Ongoing DNS Propagation Causing Intermittent Access to Dstny Services

Update timeline

1. identified Sep 17, 2026, 08:36 PM UTC

   We are currently investigating reports of intermittent access issues affecting Dstny services in Sweden (SE). This is impacting access to both production and staging environments for some users due to a DNS-related issue affecting dstny.com and dstny.se. The underlying issue has been resolved by our GIS Cloud team. However, due to DNS propagation and caching across internet service providers and local networks, some customers may continue to experience intermittent connectivity or access issues while DNS records are refreshed. Our teams are actively monitoring the situation and will continue to provide updates every 60 minutes or sooner if significant new information becomes available. We apologise for any inconvenience caused and appreciate your patience during this time. Dstny Support

2. identified Sep 17, 2026, 09:08 PM UTC

   The DNS-related issue affecting dstny.com and dstny.se has been resolved by our GIS Cloud team. However, some customers may continue to experience intermittent access issues to Dstny production and staging environments while DNS changes propagate across internet service providers and local networks. If you are still experiencing connectivity issues, we recommend first clearing your local DNS cache. Customers who are familiar with their network settings may also temporarily switch to a public DNS provider such as Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) or Google DNS (8.8.8.8), both of which have been confirmed to have the correct DNS records. We continue to actively monitor the situation and will provide further updates as required. Dstny Support

3. resolved Sep 18, 2026, 03:49 PM UTC

   We are pleased to confirm that the service issues reported under these two related incidents have now been fully resolved. Over the past 24 hours, we have closely monitored the affected services and have observed no further recurrence or impact. Our investigation determined that this incident and the related incident affecting Dstny Zone were both caused by the same underlying issue. Corrective measures have since been implemented to address the root cause and reduce the likelihood of recurrence. To provide transparency and insight into what occurred, a detailed post-mortem report covering the incident, its impact and the actions taken will be made available within the next five business days. We sincerely apologise for any inconvenience caused and thank you for your patience and understanding throughout this incident. Should you have any further questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact our Support team. Thank you, Dstny Support

4. postmortem Sep 23, 2026, 10:37 AM UTC

   **Incident Summary** From 17:35 UTC on 17th September to 11:00 UTC on 18th September 2026, several Dstny services including Dstny Zone, the Service Management Portal \(SMP\) and voice services such as ConnectMe, Softphone and our Mobile Apps experienced a period of unavailability. We identified the issue at 19:30 UTC on 17th September, following reports of access difficulties. Our engineering teams found that the disruption was caused by a temporary suspension of core domain services, which prevented traffic from reaching the affected platforms. Restoration began immediately. Some services were intermittently restored during the evening as our teams worked through the fix, with full recovery of the majority of services confirmed by 23:14 UTC on 17th September. Final stability checks on the remaining environments were completed the following morning, and the incident was fully resolved by 11:00 UTC on 18th September 2026, with all services confirmed stable. **Root Cause** The incident was caused by an administrative issue relating to our domain registration. A required validation check with our domain registrar was not completed in time, which led to the registrar temporarily suspending the affected domains. This caused a loss of DNS resolution, the system responsible for directing internet traffic to our services, which resulted in unavailability across multiple regions. **Incident Resolution** Our technical teams manually re-established the domain management profiles and restarted the required validation process with the registrar. Once the updated details were confirmed, the suspensions were lifted and traffic resumed normal routing to Dstny services. Following restoration, we migrated all domain contact information to a centralised, monitored management system, so that future registrar notifications are received and acted on promptly. **Mitigative Actions** Improved monitoring: Adding proactive alerting so we're notified directly by our registration provider if a domain is at risk of suspension, rather than relying solely on internal processes. Stronger registrar coordination: Reviewing what happened with our registrar around the time of the incident, and improving communication workflows with external registration partners more broadly. Reduced single points of failure: Assessing whether voice services can use fallback domain names, so they're not dependent on a single domain. Supplier process audit: Conducting a full audit of our registration provider as part of our broader third-party supplier management review. **Timeline** _Prior to 17th Sept_ - An administrative issue with domain contact details was identified following a change in domain management. A request to correct this was submitted but not resolved in time. * 17th Sept 2026, 19:30 - We identified access issues affecting Dstny Zone and began investigating. * 17th Sept 2026, 20:07 - Monitoring confirmed that voice services were also affected. * 17th Sept 2026, 20:20 - Investigation confirmed that a domain suspension was the cause of the outage. Corrected contact details were submitted and services began to recover. * 17th Sept 2026, 21:01 - A further suspension notice was received, showing the issue had not been fully resolved. * 17th Sept 2026, 22:00 - Additional corrective action was taken to finalise the validation process with the registrar. * 17th Sept 2026, 23:14 - All affected domains were confirmed reinstated, restoring the majority of services. * 18th Sept 2026 - Domain contact details were migrated to a centralised, monitored system as a permanent fix. * 18th Sept 2026, 11:00 - Final checks confirmed all environments were stable, and the incident was formally resolved.

5. postmortem Sep 25, 2026, 08:49 AM UTC

   **Incident Summary** From 17:35 UTC on 17th September to 11:00 UTC on 18th September 2026, several Dstny services including Dstny Zone, the Service Management Portal \(SMP\) and voice services such as ConnectMe, Softphone and our Mobile Apps experienced a period of unavailability. We identified the issue at 19:30 UTC on 17th September, following reports of access difficulties. Our engineering teams found that the disruption was caused by a temporary suspension of core domain services, which prevented traffic from reaching the affected platforms. Restoration began immediately. Some services were intermittently restored during the evening as our teams worked through the fix, with full recovery of the majority of services confirmed by 23:14 UTC on 17th September. Final stability checks on the remaining environments were completed the following morning, and the incident was fully resolved by 11:00 UTC on 18th September 2026, with all services confirmed stable. **Root Cause** The incident was caused by an issue on our domain registrar's side. While processing an unrelated administrative change, the registrar set a contact address on our account to one of their own addresses rather than ours. As a result, a subsequent domain verification request did not reach us, and when the verification deadline passed without a response, the registrar suspended the affected domains. This caused a loss of DNS resolution, the system responsible for directing internet traffic to our services, resulting in unavailability across multiple regions. **Incident Resolution** Once the cause was identified, our technical teams worked to have the domains reinstated. An initial attempt to resolve the suspension by moving the domains to an already-verified account did not fully resolve the issue, due to a separate technical fault on the registrar's side. Our teams then established a new domain management profile and completed the full verification process again. Once the registrar confirmed the updated details, the suspensions were lifted and traffic resumed normal routing to Dstny services. Following the incident, we have migrated all domain contact information to a centralised, monitored management system on our side, and worked with our registrar to ensure future verification requests are communicated directly to Dstny rather than through third-party intermediary addresses. **Mitigative Actions** Improved monitoring: Adding proactive alerting so we're notified directly by our registration provider if a domain is at risk of suspension, rather than relying solely on internal processes. Stronger registrar coordination: Reviewing what happened with our registrar around the time of the incident, and improving communication workflows with external registration partners more broadly. Reduced single points of failure: Assessing whether voice services can use fallback domain names, so they're not dependent on a single domain. Supplier process audit: Conducting a full audit of our registration provider as part of our broader third-party supplier management review. **Timeline** Following an unrelated administrative change made by our registrar, a contact address on our domain account was set to a third-party address rather than one belonging to Dstny. As a result, a subsequent routine verification request from the registrar was not received by our team. * 17 Sept 2026, 19:30 - We identified access issues affecting Dstny Zone and began investigating. * 17 Sept 2026, 20:07 - Monitoring confirmed that voice services were also affected. * 17 Sept 2026, 20:20 - Investigation confirmed that a domain suspension was the cause of the outage. Corrected contact details were submitted and services began to recover. * 17 Sept 2026, 21:01 - A further suspension notice was received, showing the issue had not been fully resolved. * 17 Sept 2026, 22:00 - Additional corrective action was taken to finalise the validation process with the registrar. * 17 Sept 2026, 23:14 - All affected domains were confirmed reinstated, restoring the majority of services. * 18 Sept 2026 - Domain contact details were migrated to a centralised, monitored system as a permanent fix. * 18 Sept 2026, 11:00 - Final checks confirmed all environments were stable, and the incident was formally resolved.