StatusPage Outage History

Started Apr 09, 2026, 07:10 AM UTC· resolved Apr 09, 2026, 07:38 AM UTC

1. investigating Apr 09, 2026, 07:10 AM UTC

   Customers might intermittently experience issues when accessing Statuspage capabilities.

2. investigating Apr 09, 2026, 07:35 AM UTC

   Issue has been resolved.

3. resolved Apr 09, 2026, 07:38 AM UTC

   StatusPage is operational and issue has been resolved.

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Started Mar 19, 2026, 10:52 PM UTC· resolved Mar 27, 2026, 07:08 AM UTC

1. investigating Mar 19, 2026, 10:52 PM UTC

   We are investigating a processing delay affecting system metrics. We are working on a fix and will update you shortly.

2. monitoring Mar 20, 2026, 01:39 PM UTC

   The latency-reduction fix for system metrics has been deployed, and we are actively monitoring its performance.

3. monitoring Mar 27, 2026, 07:08 AM UTC

   The latency fix is confirmed stable across all integrations, and we are closing this issue as resolved.

4. resolved Mar 27, 2026, 07:08 AM UTC

   The latency fix is confirmed stable across all integrations, and we are closing this issue as resolved.

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Started Feb 26, 2026, 06:18 AM UTC· resolved Mar 13, 2026, 06:27 PM UTC

1. investigating Feb 26, 2026, 06:18 AM UTC

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting the display of system metrics on statuspages.

2. identified Feb 26, 2026, 02:11 PM UTC

   System Metrics fix has been rolled out to majority of the customers. We will continue a gradual rollout to other customers and monitor progress closely.

3. monitoring Feb 27, 2026, 07:50 AM UTC

   System metrics has been fixed for all customers.

4. resolved Mar 13, 2026, 06:27 PM UTC

   The issue has been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

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Started Feb 10, 2026, 09:48 PM UTC· resolved Feb 10, 2026, 11:02 PM UTC

1. investigating Feb 10, 2026, 09:48 PM UTC

   We are actively investigating reports of an intermittent partial service disruption affecting Statuspage. We'll share updates here as more information is available.

2. monitoring Feb 10, 2026, 10:37 PM UTC

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

3. resolved Feb 10, 2026, 11:02 PM UTC

   On February 10, 2026, affected Statuspage users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

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Started Feb 02, 2026, 10:56 AM UTC· resolved Feb 02, 2026, 04:40 PM UTC

1. identified Feb 02, 2026, 10:56 AM UTC

   Customers may be experiencing issues accessing Statuspage via the API due to the deprecation of existing keys. Our team is actively working on the fix and will provide an update soon. In the meantime, as a workaround, please generate new credentials with a Statuspage API key and update your integrations accordingly.

2. monitoring Feb 02, 2026, 03:47 PM UTC

   We have started rolling out a fix and are currently monitoring its impact. We’ll share an update as soon as the issue has been fully resolved.

3. resolved Feb 02, 2026, 04:40 PM UTC

   The incident has been resolved.

4. postmortem Mar 11, 2026, 03:53 AM UTC

   On 2 February 2026 between 08:52 and 16:40 UTC, some Statuspage customers’ API-based integrations started failing with authorization errors when a planned cleanup of old API keys unintentionally disabled new keys as well. Statuspage UI and core product functions remained available. We provided a workaround by creating new API keys and then fully restored affected keys from a point‑in‑time database backup. We are implementing safeguards around bulk key operations, improved detection of abnormal API error rates, and stronger operational checks for similar maintenance activities to reduce the likelihood and duration of similar incidents in the future.

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Started Oct 29, 2025, 10:00 AM UTC· resolved Oct 29, 2025, 10:00 AM UTC

1. resolved Oct 29, 2025, 10:37 AM UTC

   On October 29th, between 9:50 UTC and 10:04 UTC, some Statuspage customers using custom domains may have experienced downtime. Once we identified the root cause of the issue, we took swift action to resolve it. We have verified that the service is now fully restored and operational. Our team is closely monitoring the situation to ensure continued stability. We will conduct an internal review of this incident and implement necessary improvements to our systems to prevent or reduce the likelihood of similar occurrences in the future.

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Started Oct 24, 2025, 04:06 AM UTC· resolved Oct 24, 2025, 04:22 AM UTC

1. monitoring Oct 24, 2025, 04:06 AM UTC

   We have identified a change which affected the availability of public status pages with custom domain. The change has been rolled back and we are monitoring.

2. monitoring Oct 24, 2025, 04:15 AM UTC

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

3. resolved Oct 24, 2025, 04:22 AM UTC

   We identified a configuration change to our edge networking that affected our ability to route traffic for Public Statuspages that use a custom domain. This occurred from 02:55 to 03:13 UTC, at which point the issue was rectified. During this period, the ability to view these status pages was unavailable, but the ability to manage them remained functional, ensuring that no updates or notifications were lost.

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Started Oct 20, 2025, 08:00 AM UTC· resolved Oct 20, 2025, 08:00 AM UTC

1. resolved Oct 21, 2025, 09:48 AM UTC

   Atlassian Cloud services were impacted due to an incident with our public cloud provider. During this issue, Atlassian's internal services were affected which could have led to intermittent issues while logging into manage.statuspage.io for some of our customers. This issue is resolved and the product is fully functional as of Oct 21, 2025 - 05:24 UTC.

2. postmortem Oct 28, 2025, 05:43 AM UTC

   ### Postmortem publish date: Nov 19th, 2025 Summary All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. Customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 04:05. The service disruptions were triggered due to an [AWS DynamoDB outage](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=1%3A50%20PM.-,DynamoDB,-Between%2011%3A48) and further affected by subsequent failures in [AWS EC2](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) and [AWS Network Load Balancer](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) within the us-east-1 region. The incident started at Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and was detected within six minutes by our automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore all core services by Oct 21, 2025 04:05. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues was completed on Oct 22, 2025. We recognize the critical role our products play in your daily operations, and we offer our sincere apologies for any impact this incident had on your teams. We are taking immediate steps to enhance the reliability and performance of our services, so that you continue to receive the standard of service you have come to trust. ### IMPACT Before examining product-level impacts, it's helpful to understand Atlassian's service topology and internal dependencies. Products such as Jira and Confluence are deployed across multiple AWS regions. The data for each tenant is stored and processed exclusively within its designated host region. This design is intentional and represents the desired operational state, as it limits the impact of any regional outage strictly to tenants in-region, in this case us-east-1. While in-scope application data is pinned to the region selected by the customer, there are times when systems need to call other internal services that may be based in a different region. If a problem occurs in the main region where these services operate, systems are designed to automatically fail over to a backup region, usually within three minutes. However, if unexpected issues arise during this failover, it can take longer to restore services. In rare cases, this could affect customers in more than one region. It’s important to note that all in-scope application data for supported products is pinned according to a customer’s chosen region. **Jira** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 20:00, customers with tenants hosted in the us-east-1 region experienced increased error rates when accessing core entities such as Issues, Boards, and Backlogs. This disruption was caused by AWS's inability to allocate AWS EC2 instances and elevated errors in AWS Network Load Balancer \(NLB\). During this window, users may also have observed intermittent timeouts, slow page loads, and failures when performing operations like creating or updating issues, loading board views, and executing workflow transitions. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced elevated failure rates when attempting to load Jira pages. This disruption was caused by the regional frontend service entering an unhealthy state during this specific time interval. Normally, the frontend service connects to the primary AWS DynamoDB instance located in the us-east-1 to retrieve the most recent configuration data necessary for proper operation. Additionally, the service is designed with a fallback mechanism that references static configuration data in the event that the primary database becomes inaccessible. Unfortunately, a latent bug existed in the local fallback path. When the frontend service nodes restarted, they were unable to load critical operational configuration data from primary or fallback sources, leading to the observed failures experienced by customers. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 06:30, customers experienced significant delays and missing Jira in-app notifications across all regions. The notification ingestion service, which is hosted exclusively in us-east-1, exhibited an increased failure rate when processing notification messages due to AWS EC2 and NLB issues. This issue resulted in notifications being delayed - and in some cases, not delivered at all - to users worldwide. **Jira Service Management \(JSM\)** JSM was impacted similarly to Jira above, with the same timeframes and for the same reasons. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced significantly elevated failure rates when attempting to load JSM pages. This affected all JSM experiences including the Help Centre, Portal, Queues, Work Items, Operations, and Alerts. **Confluence** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 02:45, customers using Confluence in the us-east-1 region experienced elevated failure rates when performing common operations such as editing pages or adding comments. The primary cause of this service degradation was the system's inability to auto-scale due to AWS EC2 issues to manage peak traffic load effectively. Though the AWS outage ended at Oct 20, 21:09, a subset of customers continued to experience failures as some Confluence web server nodes across multiple clusters remained in an unhealthy state. This was ultimately mitigated by recycling the affected nodes. To protect our systems while AWS recovered, we made a deliberate decision to enable node termination protection. This action successfully preserved our server capacity but, as a trade-off, it extended the time required for a full recovery once AWS services were restored. **Automation** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 23:59, automation customers whose rules are processed in us-east-1 experienced delays of up to 23 hours in rule execution. During this window, some events triggering rule executions were processed out of order because they arrived later during backlog processing. This caused potential inconsistencies in workflow executions, as rules were run in the order events were received, not when the action causing the event occurred. Additionally, some rule actions failed because they depend on first-party and third-party systems, which were also affected by the AWS outage. Customers can see most of these failures in their audit logs; however, a few updates were not logged due to the nature of the outage. By Oct 21, 2025 5:30, the backlog of rule runs in us-east-1 was cleared. Although most of these delayed rules were successfully handled, there were some additional replays of events to ensure completeness. Our investigation confirmed that a few events may never have triggered their associated rules due to the outage. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 11:20, all non-us-east-1 regional automation services experienced delays of up to 4 hours in rule execution. This was caused by an upstream service that was unable to deliver events as expected. The delivery service encountered a failure due to a cross-region dependency call to a service hosted in the us-east-1 region. Because of this dependency issue, the delivery service was unable to successfully deliver events throughout this time frame, resulting in customer-defined rules not being executed in a timely manner. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:33, Bitbucket experienced intermittent unavailability across core services. During this period, users faced increased error rates and latency when signing in, navigating repositories, and performing essential actions such as creating, updating, or approving pull requests. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage that impacted downstream services. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 22:46, numerous Bitbucket Pipeline steps failed to start, stalled mid-execution, or experienced significant queueing delays. Impact varied, with partial recoveries followed by degradation as downstream components re-synchronized. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage, compounded by instability in AWS EC2 instance availability and AWS Network Load Balancers. Furthermore, Bitbucket Pipelines continued to experience a low but persistent rate of step timeouts and scheduling errors due to AWS bare-metal capacity shortages in select availability zones. Atlassian coordinated with AWS to provision additional bare-metal hosts and addressed a significant backlog of pending pods, successfully restoring services by 01:30 on Oct 21, 2025. **Trello** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 15:25, users of Trello experienced widespread service degradation and intermittent failures due to upstream AWS issues affecting multiple components, including AWS DynamoDB and subsequent AWS EC2 capacity constraints. During this period, customers reported elevated error rates when loading boards, opening cards, adding comments or attachments. **Login** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, a small subset of users experienced failures when attempting to initiate new login sessions using SAML tokens. This resulted in an inability for those users to access Atlassian products during that time period. However, users who already had valid active sessions were not affected by this issue and continued to have uninterrupted access. The issue impacted all regions globally because regional identity services relied on a write replica located in the us-east-1 region to synchronize profile data. When the primary region became unavailable, the failover to a secondary database in another region failed, which delayed recovery. This failover defect has since been addressed. **Statuspage** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, Statuspage customers who were not already logged in to the management portal were unable to log in to create or update incident statuses. This impact was restricted only to users who were not already logged in at the time. The root cause was the same as described in the Login section above, and it was resolved by the same remediation steps. ### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS We have completed the following critical actions designed to help prevent cross-region impact from similar issues: * Resolved the code defect in the fallback option to ensure that Jira Frontend Services in other regions remain unaffected during a region-wide outage. * Fixed the issue that prevented timely failover of the identity service which impacted new login sessions. * Resolved the code defect so that delivery services in unaffected regions remain operational during region-wide outages. Additionally, we are prioritizing the following improvement actions: * Implement mitigation strategies to strengthen resilience against region-wide outages in the notification ingestion service. Although disruptions to our cloud services are sometimes unavoidable during outages of the underlying cloud provider, we continuously evaluate and improve test coverage to strengthen resilience of our cloud services against these issues. We recognize the critical importance of our products to your daily operations and overall productivity, and we extend our sincere apologies for any disruptions this incident may have caused your teams. If you were impacted and require additional details for internal post-incident reviews, please reach out to your Atlassian support representative with affected timeframes and tenant identifiers so we can correlate logs and provide guidance. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

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Started Feb 13, 2025, 07:22 PM UTC· resolved Mar 11, 2025, 07:52 AM UTC

1. investigating Feb 13, 2025, 07:22 PM UTC

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. investigating Feb 14, 2025, 07:07 AM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. identified Feb 19, 2025, 09:55 AM UTC

   We have determined that the connectivity issue is due to a DNS name resolution problem affecting certain ISPs in Brazil, which are unable to resolve *.statuspage.io domains. This issue does not impact all Brazilian customers and subscribers; it varies depending on the customer's or subscriber's ISP. Customers using custom domains for their status pages are not affected. While your Statuspage remains available, ISP configurations are preventing traffic from resolving the Statuspage domain. We are exploring mitigation strategies, but we advise affected customers to contact their ISP to understand why their ISP cannot resolve *.statuspage.io domains.

4. identified Feb 20, 2025, 03:43 PM UTC

   Please follow the steps mentioned in the below link to mitigate the DNS issues in Brazil for statuspage.io domains: https://community.atlassian.com/t5/Statuspage-articles/Mitigation-steps-for-statuspage-io-domain-ISP-Issues-in-Brazil/ba-p/2951025#M274

5. identified Feb 25, 2025, 02:29 PM UTC

   We are actively working with ISPs to resolve the current issues and to better understand the recent changes that have contributed to these problems. We also encourage our customers to contact their ISPs, as this appears to be an ISP-specific issue. Our investigation show that statuspage.io domains can be resolved using Google or Cloudflare DNS resolvers, such as 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8. Please refer to the steps outlined in our community post to access all Statuspage-based domains effectively. https://community.atlassian.com/t5/Statuspage-articles/Mitigation-steps-for-statuspage-io-domain-ISP-Issues-in-Brazil/ba-p/2951025#M274

6. resolved Mar 11, 2025, 07:52 AM UTC

   After a thorough investigation, we have determined that the recent connectivity issues experienced for statuspage.io domains in Brazil were isolated to specific Internet Service Providers (ISPs) within Brazil and there was no impact or issue with Statuspage’s infrastructure and DNS configurations itself. Our team is actively monitoring the situation and trying our best to reach out to the relevant ISPs to ensure that access issues are resolved for all affected users. If connectivity issues persist, and you are located in Brazil, we kindly ask that you open a support request with your internet service provider or follow our community post to resolve the issue. https://community.atlassian.com/forums/Statuspage-articles/Mitigation-steps-for-statuspage-io-domain-ISP-Issues-in-Brazil/ba-p/2951025#M274

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Started Nov 09, 2024, 09:28 AM UTC· resolved Nov 09, 2024, 10:10 AM UTC

1. identified Nov 09, 2024, 09:28 AM UTC

   We are investigating server errors. We have isolated the problem and applied the fix.

2. monitoring Nov 09, 2024, 09:39 AM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. resolved Nov 09, 2024, 10:10 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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