Commerce Layer Outage History

Commerce Layer is up right now

Pingoru has recorded 14 incidents for Commerce Layer: 2 in the last 12 months and 1 in the last 90 days.

Source: status.commercelayer.io

14incidents recorded
2last 12 months
1last 90 days
10 hourstypical duration
Incidents per month
012AprMayJunJulAugSepOct0
Share of hours with an open incident, any severity
0%50%100%AprMayJunJulAugSepOct0%
Pingoru began tracking Commerce Layer in April 2026, so earlier months are not shown. Hover a bar for its value.
Show as a table
MonthIncidentsHours with an open incident
April 202600 of 720 (0%)
May 202600 of 744 (0%)
June 202600 of 720 (0%)
July 202600 of 744 (0%)
August 202610 of 744 (0%)
September 202600 of 720 (0%)
October 202600 of 579 (0%)

Incidents, newest first

Critical August 3, 2026 August 2026: Commerce Layer major outage on Commerce API 11m Commerce API, Dashboard

Started Aug 03, 2026, 05:02 AM UTC· resolved Aug 03, 2026, 05:13 AM UTC

  1. resolved Aug 03, 2026, 07:29 AM UTC

    During a routine automated update of the EU database, the procedure couldn't complete and the DB couldn't return to normal operations. Our monitoring systems alerted immediately our team, that could restart the procedure manually and completed it in a few minutes. Root cause analysis currently in progress.

  2. postmortem Aug 04, 2026, 08:31 AM UTC

    # Summary On Aug 3rd, 2026, from \`5:02 AM UTC\` till \`5:13 AM UTC\`, a routine automated update process failed to complete, causing a major downtime of our EU Database cluster. Monitoring system alerted immediately our team, that started a manual override of the process, taking it to a successful end. # Leadup While our recurrent automated DB update process was running on the EU database it encountered an unexpected condition, that prevented the process to complete, leaving the cluster in an unconsistent state. # Fault Some database engine items were not in the expected condition for the update to complete correctly and that caused the update to fail. # Detection Moments after the initial failure of the automated process, our monitoring system alerted our infrastructure team. # Root Cause Logical replication feature was not in the proper state after some previous replication activity in the cluster. The current update process couldn't detect this situation in advance to avoid starting at all. # Mitigation and resolution A few minutes after the beginning of the issue, our operators were able to reset the inconsistent parameters and apply the manual update procedure. # Corrective and Preventative Measures We are introducing a more robust update process that, by design, will not be prone to similar issues and will consistently limit the overall risk of errors during to database updates.

Read the full incident report →

Minor November 18, 2025 Dashboard suffered from third party CDN issue 20h 14m Dashboard

Started Nov 18, 2025, 12:20 PM UTC· resolved Nov 19, 2025, 08:34 AM UTC

  1. monitoring Nov 18, 2025, 12:20 PM UTC

    The Dashboard was not accessible for a few minutes. This is due to a currently ongoing incident on a third party CDN (https://www.cloudflarestatus.com/incidents/8gmgl950y3h7). They are actively investigating and working on a fix. The dashboard looks accessible in this moment, but we cannot exclude other disservices until the issue is not resolved on their side. We'll keep the situation monitored.

  2. monitoring Nov 18, 2025, 02:56 PM UTC

    The CDN provider has confirmed a fix has been implemented. The issue seems to be resolved, but we'll continue to monitor the situation before closing the incident.

  3. resolved Nov 19, 2025, 08:34 AM UTC

    The issue has been resolved.

Read the full incident report →

Major May 23, 2025 May 2025: Commerce Layer major outage 1d

Started May 23, 2025, 05:50 AM UTC· resolved May 24, 2025, 05:50 AM UTC

  1. resolved May 26, 2025, 05:11 PM UTC

    After a scheduled deployment, some customers experienced mismatched data responses on their interactions with our services. After detecting a major issue, we initiated the roll-back procedure, reverting our services to the previous code version. Root cause analysis currently in progress.

  2. postmortem May 26, 2025, 05:12 PM UTC

    # **Summary** On May 23rd, 2025, from \`5:50 AM UTC\` till \`7:03 AM UTC\`, after a scheduled deployment, some customers experienced mismatched data responses on their interactions with our services. Realizing that it was a major issue, we initiated the roll-back procedure, reverting our services to the previous code version. # **Leadup** At \`5:50 AM UTC\` we concluded a deployment that included an upgrade of a third party provider library. The deployment introduced errors on several sessions. # **Fault** Some sessions with tokens requested during the affected timeframe might have experienced issues with add to cart functionality and checkout. In particular, adding items to cart and placing orders was not always feasible. In addition to this, some placed orders were missing approved\_at and reference data. # **Detection** A few minutes after the release, one of our operators detected an anomaly on the internal metrics dashboard that was confirmed by our clients requests to the support team. # **Root Cause** The upgrade of a third party provider library that manages low level web request wrappers introduced problems in our APIs that have not been detected by our tests in preprod and qa environments. The upgrade was recommended to keep our services up to speed with the latest security patches and compatibility with other components. # **Mitigation and resolution** A few minutes after the release, once we realized the severity of the issue, we decided to roll-back to the previous version of the code in order to immediately restore normal operations and allow a deeper understanding of the root cause offline. In addition to the roll-back, a partial CDN cache purge was performed to reduce the TTL of the wrong data. # **Corrective and Preventative Measures** We are introducing additional automatic tests related to the involved component and other similar patterns.

Read the full incident report →