GitHub Outage History

Started Oct 30, 2026, 08:59 PM UTC· resolved Oct 30, 2026, 11:29 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 08:59 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 09:00 PM UTC

   We are investigating elevated errors when viewing some Dependabot alerts.

3. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 09:44 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate elevated errors when viewing some Dependabot alerts. We’ll provide more updates as we learn more.

4. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 10:32 PM UTC

   We have mitigated impact and are seeing recovery. We are monitoring for full recovery.

5. monitoring Oct 30, 2026, 10:32 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

6. resolved Oct 30, 2026, 11:29 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 30, 2026, 05:50 PM UTC· resolved Oct 30, 2026, 07:23 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 05:50 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions and Webhooks

2. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 06:00 PM UTC

   Pages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

3. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 06:06 PM UTC

   We continue to investigate delays affecting Actions workflows, Pages deployments, and webhook events, along with errors affecting code search and live updates. We have taken mitigation steps. Actions processing and Pages deployments are showing signs of recovery, but impact has not fully resolved. We are monitoring recovery and investigating the underlying cause.

4. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 06:32 PM UTC

   All affected services have recovered following mitigation. We continue to investigate root cause.

5. monitoring Oct 30, 2026, 06:32 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions, Pages and Webhooks has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

6. resolved Oct 30, 2026, 07:23 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 30, 2026, 02:31 PM UTC· resolved Oct 30, 2026, 03:02 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 02:31 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 02:35 PM UTC

   We are investigating degraded performance across multiple services. We will continue to keep users updated on progress towards mitigation.

3. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 02:36 PM UTC

   Issues is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

4. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 02:39 PM UTC

   Pages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

5. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 02:45 PM UTC

   Issues is operating normally.

6. investigating Oct 30, 2026, 02:48 PM UTC

   A temporarily overloaded component triggered a burst of errors between 14:21 and 14:30 UTC across numerous services. Component health has returned to normal and we continue to monitor while investigating the root cause.

7. monitoring Oct 30, 2026, 02:49 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Pages has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

8. resolved Oct 30, 2026, 03:02 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 29, 2026, 10:19 AM UTC· resolved Oct 29, 2026, 12:49 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 29, 2026, 10:19 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 29, 2026, 10:22 AM UTC

   We are experiencing increased failures and latency on our agent sessions service, including creating and listing sessions. This can impact cloud based agent sessions on web, mobile, VS Code, CLI and the GitHub Copilot app.

3. investigating Oct 29, 2026, 11:01 AM UTC

   We continue to experience failure rates of 1-2% and increased latency on our agent sessions service, including creating and listing sessions. This can impact cloud based agent sessions on web, mobile, VS Code, CLI and the GitHub Copilot app.

4. investigating Oct 29, 2026, 11:37 AM UTC

   We continue to experience failure rates of 1-2% and increased latency on our agent sessions service, including creating and listing sessions. This can impact cloud based agent sessions on web, mobile, VS Code, CLI and the GitHub Copilot app. We are actively applying mitigations and monitoring for recovery.

5. monitoring Oct 29, 2026, 12:33 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

6. resolved Oct 29, 2026, 12:49 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 28, 2026, 02:12 PM UTC· resolved Oct 28, 2026, 03:28 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 02:12 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 02:15 PM UTC

   We are experiencing issues with upstream model providers resulting in a degraded experience across Copilot services. The team is actively investigating the issue.

3. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 02:33 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the GPT-5.3-Codex, GPT-5.6 Luna, GPT-6.1 Sol, GPT-5.6 Terra, GPT-6 Luna, and MAI Code 1.1 Flash models in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. While we work with them to resolve the issue we recommend choosing another model to continue using Copilot.

4. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 02:55 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the GPT-5.3-Codex, GPT-5.6 Luna, GPT-6.1 Sol, GPT-5.6 Terra, GPT-6 Luna, and MAI Code 1.1 Flash models in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. We have identified the root cause and working to apply a mitigation. While we work to resolve the issue we recommend choosing another model to continue using Copilot.

5. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 03:15 PM UTC

   We have applied the mitigation and are seeing signs of recovery. We will continue to monitor and expect full resolution soon.

6. investigating Oct 28, 2026, 03:24 PM UTC

   Copilot is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

7. monitoring Oct 28, 2026, 03:26 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Copilot has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

8. resolved Oct 28, 2026, 03:28 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 27, 2026, 06:55 AM UTC· resolved Oct 27, 2026, 08:01 AM UTC

1. resolved Oct 27, 2026, 08:00 AM UTC

   Between 0655 and 0801 UTC on 10/27, customers experienced increased failure rates for API and git requests authenticated with server-to-server tokens for GitHub Apps (excluding Actions tokens). During this window, authenticated git operations mistakenly returned 404 for 1.24% (2.6x) of requests on average and 2.49% (5.3x) at peak. These failures were caused by a scheduled maintenance event where GitHub migrated 7 tables between two MySQL clusters in our IAD and Azure Central US datacenters. One of the affected tables stores installation records for GitHub App server-to-server tokens (excluding Actions). We've successfully completed several of these migrations in recent months without notable customer impact. However, in this case, the migration coincided with a scheduled cleanup job on the installation records table, which deleted approximately 59 million records from 0444-0617 UTC. As a result, the gh-ost tooling used in the migration experienced inter-cluster replication delays (up to 1 hour at peak). At 0655 UTC, we begin transitioning reads of the target tables to the new MySQL cluster, with 100% of reads cutover at 0721 UTC. Customer impact began, but was not detected, throughout the read cutover and persisted until completion of the write cutover at 0801 UTC. We are updating our processes and automation to prevent a repeat of this incident, including disabling overlapping cleanup jobs prior to these migrations and blocking the cutover of reads when replication delays are high.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 26, 2026, 06:48 PM UTC· resolved Oct 26, 2026, 06:57 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 26, 2026, 06:48 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for API Requests, Actions, Issues and Pull Requests

2. monitoring Oct 26, 2026, 06:50 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

3. monitoring Oct 26, 2026, 06:54 PM UTC

   We saw elevated latency affecting REST API requests, including Checks, and some Actions, Issues, Pull Requests, and GraphQL functionality. Some requests may have been slow or timed out, and notifications were delayed from 17:59 UTC - 18:40 UTC. We mitigated the issue and all services have recovered.

4. resolved Oct 26, 2026, 06:57 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 23, 2026, 11:41 PM UTC· resolved Oct 24, 2026, 12:23 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 11:41 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot AI Model Providers

2. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 11:42 PM UTC

   We are experiencing degraded availability for the Grok 4.6 and Grok 4.7 models in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. While we work with them to resolve the issue, we recommend choosing another model or selecting 'Auto' to continue using Copilot.

3. monitoring Oct 24, 2026, 12:23 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting Copilot AI Model Providers has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

4. resolved Oct 24, 2026, 12:23 AM UTC

   Between 23:28 and 00:23 UTC on October 27, 2026, GitHub Copilot experienced degradation affecting Grok 4.6 and Grok 4.7 models. Users encountered elevated error rates when using these models. The degradation was caused by an issue with an upstream model provider. GitHub engineers detected the issue through automated monitoring and coordinated with the provider. Our automated model-warning system activated in-product warnings for affected models during the incident. Service returned to normal after the provider implemented a mitigation.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 23, 2026, 02:58 PM UTC· resolved Oct 23, 2026, 06:51 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 02:58 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 03:00 PM UTC

   We’re investigating delays in some Dependabot alerts closing after affected repositories have been updated to address a vulnerability. Alert processing is backed up. We’ll share more information as it becomes available.

3. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 03:39 PM UTC

   We’re scaling alert processing capacity to reduce the backlog causing delays in some Dependabot alerts closing after affected repositories have been updated. We’re continuing to monitor and will share another update as more information becomes available.

4. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 04:11 PM UTC

   We’re continuing to investigate delays in some Dependabot alerts closing after affected repositories are updated. Alert processing remains backed up, and additional processing capacity is rolling out to help reduce the backlog. We’re monitoring the rollout and will share another update as we learn more.

5. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 04:43 PM UTC

   We’re continuing to investigate delays in some Dependabot alerts closing after affected repositories are updated. Alert processing remains backed up, and additional processing capacity is rolling out to help reduce the backlog. We’re monitoring progress and will share another update as we learn more.

6. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 05:27 PM UTC

   Some Dependabot alerts continue to be delayed in closing after repository updates address a vulnerability. We're continuing to investigate and work to restore normal processing.

7. monitoring Oct 23, 2026, 06:36 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

8. resolved Oct 23, 2026, 06:51 PM UTC

   We identified that an advisory-publication driven fan-out was overwhelming Dependabot alert processing on repositories by saturating the queue with its own events, delaying processing of events related to repository pushes. We have now isolated this fan-out and applied a throttle so it runs at a fixed rate and cannot delay other events. This remediation has successfully prevented a new fan-out process impacting users.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 23, 2026, 07:29 AM UTC· resolved Oct 23, 2026, 08:05 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 07:29 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions

2. investigating Oct 23, 2026, 07:31 AM UTC

   We are seeing delays in results from Actions workflows being reported within GitHub starting from 07:07 UTC. Recovery is already being seen but our team is continuing to investigate and monitor performance.

3. monitoring Oct 23, 2026, 07:53 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

4. monitoring Oct 23, 2026, 07:56 AM UTC

   As of 07:27 UTC, Actions results are delivering within normal SLOs again. Thank you for this patience during this period of delayed Actions results delivery. Our team continues to monitor system health and explore refinements to reduce impact to customers in the future.

5. resolved Oct 23, 2026, 08:05 AM UTC

   On October 23, 2026, between 07:06 UTC and 07:27 UTC, GitHub Actions workflow run results were delayed. Job status, check run updates, and logs in the GitHub UI and API updated with an average delay of about 2 minutes, and some updates were delayed by up to about 7 minutes. During this window, a storage dependency that Actions uses to process workflow logs and artifacts throttled our requests. This slowed result processing, causing updates to queue up. The queue was fully processed by 07:27 UTC, shortly after the throttling stopped. To reduce the risk of recurrence, we have added several storage accounts to increase capacity, and we are working on additional steps to continue to scale. We are also working with our storage provider to understand why the throttling occurred, and improving how result processing handles storage throttling and how quickly we detect it.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 22, 2026, 03:28 PM UTC· resolved Oct 23, 2026, 02:30 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 03:28 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions, Issues and Pull Requests

2. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 03:33 PM UTC

   Some users may experience intermittent errors loading Issues, Pull Requests and search results on github.com. We're investigating and working to restore normal service.

3. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 04:08 PM UTC

   Some users continue to experience intermittent errors loading Issues, Pull Requests and search results on github.com. We're investigating and evaluating mitigation options to restore normal service.

4. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 04:26 PM UTC

   API Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

5. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 04:28 PM UTC

   Packages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

6. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 04:35 PM UTC

   API Requests is operating normally.

7. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 04:41 PM UTC

   Some users continue to experience errors loading Issues, Pull Requests, package listings and search results on github.com. We're working through multiple mitigation efforts and continuing to investigate.

8. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 05:16 PM UTC

   We're seeing recovery after adding capacity, with errors decreasing. Some users may still experience errors loading Issues, Pull Requests and search results on github.com. We're continuing to work towards full recovery and monitoring for stability.

9. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 05:41 PM UTC

   Actions, Issues, Packages and Pull Requests are operating normally.

10. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 05:43 PM UTC

    We're seeing recovery across the affected services. GitHub Projects is still recovering as queued updates are processed, and we're continuing to monitor for stability.

11. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 06:26 PM UTC

    The other affected services have recovered. We're continuing to investigate GitHub Projects and verify that normal operation has been restored.

12. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 07:04 PM UTC

    Some updates in GitHub Projects are still delayed. We're continuing mitigation work and monitoring.

13. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 07:56 PM UTC

    Some GitHub Projects updates related to issue changes and merged pull requests are still delayed. We're investigating the remaining delays and working to restore normal processing.

14. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 08:46 PM UTC

    Some GitHub Projects updates, including newly added items and changes to issues and pull requests, remain delayed. We've identified interruptions in update processing and are evaluating mitigations to restore normal operation.

15. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 10:07 PM UTC

    Some GitHub Projects updates, including newly added items and changes to issues and pull requests, are still delayed. We have seen some recovery, and are working to add more capacity to accelerate the recovery.

16. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 11:48 PM UTC

    GitHub Projects update processing has improved, but newly added items may still take longer than expected to appear. We're continuing to work on the remaining delays and monitor recovery.

17. monitoring Oct 23, 2026, 12:55 AM UTC

    The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

18. resolved Oct 23, 2026, 02:30 AM UTC

    This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 22, 2026, 02:18 PM UTC· resolved Oct 22, 2026, 03:18 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 02:18 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions

2. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 02:19 PM UTC

   We’re investigating delays in processing GitHub Actions workflow and step results, along with some repository updates.

3. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 02:35 PM UTC

   Repository update processing has recovered. We’re continuing to work on delays affecting GitHub Actions workflow and step results. We’ll share another update as we make progress.

4. investigating Oct 22, 2026, 03:06 PM UTC

   We’re seeing recovery, and repository update processing has returned to normal. Delays affecting GitHub Actions workflow and step results are continuing to clear as we scale processing capacity; the remaining backlog is expected to take about 20 minutes to drain.

5. monitoring Oct 22, 2026, 03:17 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

6. monitoring Oct 22, 2026, 03:18 PM UTC

   GitHub Actions workflow and step result processing has recovered. Repository update processing has also returned to normal.

7. resolved Oct 22, 2026, 03:18 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 21, 2026, 02:52 PM UTC· resolved Oct 21, 2026, 07:22 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 02:52 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions, Pull Requests and Webhooks

2. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 03:15 PM UTC

   Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

3. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 03:36 PM UTC

   We are investigating delays affecting pull request updates and webhook deliveries. Increased load on our event streaming platform is contributing to hotspots. We are shifting traffic away from affected areas and adding processing capacity; impact is ongoing while these mitigations take effect.

4. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 03:58 PM UTC

   We continue to see delays affecting pull request updates, webhook deliveries, and audit log events. The event streaming platform is showing signs of recovery, and we are monitoring as the impact continues.

5. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 04:17 PM UTC

   Audit log events and Actions workflow status updates continue to be delayed. Pull request updates and webhook deliveries are recovering as we restore event processing and work through backlogs. We’re monitoring the recovery and will share further updates as we learn more.

6. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 04:25 PM UTC

   Audit log events are delayed by up to 100 minutes, and Actions workflow status updates continue to experience extended delays. Pull request updates and webhook deliveries are recovering as we restore event processing and work through backlogs. We’re monitoring recovery and will share further updates as we learn more.

7. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 04:33 PM UTC

   Pull Requests is operating normally.

8. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 04:34 PM UTC

   Audit log events continue to be delayed by up to 110 minutes. Pull request updates have recovered. Actions is recovering, and users should no longer experience impact in Actions. Webhook deliveries continue to recover as we work through backlogs. We are monitoring recovery and will share further updates as we learn more.

9. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 04:57 PM UTC

   Actions and Webhooks are operating normally.

10. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 04:59 PM UTC

    Actions and webhook deliveries have recovered. Audit log events are still delayed by about 100 minutes. We are working through the backlog, and full recovery will take some time. We will share more updates as recovery continues.

11. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 05:09 PM UTC

    Pull request updates, Actions, and webhook deliveries have recovered. Audit log events are recovering and delays are decreasing, but we expect the remaining backlog to take approximately two to three hours to clear. We’re monitoring recovery and will share further updates.

12. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 06:18 PM UTC

    Audit log events are recovering, with delays now below 90 minutes as the remaining backlog is processed. We’ve reduced load on the event-streaming platform and are monitoring recovery. Further updates will follow.

13. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 06:52 PM UTC

    Audit log events continue to recover, with delays now below 70 minutes. We’ve applied mitigations to speed recovery and expect audit logs to fully recover in about 40 minutes. Pull request updates, Actions, and webhook deliveries remain recovered. We are monitoring progress and will share further updates.

14. investigating Oct 21, 2026, 07:22 PM UTC

    Pull request updates, Actions, and webhook deliveries have recovered. Audit log delays are now below 40 minutes, within the healthy threshold, and continue to decrease as the remaining backlog is processed.

15. resolved Oct 21, 2026, 07:22 PM UTC

    This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 19, 2026, 03:49 PM UTC· resolved Oct 19, 2026, 04:56 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 19, 2026, 03:49 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions and Pages

2. investigating Oct 19, 2026, 03:50 PM UTC

   Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

3. investigating Oct 19, 2026, 03:56 PM UTC

   We’re are currently investigating degraded availability affecting GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages and Webhooks. Customers may experience delays in workflow processing, site builds and webhook delivery.

4. investigating Oct 19, 2026, 04:30 PM UTC

   We’re seeing recovery following mitigation and are continuing to monitor. Customers may still experience delays in GitHub Actions workflow status updates, GitHub Pages deployments, and check and workflow webhook events generated by Actions runs.

5. monitoring Oct 19, 2026, 04:56 PM UTC

   Actions, Pages and Webhooks are operating normally.

6. resolved Oct 19, 2026, 04:56 PM UTC

   On October 19, 2026, between 15:24 and 16:52 UTC, GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages, and webhooks generated by Actions were degraded. Live updates on GitHub.com and code search were also degraded for part of this time. No data was lost. Impact - Workflow status updates, logs, and checks were delayed. - 5.13% of jobs on GitHub-hosted runners were delayed in starting, and 0.02% of workflow runs failed. - During the first 30 minutes, 8.47% of requests to the Actions jobs REST API returned errors. Pages deployments and webhooks generated by Actions runs were delayed. An internal Actions service that stores logs and run status lost connections to some of its cache servers in one cloud region and immediately retried them from every server at once. The resulting surge of new connections overloaded a shared network link between our data center and that region, which also disrupted other services that use the same link. We mitigated the incident by moving the Actions service off the affected cache servers and reducing connections from other services on the link. We then processed the delayed Actions work. We are continuing to investigate the cause of the initial connection timeouts. We were already in the process of rolling out a limit on how quickly this service can open new connections, but it was still in shadow mode (logging only, not enforcing) at the time of the incident. We have since fully enforced it and capped the service's concurrent connection attempts. We are extending these limits to other Actions services, adding backoff to retries, limiting how much shared network capacity a single service can use, and improving alerting so we can find the source of connection surges faster.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 15, 2026, 06:31 PM UTC· resolved Oct 15, 2026, 06:56 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 15, 2026, 06:31 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 15, 2026, 06:34 PM UTC

   CCA Automations are experiencing delays when users start an Automation

3. monitoring Oct 15, 2026, 06:53 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

4. resolved Oct 15, 2026, 06:56 PM UTC

   We suspected that CCA Automations were experiencing delays when users start an Automation, but further investigation found that there was no delay or impact to CCA Automations.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 13, 2026, 08:30 PM UTC· resolved Oct 13, 2026, 08:30 PM UTC

1. resolved Oct 13, 2026, 08:30 PM UTC

   On October 13, around 20:42 UTC, an infrastructure failure caused GitHub Actions to have delays showing logs for workflow runs. No logs were lost and the issue has now been resolved and log processing has caught up. The actual workflows producing the logs were not impacted and ran normally and no run delays or check delays occurred.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 12, 2026, 12:21 PM UTC· resolved Oct 12, 2026, 08:16 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 12:21 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions, Issues and Pull Requests

2. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 12:33 PM UTC

   Users may experience issues loading the Actions tab UI, interacting with the Checks API, queueing new Actions runs, creating and updating issues, and requesting PR reviews, including via REST and GraphQL APIs.

3. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 12:57 PM UTC

   We have a mitigation in progress and are monitoring for recovery. Users may also experience delayed web notifications as we mitigate.

4. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 01:02 PM UTC

   Pull Requests is operating normally.

5. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 01:38 PM UTC

   Our initial mitigation was not fully successful, and users may still experience delays and errors with Actions, issues and projects, and notifications are delayed. We're continuing to investigate the root cause and work on additional mitigations.

6. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 02:35 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Issues has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

7. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 02:36 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

8. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 02:37 PM UTC

   We have mitigated the issues with Actions, issues, and projects, and have a mitigation in progress to address the delay with notifications.

9. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 03:19 PM UTC

   We have successfully applied a mitigation for notifications, and notifications have resumed but will continue to be delayed as we work through a backlog.

10. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 03:50 PM UTC

    Notifications have resumed but will continue to be delayed as we work through a backlog.

11. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 05:34 PM UTC

    Web and email notifications continue to be delayed as we work through a backlog of notifications.

12. investigating Oct 12, 2026, 07:28 PM UTC

    Web and email notifications will be delayed for 1 more hour as we are close to completing the backlog of notifications.

13. resolved Oct 12, 2026, 08:16 PM UTC

    On October 12th 2026 11:51 UTC GitHub experienced elevated 500 responses across several application pages. This caused failures on Issues and Pull Requests as well as Projects and Actions. Customers also experienced delayed notifications in their web inbox and via email. The immediate impact to Issues, Pull Requests, Projects, and Actions was mitigated by 12:41 UTC on October 12th. Notifications deliveries to the web inbox and via email were recovering at 15:27 UTC and fully mitigated by 20:16 UTC. The incident was triggered through a latent condition in our notifications delivery pipeline that put a high volume of an expensive query on our sharded database replicas. This reduced available database capacity to serve requests for Issues, Pull Requests, Projects, and Actions. We have fixed the notifications pipeline’s code path that issued the expensive query. We are also improving resilience of the database layer to reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 07, 2026, 05:17 PM UTC· resolved Oct 07, 2026, 06:04 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 05:17 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions, Git Operations, Issues and Pull Requests

2. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 05:25 PM UTC

   We observed widespread impact across GitHub services from 16:52 UTC to 17:01 UTC, and are investigating the root cause. All systems have recovered. This incident is a reoccurrence of the incident from earlier in the day https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7. Durable mitigation is in progress. We will provide another update in 30 minutes.

3. monitoring Oct 07, 2026, 05:27 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

4. monitoring Oct 07, 2026, 06:00 PM UTC

   All systems have recovered. We have applied mitigations and do not anticipate another recurrence.

5. resolved Oct 07, 2026, 06:04 PM UTC

   On October 7, 2026, from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC, GitHub experienced a recurrence of the write-operation outage from earlier that day. Both outages shared the same root cause. Please refer to the combined summary covering both incidents, their impact, and our prevention measures: https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 07, 2026, 03:14 PM UTC· resolved Oct 07, 2026, 04:25 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:14 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Actions, Git Operations and Pull Requests

2. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:14 PM UTC

   Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

3. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:15 PM UTC

   Issues is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

4. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:16 PM UTC

   Webhooks is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.

5. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:21 PM UTC

   Git Operations is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

6. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:24 PM UTC

   We observed widespread impact across GitHub services between 15:06 UTC and 15:16 UTC, and are investigating the root cause. We are seeing all systems recover, and will provide another update shortly.

7. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:25 PM UTC

   Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

8. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:27 PM UTC

   Git Operations is operating normally.

9. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:27 PM UTC

   Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

10. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:31 PM UTC

    The degradation affecting Pull Requests has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

11. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:32 PM UTC

    Actions is operating normally.

12. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:35 PM UTC

    Git Operations is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

13. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:41 PM UTC

    We are observing partial recovery across all systems. We are continuing to monitor and investigate the root cause of the disruption.

14. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:47 PM UTC

    The degradation affecting Issues has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

15. investigating Oct 07, 2026, 03:49 PM UTC

    The degradation affecting Git Operations and Webhooks has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

16. monitoring Oct 07, 2026, 03:49 PM UTC

    The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

17. monitoring Oct 07, 2026, 03:56 PM UTC

    The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

18. monitoring Oct 07, 2026, 03:58 PM UTC

    We are seeing full recovery across all systems including Git Operations, Pull Requests and Actions. We are continuing to investigate the root cause of the disruption between 15:06 UTC and 15:16 UTC, and will share another update shortly.

19. monitoring Oct 07, 2026, 04:23 PM UTC

    Git Operations, Pull Requests and Actions are fully recovered and stable. The root cause has been identified and mitigations are being applied to prevent a reoccurrence.

20. resolved Oct 07, 2026, 04:25 PM UTC

    On October 7, 2026, GitHub had two outages of write operations with the same cause, totaling about 19 minutes. The first ran from 15:06 to 15:16 UTC (about 10 minutes) and the second from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC (about 9 minutes). In both windows, actions that save or change data failed across Git operations, pull requests, issues, GitHub Actions, the API, webhooks, sign-in and authentication, GitHub Apps and OAuth, code scanning, Codespaces, and Copilot. Reading data was largely unaffected. In the first outage, 5.6% of all web and API requests failed, peaking at 8.9%, and more than 12,000 organizations saw failed requests. Up to 26% of Git authentication requests failed, and 17% of Actions workflow runs failed with infrastructure errors. In the second outage, 6.2% of web and API requests failed, peaking at 9.3%, and more than 11,000 organizations were affected. Up to 25% of Git authentication requests failed, and 19% of Actions workflow runs failed. No databases experienced data loss, and operations retried after recovery succeeded. GitHub relies on an internal service that keeps track of which database servers should receive new and updated data. While replacing machines that run this service as part of regular maintenance, one of the new machines started with an outdated copy of its records, which still listed database servers we had already retired. When this node came online, it incorrectly modified routing configuration with the outdated records, routing write requests to non-existent database servers. Each outage ended when one of our established machines with correct configuration became the leader of the quorum and sent the correct configuration. After the first outage, we identified the new machine as the source and paused automated maintenance to stop it from being leader again. At 16:52 UTC, an automated maintenance task that did not honor the pause put it back in charge, and the outage happened again. We shut that machine down at 17:02 UTC and have since removed it, and the automation now honors the pause, which was a new regression due to an update of our puppet infrastructure. To prevent recurrence, we are clearing retired database servers from the service's records before any new machine is added, and we are keeping new machines from being elected leader until their records have been checked. We are also changing our systems to reject configuration that point to servers that don't exist and to keep using the last known-good settings instead. Finally, we are giving responders a faster way to take a misbehaving machine out of service, and adding alerts so changes like this are spotted within seconds. We will share a more detailed write-up of these incidents in our monthly availability report, along with the status of the repairs we are making to prevent issues like these in the future.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 06, 2026, 07:57 PM UTC· resolved Oct 06, 2026, 11:40 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 06, 2026, 07:57 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Pull Requests and Webhooks

2. investigating Oct 06, 2026, 08:04 PM UTC

   Webhooks is operating normally.

3. investigating Oct 06, 2026, 08:12 PM UTC

   Pull Requests is operating normally.

4. investigating Oct 06, 2026, 08:22 PM UTC

   A number of services including issues, pull requests, and webhooks, were briefly degraded, but have now recovered. Enterprise migrations are paused while we validate causes and mitigations.

5. monitoring Oct 06, 2026, 08:26 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

6. investigating Oct 06, 2026, 08:57 PM UTC

   All services are functioning normally except for enterprise migrations, which are still paused. They will resume soon.

7. investigating Oct 06, 2026, 09:29 PM UTC

   We are working towards a mitigation that will allow us to resume processing enterprise migrations.

8. investigating Oct 06, 2026, 10:40 PM UTC

   We are deploying a mitigation and plan to resume migrations shortly thereafter

9. resolved Oct 06, 2026, 11:40 PM UTC

   On October 6, 2026, from 19:44 to 19:50 UTC, GitHub experienced a service outage with elevated error rates peaking at 1.30% of all requests, totaling approximately 1.16 million failed requests. This impacted 12 services across GitHub, including Pull Requests, Webhooks, Repos, OAuth, Git over SSH, Codespaces, and Gists. The incident was triggered by GitHub Enterprise Importer (GEI) making multiple, long duration queries which saturated a database connection pool. Recovery was seen at approximately 19:50 UTC once the migration's calls stopped; GEI migrations were reenabled at 23:32 UTC after a code fix was merged. We have completed a detailed root-cause review and are implementing improved database-health safeguards. We will continue to review and add additional safeguards to prevent future recurrence.

Read the full incident report →

Started Oct 05, 2026, 11:47 PM UTC· resolved Oct 06, 2026, 01:32 AM UTC

1. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 11:47 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 06, 2026, 12:05 AM UTC

   Users may experience issues accessing organization and enterprise billing and licensing pages. We are deploying a mitigation and monitoring for recovery.

3. resolved Oct 06, 2026, 01:32 AM UTC

   On October 5, 2026, between 23:05 UTC and 00:11 UTC on October 6, some users experienced slow page loads, timeouts, and errors when accessing organization and enterprise billing, licensing, and settings pages. On average, the error rate was 1.9% and peaked at 13.8% of requests to the service that powers these pages. This was caused by a networking failure, which disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database services. We mitigated the incident by shifting the database traffic to a healthy region. We are working to make regional database failover faster and more complete, reduce timeouts so these pages fail fast instead of hanging, and add latency-based alerting to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future. We continue to partner with our cloud provider to understand the underlying network failure.

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Started Oct 05, 2026, 07:11 PM UTC· resolved Oct 05, 2026, 10:49 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 07:11 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions

2. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 07:15 PM UTC

   We’re investigating an issue causing delays when assigning GitHub-hosted runners to Actions jobs. Some workflows may take longer to start across runner configurations. Our teams are working to mitigate the issue, and we’ll provide an update as we learn more.

3. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 07:50 PM UTC

   We’re still investigating delays in assigning GitHub-hosted runners, affecting workflow start times across multiple runner configurations. Our teams are working to mitigate the impact; we’ll share another update as we learn more.

4. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 08:39 PM UTC

   We’re continuing to investigate job failures and delays affecting GitHub-hosted runner assignment and workflow start times. Our teams are actively working to mitigate the impact and will provide another update as we learn more.

5. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 08:47 PM UTC

   Actions is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.

6. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 09:09 PM UTC

   In addition to ongoing issues with Actions and Hosted Runners, some customers are also unable to access repository list, licensing and billing pages within their GitHub accounts. We continue to investigate and are working on mitigation.

7. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 09:22 PM UTC

   Pages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

8. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 09:31 PM UTC

   Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

9. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 09:32 PM UTC

   We have applied mitigations to address GitHub Actions failures. Queued jobs are clearing, new jobs are not delayed, and we expect full runner recovery shortly. We continue to monitor for full recovery and are working to mitigate ongoing issues affecting other services, including access to repository lists, licensing, and billing pages.

10. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 09:54 PM UTC

    Actions is operating normally.

11. investigating Oct 05, 2026, 10:40 PM UTC

    Pages is operating normally.

12. resolved Oct 05, 2026, 10:49 PM UTC

    On October 5, 2026, between 18:48 and 22:49 UTC, GitHub Actions and Hosted Runners experienced degraded performance. Over the full incident, 14.3% of workflow runs using GitHub-hosted runners and 26.5% of individual GitHub-hosted jobs did not start within five minutes. During the roughly 90-minute period of highest impact, 47.0% of workflow runs using GitHub-hosted runners failed and 71.9% of GitHub-hosted jobs did not start within five minutes, while existing Pages sites continued to serve normally. A portion of customers also encountered intermittent errors in repository lists, licensing and billing pages, and some Copilot features. Self-hosted runners were not affected. The incident was caused by a partial networking failure that disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database and storage services. We mitigated the incident by shifting database and storage traffic to healthy regions and endpoints and increasing capacity for affected compute services. GitHub Actions and Hosted Runners recovered by 21:54 UTC, and all affected services recovered by 22:49 UTC. We are partnering with our cloud provider to understand the network failure and identify improvements to network-path resilience, detection, and recovery for similar incidents.

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Started Oct 01, 2026, 02:47 PM UTC· resolved Oct 01, 2026, 05:56 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 02:47 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions

2. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 02:54 PM UTC

   We have identified the cause of increased Actions run start delays on Ubuntu runners and are actively deploying a fix. Customers may continue to experience intermittent delays while the mitigation rolls out and service metrics return to normal.

3. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 03:02 PM UTC

   Run-start delays on Ubuntu runners have been resolved. We are investigating run-start delays on Windows runners and will share more information as it becomes available.

4. monitoring Oct 01, 2026, 03:10 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

5. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 03:20 PM UTC

   Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

6. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 03:29 PM UTC

   We are seeing a reoccurrence in run-start delays, and are continuing to investigate to issue. Customers will potentially experience delays of up to ten minutes.

7. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 04:10 PM UTC

   We have identified an issue with our upstream provider which is causing Actions requests to 429 which is creating the delays. We have escalated to the owning team and are investigating how to mitigate the 429s.

8. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 04:48 PM UTC

   We are currently applying a mitigation and anticipate recovery within thirty minutes.

9. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 05:50 PM UTC

   GitHub Actions experienced degraded performance for some hosted runners due to throttling within an upstream Azure dependency. Service capacity has recovered, and we are continuing to monitor while working with Azure on the underlying condition.

10. resolved Oct 01, 2026, 05:56 PM UTC

    On October 1, 2026, GitHub Actions experienced two periods of delayed and failed job starts on GitHub-hosted runners, beginning at approximately 14:15 UTC. Across the 14:15–17:56 UTC incident-response window, approximately 0.68% of workflow runs experienced start delays, and 0.196% of jobs failed to start. A routing change at our cloud provider concentrated API traffic on a single backend, causing an increase in rate-limit errors. Incorrect retry behavior in the provider’s inventory service added load to the affected APIs, compounding the rate limiting. This disrupted runner provisioning and reduced available capacity in affected regions. The resulting increase in demand in unaffected regions exposed a concurrency limit in our job-assignment system, delaying jobs even where runners were available. During the response, we increased job-assignment concurrency, scaled runner capacity, and worked with our cloud provider to reduce API load by excluding our runner subscriptions from its inventory service. By approximately 16:15 UTC, jobs were starting and executing as expected. We continued mitigation and monitoring until the incident was resolved at 17:56 UTC. Our cloud provider has since increased resource-management API rate limits for our workloads. To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents, we are also adding more granular rate-limiting alerts and updating our job-assignment system to handle increased demand across fewer available regions.

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Started Oct 01, 2026, 01:37 PM UTC· resolved Oct 01, 2026, 01:57 PM UTC

1. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 01:37 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.

2. investigating Oct 01, 2026, 01:39 PM UTC

   We are investigating recurrent periods of elevated latency affecting web requests. We’ll share updates as more information becomes available.

3. monitoring Oct 01, 2026, 01:51 PM UTC

   The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

4. resolved Oct 01, 2026, 01:57 PM UTC

   On October 1, 2026, between 13:04 UTC and 13:34 UTC, users experienced two periods of slow page loads and intermittent request failures on GitHub.com. On average, the error rate was 0.52% and peaked at 6.13%. An unusually high volume of incoming traffic placed additional load on our traffic-handling infrastructure, delaying requests before they reached our application servers. Performance returned to normal as the traffic subsided, and we have since applied additional traffic filtering to protect against similar traffic. We are improving alerting for delays in our traffic-handling infrastructure and strengthening our automated traffic protections to reduce our time to detection and mitigation.

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Started Oct 01, 2026, 02:00 AM UTC· resolved Oct 01, 2026, 02:00 AM UTC

1. resolved Oct 01, 2026, 02:00 AM UTC

   On October 1, around 02:00 UTC, an isolated infrastructure failure caused GitHub Actions to lose execution state for a small number of existing workflow runs. Affected runs may remain stuck, fail deployment approvals, or return errors when cancelled. Service connectivity has recovered, but the lost state cannot be restored by retrying an approval. If you're affected, you can trigger a new run or contact GitHub Support with links to your stuck runs so we can unblock them. Once cleared, select "Re-run all jobs." This preserves the workflow run ID but starts a new attempt, rebuilds artifacts, and requires fresh deployment approvals. Before rerunning, check whether any deployment steps already completed to avoid repeating changes.

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