Fastly Outage History

Started Aug 24, 2026, 03:16 PM UTC· resolved Aug 24, 2026, 03:56 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 24, 2026, 03:16 PM UTC

   We are investigating an issue causing Next-Gen Waf (NGWAF) dashboard to display blank or missing performance data for some customers. This is a visible issue only - NGWAF protection and services are no impacted. Our engineers are actively working to diagnose the contributing factor. We will provide another update as more information becomes available or within the hour All other products and services are unaffected by this incident

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Started Aug 24, 2026, 02:00 PM UTC· resolved Aug 24, 2026, 07:30 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 24, 2026, 02:00 PM UTC

   Between 14:00 UTC and 19:30 UTC on August 24, 2026, the "Forgot your password" functionality on manage.fastly.com was temporarily unavailable for all Fastly account users while our team performed maintenance. During this window, customers attempting to reset their password via the Fastly Control Panel may have been unable to complete the request. No other account functionality was affected. Our engineering team completed the maintenance and confirmed the password reset flow was fully restored as of 19:30 UTC. No further action is needed from customers. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

2. resolved Aug 24, 2026, 07:30 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 23, 2026, 04:00 PM UTC· resolved Aug 26, 2026, 12:50 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 24, 2026, 03:20 PM UTC

   We are investigating an issue causing Next-Gen WAF (NGWAF) dashboard to display blank or missing performance data for some customers. This is a visible issue only - NGWAF protection and services are no impacted. Our engineers are actively working to diagnose the contributing factor. We will provide another update as more information becomes available or within the hour All other products and services are unaffected by this incident

2. investigating Aug 24, 2026, 03:55 PM UTC

   Our engineers believe we have identified contributing factor causing missing dashboard data in NGWAF. NGWAF protection and service are not impacted — this affects dashboard visibility only. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

3. monitoring Aug 24, 2026, 04:16 PM UTC

   Engineering has deployed a fix and have confirmed a gradual recovery to missing NGWAF dashboard data. Dashboard data is gradually backfilling and catching up — no data has been lost. Engineers are continuing to monitor the recovery. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

4. resolved Aug 26, 2026, 12:50 AM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed that our NGWAF Dashboard Data has been fully restored. Customers may have experienced blank or missing data from 16:00 on August 23 to 00:42 on August 26 UTC. This incident is resolved. Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team. Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2026-08-24 15:20:57 UTC

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Started Aug 23, 2026, 01:06 AM UTC· resolved Aug 23, 2026, 01:51 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 23, 2026, 01:06 AM UTC

   Between 01:06 UTC and 01:51 UTC on August 23, 2026, Fastly Engineers detected a performance impacting event affecting the Tokyo (NRT), Chicago (CHI), Columbus (CMH), Los Angeles (BUR), Phoenix (PHX), Toronto (YYZ), Los Angeles (LAX), Los Angeles (HHR) Points of Presence (POPs). During this time, customers with traffic routed through these locations may have experienced elevated error rates or latency. All other data centers and services were unaffected. The issue has been resolved and we are monitoring performance closely.

2. resolved Aug 23, 2026, 01:51 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 22, 2026, 01:20 AM UTC· resolved Aug 22, 2026, 04:42 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 22, 2026, 04:04 AM UTC

   We are investigating elevated errors to our Chicago (CHI) Point of Presence (POP). All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

2. investigating Aug 22, 2026, 04:06 AM UTC

   We have identified the cause of elevated latency affecting a subset of edge POPs served by our Chicago (CHI) shield. Engineers are actively working on a mitigation. We understand how critical this service is to your operations and apologize for the disruption. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

3. monitoring Aug 22, 2026, 04:28 AM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed the impact to the subset of edge POPs served by our Chicago (CHI) shield has been mitigated.

4. resolved Aug 22, 2026, 04:42 AM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed that a subset of edge POPs served by our Chicago (CHI) shield has been fully restored. Customers may have experienced elevated latency from 01:20 to 04:05 UTC. This incident is resolved. Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team. Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2026-08-22 04:06:19 UTC

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Started Aug 20, 2026, 09:24 PM UTC· resolved Aug 20, 2026, 10:05 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 09:24 PM UTC

   Traffic in Honolulu (HNL) has been temporarily rerouted. All other locations and services are unaffected.

2. resolved Aug 20, 2026, 10:05 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 20, 2026, 04:59 PM UTC· resolved Aug 20, 2026, 05:12 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 04:59 PM UTC

   Between approximately 16:59 and 17:12 UTC on August 20, 2026, some customers experienced difficulty accessing the manage.fastly.com dashboard, including blank pages and login issues. This incident did not impact API endpoints on api.fastly.com. This issue has been fully resolved and all customers should now have normal access to manage.fastly.com. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused. Our engineering team has identified the contributing factor and is implementing measures to prevent recurrence.

2. resolved Aug 20, 2026, 05:12 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 20, 2026, 06:21 AM UTC· resolved Aug 20, 2026, 11:09 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 06:21 AM UTC

   Our engineers have identified a contributing factor causing reduced cache-hit performance for a subset of cache infrastructure serving Compute customers. Affected customers may see temporarily elevated origin load. A fix is being deployed to the affected nodes. Due to the scope of the change, full deployment will take some time. We will post updates as the rollout progresses. All other products and services remain unaffected by this incident.

2. monitoring Aug 20, 2026, 08:12 AM UTC

   We have identified the cause of reduced cache-hit ratio and elevated origin load affecting a subset of Compute customers using caching, and have deployed a fix. The fix is being rolled out gradually across affected sites and cache nodes, timed to off-peak windows to minimize any additional disruption. Some locations have already completed the rollout; others remain in progress. We are actively monitoring recovery and will provide another update as the rollout completes.

3. resolved Aug 20, 2026, 11:09 PM UTC

   We're updating this incident with corrected details following further investigation. The actual impact was delayed purge processing for a subset of sites, caused by slower purge handling in our object caching software introduced in a recent release — not a broader Edge Cloud Service issue as previously described. This resulted in an elevated purge backlog and, for affected sites, previously cached content could be served longer than expected until the backlog cleared. This incident is resolved.

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Started Aug 19, 2026, 06:48 PM UTC· resolved Aug 19, 2026, 08:29 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 19, 2026, 06:48 PM UTC

   Traffic in Ambala (QAA) has been temporarily rerouted. All other locations and services are unaffected.

2. resolved Aug 19, 2026, 08:29 PM UTC

   This event has been resolved.

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Started Aug 19, 2026, 05:02 PM UTC· resolved Aug 19, 2026, 11:30 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 19, 2026, 05:02 PM UTC

   We are investigating increased latency for purging at our Purging, Minneapolis (STP), Ranchi (IXR), Mumbai (QAI), Surat (STV), Ambala (QAV), Ludhiana (QBA), Shimla (QBF), Kochi (QBO), Srinagar-Nahota (QBG), Hyderabad (QBN), Siliguri (IXB), Shillong (SHL), LA - Santa Clara (RHV), LA - West Florida (VNC), LA - Salt Lake City (BTF), LA - Denver (APA), LA - Pompano (PPM), LA - Richmond (RIC), LA - Nashville (BNA), LA - Memphis (MEM), LA - Pittsburgh (PIT), LA - Roseville (STP) Points of Presence (POPs). All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

2. investigating Aug 19, 2026, 10:09 PM UTC

   Our engineers believe they have identified contributing factor causing the issue impacting the Purging, Minneapolis (STP), Ranchi (IXR), Mumbai (QAI), Surat (STV), Ambala (QAV), Ludhiana (QBA), Shimla (QBF), Kochi (QBO), Srinagar-Nahota (QBG), Hyderabad (QBN), Siliguri (IXB), Shillong (SHL), LA - Santa Clara (RHV), LA - West Florida (VNC), LA - Salt Lake City (BTF), LA - Denver (APA), LA - Pompano (PPM), LA - Richmond (RIC), LA - Nashville (BNA), LA - Memphis (MEM), LA - Pittsburgh (PIT), LA - Roseville (STP) status page components. We are now developing a fix, and will post a new update once it has been fully implemented and we see signs of recovery. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

3. investigating Aug 19, 2026, 11:04 PM UTC

   Our engineers have identified an additional contributing factor and are developing an adjusted mitigation strategy to the Purging, Minneapolis (STP), Ranchi (IXR), Mumbai (QAI), Surat (STV), Ambala (QAV), Ludhiana (QBA), Shimla (QBF), Kochi (QBO), Srinagar-Nahota (QBG), Hyderabad (QBN), Siliguri (IXB), Shillong (SHL), LA - Santa Clara (RHV), LA - West Florida (VNC), LA - Salt Lake City (BTF), LA - Denver (APA), LA - Pompano (PPM), LA - Richmond (RIC), LA - Nashville (BNA), LA - Memphis (MEM), LA - Pittsburgh (PIT), LA - Roseville (STP) status page components. All other locations and services are unaffected.

4. monitoring Aug 19, 2026, 11:27 PM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed the impact to the Purging, Minneapolis (STP), Ranchi (IXR), Mumbai (QAI), Surat (STV), Ambala (QAV), Ludhiana (QBA), Shimla (QBF), Kochi (QBO), Srinagar-Nahota (QBG), Hyderabad (QBN), Siliguri (IXB), Shillong (SHL), LA - Santa Clara (RHV), LA - West Florida (VNC), LA - Salt Lake City (BTF), LA - Denver (APA), LA - Pompano (PPM), LA - Richmond (RIC), LA - Nashville (BNA), LA - Memphis (MEM), LA - Pittsburgh (PIT), LA - Roseville (STP) status page components has been mitigated.

5. resolved Aug 19, 2026, 11:30 PM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed that our Minneapolis (STP), Ranchi (IXR), Mumbai (QAI), Surat (STV), Ambala (QAV), Ludhiana (QBA), Shimla (QBF), Kochi (QBO), Srinagar-Nahota (QBG), Hyderabad (QBN), Siliguri (IXB), Shillong (SHL), LA - Santa Clara (RHV), LA - West Florida (VNC), LA - Salt Lake City (BTF), LA - Denver (APA), LA - Pompano (PPM), LA - Richmond (RIC), LA - Nashville (BNA), LA - Memphis (MEM), LA - Pittsburgh (PIT), LA - Roseville (STP) POPs and Purging service has been fully restored. Customers may have experienced delayed cache purge propagation, with some purge requests lost from 17:02 to 23:24 UTC. Customers who purged content during this window should expect that some previously purged content may have been served as stale until the fix was applied. This incident is resolved. Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team. Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2026-08-19 22:07:47 UTC

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Started Aug 19, 2026, 12:15 PM UTC· resolved Aug 26, 2026, 11:39 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 10:33 PM UTC

   We are investigating a small number of requests receiving an empty response body where content is expected. Impact is limited to requests that use Streaming Miss and are eligible for HTTP response revalidation. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

2. investigating Aug 20, 2026, 11:32 PM UTC

   Our engineers believe they have identified contributing factor causing the issue impacting the Content Delivery (CDN) status page component. We are now developing a fix, and will post a new update once it has been fully implemented and we see signs of recovery. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

3. investigating Aug 21, 2026, 12:33 AM UTC

   Our engineers have identified an additional contributing factor and are developing an adjusted mitigation strategy to our Content Delivery (CDN) service. All other locations and services are unaffected.

4. monitoring Aug 21, 2026, 10:19 AM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed the impact to our Content Delivery (CDN) service has been mitigated.

5. monitoring Aug 22, 2026, 03:15 AM UTC

   Fastly Engineering continues to monitor for any unexpected ongoing impact. If your users see empty response bodies after 17:00 PM UTC on August 21, 2026 on services using the streaming miss feature, please contact Fastly Support.

6. resolved Aug 26, 2026, 11:39 PM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed that our Content Delivery (CDN) has been fully restored. Customers may have experienced empty response body where content is expected for requests that used Streaming Miss and were eligible for HTTP response revalidation from 12:15 on August 19 to 00:51 on August 24 UTC. This incident is resolved. Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team. Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2026-08-20 22:34:26 UTC

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Started Aug 13, 2026, 06:01 AM UTC· resolved Aug 13, 2026, 07:12 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 13, 2026, 06:01 AM UTC

   Between 06:01 and 07:12 UTC on August 13, 2026, customers may have experienced disruptions to Next-Gen WAF (NGWAF) telemetry and request logs, via the dashboard or API. Core NGWAF protection and blocking functionality were not affected; this issue was strictly limited to visibility and logging. However, please note that some telemetry and request log data generated during the impact window is unrecoverable. Our engineers have identified the contributing factor and are implementing a permanent fix to prevent recurrence. This incident is now resolved. We apologize for any inconvenience this has caused. For more information regarding this retrospective status post, please reach out to Support at https://support.fastly.com.

2. resolved Aug 13, 2026, 07:12 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 12, 2026, 11:05 AM UTC· resolved Aug 12, 2026, 12:00 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 12, 2026, 11:05 AM UTC

   Fastly Engineers detected a performance impacting event affecting the India region. All other data centers and services were unaffected. The issue has been resolved and we are monitoring performance closely.

2. resolved Aug 12, 2026, 12:00 PM UTC

   We identified an issue affecting connectivity to embedded points of presence (POPs) in India starting at approximately 11:05 UTC on August 12, 2026. During this window, customers in the region may have experienced elevated latency or packet loss. This issue has been resolved as of 12:00 UTC and we have confirmed normal connectivity has resumed. We're continuing to monitor the affected region to confirm full stability. Affected customers may have experienced impact to varying degrees and to a shorter duration than as set forth above.

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Started Aug 10, 2026, 07:50 PM UTC· resolved Aug 10, 2026, 08:09 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 10, 2026, 07:50 PM UTC

   We have identified an issue that caused elevated error rates (HTTP 429/503) and timeouts for Object Storage in the Frankfurt (FRA), Ashburn (IAD) Points of Presence (POP)s. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

2. resolved Aug 10, 2026, 08:09 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Jul 31, 2026, 06:03 AM UTC· resolved Jul 31, 2026, 08:00 AM UTC

1. investigating Jul 31, 2026, 06:03 AM UTC

   We are investigating an issue causing elevated 503 errors and slowness affecting api.fastly.com and manage.fastly.com. Our engineers are actively working to diagnose the contributing factor. We will provide another update as more information becomes available.

2. monitoring Jul 31, 2026, 07:39 AM UTC

   We have observed a recovery of our API and configuration management services (api.fastly.com and manage.fastly.com). Error rates and response times have returned to nominal levels. Our engineers are continuing to monitor the platform closely to ensure stability before we resolve this incident. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

3. resolved Jul 31, 2026, 08:00 AM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed that api.fastly.com and manage.fastly.com have been fully restored. Customers may have experienced possible errors, including elevated 503 responses and slow or failed access, from 06:03 to 07:37 UTC.This incident is resolved. Affected customers may have experienced impact to varying degrees and to a shorter duration than as set forth above. Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team. Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2026-07-31 07:12:55 UTC

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Started Jul 28, 2026, 10:50 AM UTC· resolved Sep 04, 2026, 06:38 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 28, 2026, 10:50 AM UTC

   Traffic in Port Blair (IXZ) has been temporarily rerouted. All other locations and services are unaffected.

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Started Jul 22, 2026, 12:04 AM UTC· resolved Jul 23, 2026, 05:11 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 22, 2026, 12:04 AM UTC

   We are investigating an issue causing connection failures and elevated errors for some customers connecting through our Santa Clara (RHV) Point of Presence (POP). We have rerouted traffic away from this location while our engineers work on mitigation. Customers may experience slightly elevated latency while traffic is served from neighboring POPs. We will provide another update as more information becomes available or within the next hour. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

2. investigating Jul 22, 2026, 02:03 AM UTC

   Traffic remains rerouted away from our Santa Clara (RHV) Point of Presence (POP) while our engineers continue to work on mitigation. Customers may experience slightly elevated latency while traffic is served from neighboring POPs. This POP will remain offline until further notice. We will provide another update once traffic has been restored to this location. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

3. resolved Jul 23, 2026, 05:11 PM UTC

   This event has been resolved.

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Started Jul 21, 2026, 05:49 PM UTC· resolved Jul 21, 2026, 06:09 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 21, 2026, 05:49 PM UTC

   Fastly Engineers detected a performance impacting event affecting our API & Configuration Management. All data centers and services were unaffected. The issue has been resolved and we are monitoring performance closely.

2. resolved Jul 21, 2026, 06:09 PM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed that our API & Configuration Management services has been fully restored. Customers may have experienced delayed or failed Varnish Configuration Language (VCL) deployments and API failures on https://manage.fastly.com/ from 17:49 to 18:09 UTC. This incident is resolved. Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team. Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2026-07-21 18:28:36 UTC

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Started Jul 21, 2026, 05:30 AM UTC· resolved Jul 21, 2026, 09:01 AM UTC

1. investigating Jul 21, 2026, 05:30 AM UTC

   Traffic in St. Louis (STL) has been temporarily rerouted. All other locations and services are unaffected.

2. resolved Jul 21, 2026, 09:01 AM UTC

   This event has been resolved.

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Started Jul 20, 2026, 08:55 PM UTC· resolved Jul 21, 2026, 12:49 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 20, 2026, 08:55 PM UTC

   Traffic in Srinagar-Nahota (QBG) has been temporarily rerouted. All other locations and services are unaffected.

2. resolved Jul 21, 2026, 12:49 PM UTC

   This event has been resolved.

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Started Jul 17, 2026, 07:45 PM UTC· resolved Jul 18, 2026, 12:27 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 17, 2026, 07:45 PM UTC

   We're currently investigating performance issues with our Image Optimization service in Europe. All other services are unaffected.

2. investigating Jul 18, 2026, 12:16 PM UTC

   Our engineers believe they have identified the contributing factor causing the issue impacting our Image Optimizer service. Our engineers are now developing a fix, and we will post a new update once it has been fully implemented and we see signs of recovery. All other products and services remain unaffected by this incident.

3. investigating Jul 18, 2026, 12:23 PM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed the impact to Image Optimization service has been mitigated.

4. resolved Jul 18, 2026, 12:27 PM UTC

   Image Optimization service has been fully restored and is operating normally in all regions. Our engineers identified and resolved the contributing factor. Services are no longer experiencing elevated latency or request queuing. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused. If you continue to experience issues, please contact our support team.

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Started Jul 16, 2026, 12:32 AM UTC· resolved Jul 16, 2026, 12:44 AM UTC

1. investigating Jul 16, 2026, 12:32 AM UTC

   Between 00:32 and 00:44 UTC on July 16, 2026, we experienced an issue with our Historical Stats API and Origin Inspector API. During this time, customers may have experienced failed requests to the Historical Stats API and Origin Inspector API, errors when loading observability dashboards, and alerts that evaluate these metrics may have been delayed or may not have triggered. The issue has been resolved, and all services are operating normally.

2. resolved Jul 16, 2026, 12:44 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Jul 15, 2026, 01:41 AM UTC· resolved Jul 15, 2026, 08:14 AM UTC

1. investigating Jul 15, 2026, 01:41 AM UTC

   We are investigating an issue causing elevated latency (high Time To First Byte (TTFB)) for our Singapore (SIN) Point of Presence (POP). Our engineers have taken steps to reduce the impact and are observing improvement while they continue to investigate the contributing factor. We will provide another update as more information becomes available or within the next hour. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

2. investigating Jul 15, 2026, 02:40 AM UTC

   Our engineers believe they have identified contributing factor causing the issue impacting the Singapore (SIN) status page component. We are now developing a fix, and will post a new update once it has been fully implemented and we see signs of recovery. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

3. monitoring Jul 15, 2026, 02:41 AM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed the impact to Singapore (SIN) POP has been mitigated.

4. resolved Jul 15, 2026, 08:14 AM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed that Singapore (SIN) POP has been fully restored. Customers may have experienced elevated latency from 01:00 to 01:40 UTC. This incident is resolved. Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team. Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2026-07-15 02:17:36 UTC

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Started Jul 07, 2026, 03:55 PM UTC· resolved Jul 07, 2026, 06:08 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 07, 2026, 03:55 PM UTC

   Traffic in Kolkata (CCU) has been temporarily rerouted. All other locations and services are unaffected.

2. investigating Jul 07, 2026, 04:17 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of intermittent latency and errors impacting customers served through the Kolkata (CCU) Point of Presence. Traffic has been rerouted to nearby regions while our engineers investigate. Customers may experience intermittent impact during this time as traffic stabilizes on alternate paths. Our ability to deliver network services on all other locations, and our ability to security services are not affected by this incident. We will provide another update as more information becomes available.

3. investigating Jul 07, 2026, 04:27 PM UTC

   Our engineers believe they have identified contributing factor causing the issue impacting the Kolkata (CCU) status page component. We are now developing a fix, and will post a new update once it has been fully implemented and we see signs of recovery. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

4. resolved Jul 07, 2026, 06:08 PM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed that the Kolkata (CCU) Point of Presence has been fully restored. Customers may have experienced intermittent latency and errors from 15:55 to 16:08 UTC. This incident is resolved. Affected customers may have experienced impact to varying degrees and to a shorter duration than as set forth above. Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2026-07-07 16:08:51 UTC

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Started Jul 02, 2026, 06:34 PM UTC· resolved Jul 02, 2026, 07:38 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 02, 2026, 06:34 PM UTC

   We are investigating elevated errors with Compute at our Palo Alto (PAO) Point of Presence (POP). All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

2. investigating Jul 02, 2026, 07:16 PM UTC

   Our engineers believe they have identified contributing factor causing the issue impacting our Palo Alto (PAO) POP. We are now developing a fix, and will post a new update once it has been fully implemented and we see signs of recovery. All other products and services are unaffected by this incident.

3. monitoring Jul 02, 2026, 07:28 PM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed the impact to our Palo Alto (PAO) POP has been mitigated.

4. resolved Jul 02, 2026, 07:38 PM UTC

   Engineering has confirmed that our Palo Alto (PAO) POP has been fully restored. Customers may have experienced elevated errors and increased latency from 18:34 to 19:12 UTC. This incident is resolved. Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team. Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2026-07-02 18:53:40 UTC

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