Fluid Attacks incident

General service disruption due to Cloudflare outage

Critical Resolved View vendor source →

Fluid Attacks experienced a critical incident on November 18, 2025 affecting Platform and Agent, lasting 36m. The incident has been resolved; the full update timeline is below.

Started
Nov 18, 2025, 02:34 PM UTC
Resolved
Nov 18, 2025, 03:10 PM UTC
Duration
36m
Detected by Pingoru
Nov 18, 2025, 02:34 PM UTC

Affected components

PlatformAgent

Update timeline

  1. identified Nov 18, 2025, 02:34 PM UTC

    An ongoing widespread disruption in Cloudflare's core services is currently impacting our platform, the Agent, and all API-dependent services. Click for details: https://www.cloudflarestatus.com/

  2. resolved Nov 18, 2025, 03:37 PM UTC

    The incident has been resolved, and all Fluid Attacks services are now operating normally.

  3. postmortem Nov 18, 2025, 04:11 PM UTC

    **Impact** At least one user experienced service interruptions across the platform, the agent, and all API-dependent functionalities. The issue started on UTC-5 25-11-18 08:58 and was proactively discovered 14.4 minutes \(TTD\) later by one of our monitoring tools, which detected a generalized degradation in service availability, which aligned with a major [Cloudflare incident](https://www.cloudflarestatus.com/incidents/8gmgl950y3h7) affecting global traffic routing. As a result, several core operations across our ecosystem were temporarily unable to function as expected. The problem was resolved in 43.2 minutes \(TTF\), resulting in a total window of exposure of 57.6 minutes \(WOE\). **Cause** Cloudflare experienced a global network performance issue that affected its edge infrastructure. Because Cloudflare is part of the delivery path for our services, the degradation prevented requests from being routed and processed correctly, resulting in timeouts and temporary unavailability. **Solution** No internal action was required. Once Cloudflare resolved the underlying network issue and service performance returned to normal, all affected components on our side recovered automatically. **Conclusion** This event reinforces the operational impact that third-party infrastructure outages can have on our services. We will continue closely monitoring external provider incidents and evaluating ways to improve resilience and early detection for future occurrences. **THIRD\_PARTY\_ERROR**