Dstny experienced a notice incident on October 20, 2025, lasting 23h 31m. The incident has been resolved; the full update timeline is below.
Update timeline
- monitoring Oct 20, 2025, 10:00 AM UTC
Our Platform team has identified the root cause of the issue and implemented corrective measures to restore application services. We will continue to monitor service availability over the next 24 hours, and at this time, we do not anticipate any further impact. Thank you for your patience. Dstny Support
- resolved Oct 21, 2025, 09:31 AM UTC
We are pleased to confirm that this incident has now been fully resolved. Over the past 24 hours, we have closely monitored the situation and observed no recurrence or further impact. We have identified the root cause and implemented measures to prevent future occurrences. To provide transparency and insight into the incident, a detailed post-incident report will be made available within the next five working days. We sincerely apologise for any inconvenience this may have caused and thank you for your patience and understanding throughout the incident. If you have any further questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact our support team. Kind regards, Dstny Support
- postmortem Nov 03, 2025, 05:09 PM UTC
**Major Incident Category** Service Degradation **Post Mortem Owner** Jonathan Goodier **Date Post Mortem Completed \(UTC\)** 27th Oct 2025, 11:40 **Incident Summary** On 20th October 2025, between 06:50 and 09:51 UTC, users in the SE Legacy region experienced access issues when attempting to use the SMP Legacy platform. The disruption was caused by certificate errors, which prevented successful connections to the service. The issue was initially reported through support channels and confirmed by internal monitoring and additional user reports. The incident was escalated and declared a major event for investigation and resolution. **Root Cause** The incident was caused by the failure of a multi-name security certificate to renew. This occurred because a DNS record required for the renewal process had been removed. The legacy system configuration; originally designed for a smaller customer base, allowed DNS changes without safeguards, introducing vulnerabilities in certificate management. This setup was not suited to the current scale and complexity of the environment. **Incident Resolution** Resolution involved reviewing all DNS records associated with the affected certificate to ensure they correctly pointed to the certificate authorisation endpoint. Approximately 10–15 entries were verified, and incorrect or missing records were identified and corrected. Services were then restarted to trigger renewal of the failed certificate, successfully restoring access to the SMP Legacy platform. **Mitigative Actions** * Deprecation of legacy Tools Portal and API associated with SMP Legacy * Redesign of certificate management processes to eliminate reliance on multi-name certificates * Implementation of safeguards to prevent DNS changes from impacting certificate renewals * Enhanced monitoring and alerting for certificate expiry and DNS integrity