the visibility of their status was delayed. The cause was a regional outage in a third-party cloud database service that Copilot uses to store agent task status. We failed over the affected database to a healthy region, added processing capacity to work through the backlog, and restored normal operation once the underlying service recovered. No task data was lost during the incident. To prevent repetition of similar incidents, we are removing the database configuration that made us vulnerable to this regional outage and improving our database failover procedures.

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Started Aug 18, 2026, 09:36 AM UTC· resolved Aug 18, 2026, 10:23 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 18, 2026, 09:36 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. resolved Aug 18, 2026, 10:23 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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